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ABSTRACT	
  
MEDIATION IN LITERACY: LANGUAGE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MODALITY
Hem Paudel
July 28, 2015
The issue of difference in writing, both in terms of language diversity and
modalities, has received increasing attention in the context of new developments in
technologies, increasing global migration, and intensified intersections of cultural and
linguistic practices accompanying these changes. Theories of language and modality are
trying separately to develop ways to best respond to the challenges and opportunities
brought about by these changes. Responding to scholars’ recent calls for bridging the gap
between studies of multilingualism and those of multimodality, this dissertation offers an
approach that, instead of separating the study of modality and languages, questions such a
tendency to not only create dichotomies between these two, but also to assume the
stability and discrete character of various modes and languages. I argue that dominant,
additive models of multimodality and multilingualism deemphasize understandings of
languages, modalities, and technologies as material social practices in a complex
communicative ecology, thereby implying what Brian Street calls “an autonomous”
model of multimodality and multilingualism. Going beyond the abstract notions of
language and modality as stable and discrete, this dissertation urges us to see the
material-social practice of language as always already multimodal, while also being part
of the ecology of multimodal semiotic practices.
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This dissertation has been divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces
issues of multilingualism and multimodality and provides a brief theoretical background
to analyze dominant assumptions about language and modality. Chapter Two interrogates
social theories of agency and mediation, both humanist and anti-humanist and develops
an alternative understanding of mediation based on cultural materialist theories of
practice and new materialism. I discuss how theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and
Pennycook help us see seemingly isolated acts as parts of a nexus of sedimented
practices, whereas Latour’s call to pay attention to non-human agents and mediation as
translation makes us see how durability and change in practices do not depend only on
human agents and social structures, but equally on the “missing masses.” Chapter Three
and Chapter Four take up the theoretical insights from the previous chapters, arguing that
major theories of multilingualism and multimodality retain some residues of
monolingualism and monomodality either in assuming the discrete and stable character of
languages and modes or in assuming individual users as stable and free-floating agents.
In an attempt to overcome these monolingualist and monomodalist tendencies, these two
chapters call for paying attention to the full panoply of (f)actors affecting semiotic
negotiations of our students rather than romanticizing the agency of users in an attempt to
debunk monolinugualist/monomodalist ideology. Chapter Five develops an alternative,
integrated way of viewing translingual and transmodal relations. This chapter ends with a
demonstration of how shifting our theoretical orientation challenges not only the norm of
existing pedagogical practices of segregating codes (linguistic or other semiotic), but also
revises some of the multilingual and multimodal pedagogies advocated in recent studies.
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CHAPTER 1
STUDIES OF LANGUAGE RELATIONS AND MODALITY: AN INTRODUCTION

Even though the word “composition” is a bit too long and windy, what is nice is that it underlines that
things have to be put together (Latin componere) while retaining their heterogeneity. Also, it is connected
with composure; it has clear roots in art, painting, music, theatre, dance, and thus is associated with
choreography and scenography; it is not too far from “compromise” and “compromising,” retaining a
certain diplomatic and prudential flavor. Speaking of flavor, it carries with it the pungent but ecologically
correct smell of “compost,” itself due to the active “de-composition” of many invisible agents. (Latour,
“Attempts” 473-74)

We are witnessing an increasingly diverse landscape of writing with the
developments of new forms of communication technologies, intersections of people
across cultural and geo-political borders, and increasing exchanges of ideas, symbols, and
linguistic practices. As a result, the world, as Arjun Appadurai, Walter Mignolo, and
Immanuel Wallerstein argue, does not remain as pockets of discrete, homogeneous
cultures and values. Rather, every aspect of our culture is becoming more and more
unstable, fluid, and interdependent. Such cultural changes and the new developments in
media technologies have made a significant impact on how we communicate within and
across cultures, and what resources are available for transmodal, transcultural, and
translingual practices and how those resources mediate and are mediated by existing
practices. Writing theories and pedagogical approaches have started responding to such
existing and emerging situations, semiotic practices, and their representations, especially
in terms of two major phenomena: the effects and roles of the rise of digital technologies
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and the increasing traffic of languages and semiotic practices accompanying and
contributed by those new developments in technologies. In this emerging context, several
writing and communication scholars such as Kathleen Blake Yancey, Gunther Kress, and
Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis have called us to rethink about what
writing/communication is and how we can “develop new models of writing” (Yancey 1).
The possibility and ease with which large number of people can produce, distribute, and
use writings, tapping into multisemiotic and multilingual resources, makes us rethink
how we view the notion of writing, technology and its relation to writing, and what role
language relations play into that web of interactions.
However, the dominant conception of composition and pedagogical approaches to
it are still limited to what Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge call SL/MN ideology
(Single/Standard Language and Modality). In other words, despite various attempts at
exposing the problematic assumptions about language and modality, composition
teaching largely remains dictated by monolingual and monomodal ideologies,
considering “Standard Edited English” as the only language appropriate for formal,
academic writing and writing as the only mode appropriate for serious thought in
composition (see Diana George, “Visual” and Selfe, “Aurality”). Such narrow
conceptualizations of language and modality have severely affected many students,
especially those from linguistic, racial, ethnic, and cultural minority backgrounds.
Actually, these limited and often problematic conceptualizations about language and
modality also affect mainstream students as they need to navigate through diverse
linguistic practices in everyday practice.
As a response to the dominance of SL/MN ideology and the massive diversity in
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writing practices, both inside the academy and beyond, in recent times, our discipline has
paid a lot of attention to the potential effects of these new developments on writing and
communication. In fields like applied linguistics and writing studies, scholars like
Alastair Pennycook, Claire Kramsch, Suresh Canagarajah, Bruce Horner, and Christiane
Donahue, among many others, have called for a multilingual (plurilingual/translingual)
approach to language difference in this new context. Similarly, in new media studies,
scholars like Gunther Kress, Cynthia Selfe, and Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis, have
called for a multimodal/multiliteracies approach to writing and communication to better
understand how the nature of communication has changed due to the emergence of new
forms of writing in digital spaces, leading to changed roles of writers, readers, and texts.
However, as Bruce Horner, Cynthia Selfe, and Timothy Lockridge rightly claim, “despite
their common points of origination, discussions of modality have remained largely
separate from discussions of translingulaity, to the impoverishment of both.” In other
words, the major concern of multimodal and multilingual studies have been largely
similar, calling for the recognition and promotion of language practices and modalities
different from ‘Standard’ Edited American English (or British English) and the mode of
writing in theorizing and teaching of composition. But, as they claim, there have been
very few attempts at bridging that gap and exploring intersections, overlaps, and
divergences between the two so that they can interanimate and enrich each other. In
composition and literacy scholarship, only a few studies have started looking at these two
phenomena together, examining the intersections of translingual and multimodal
practices (See Michael Apple and Steven Fraiberg). Furthermore, this area still needs to
be explored more as most of the existing studies are often limited in their interpretation
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and understanding of language practices and modalities due to their assumptions about
languages and modalities as discrete and stable and the mediation of such practices
theorized largely in terms of broader abstracted notions associated with economy, culture,
or ideologies, rather than looking at what practice theory1 scholars and new materialists
like Anthony Giddens, Alastair Pennycook, and Bruno Latour would call the “practices”
themselves in their material social ecology.
In other words, while offering alternative perspectives or advocating for
alternative modalities and language practices, we tend to leave the problematic
conceptualizations uninterrogated, often unwittingly accepting the terms of value of
modes and languages that dominant understanding assigns them. Similarly, in most of the
theorizations of language and modality, the theory of mediation remains largely limited,
often understood in terms of determination, whether it is by what we call the “social,”
“human” agency, or the materiality of the technologies, or taken in various combinations,
including the notion of overdetermination. It is important to see people’s use of
technologies (including languages) as being shaped by and also shaping not only the
larger social contexts like geopolitical relations, but also the seemingly insignificant
material ecology beyond the “social,” taking mediation as such as translation and
transformation of the assumed affordances and goals of such technologies, thereby
transforming the users themselves. Therefore, in this project, I’ll particularly focus on 1)
how mediation works in the intersection between new forms of technologies and
translingual practices, 2) what a user’s communicative practices tell us about material
1

Pierre Bourdieu and Alastair Pennycook self-identify themselves as theorists of practice whereas
Raymond Williams and Anthony Giddens do not. Following Theodore R. Schatzki’s definition of practices
as “embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity,” mediating agency and structure, I include
social theorists like Williams and Giddens under practice theory for their rejection of agency/structure
dualism and their focus on human activities and processes as units of social analysis.
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social resources and constraints enabling or/and restricting translingual and transmodal
potentials, and 3) what implication our understanding of such practices can have on how
we teach composition inside our college classrooms.
A Brief Literature Review: Language Relations and Multimodality
We have seen two major approaches in analyzing texts in this newly emerging
context: multimodal and multilingual/translingual2. A typical multimodal approach would
often focus on the increased agency of the writer due to the affordances of multiple
modes and the participatory nature of digital tools (see Cope and Kalantzis; Kress).
Similarly, a typical multilingual approach highlights the metalinguistic awareness of the
writer and her multilingual competence in “shuttling” across discourses (see Jessner;
Moore and Gajo; Canagarajah and other plurilingual theorists). Some recent writings that
have started blending multimodal and multilingual scholarship (see Freiberg; Apple;
Athon) often emphasize the affordances of new technologies and multimodality to
promote multilingual activities. These scholars have examined the issue of difference
both in language and modality studies. They have shown how allowing languages other
than “standard” English and modes other than print in writing practices can empower not
only minority students of different types but also those from dominant cultures (see
Canagarajah; Selfe; Wysocki; etc.). These scholars have cautioned us towards the
possible consequences of myopic notions of language standards and marginalization of
modes of expression and representations other than print/writing. As a result, we now see

2

There definitely are several others that talk about technology and writing. But, I’m particularly focusing
on those that analyze composing practices in terms of differences pertaining to language variety and
modalities.
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an increased focus on these issues in scholarship (journal publications, scholarly books,
awards, conferences, etc) and pedagogical theories and practices.
Studies of Language Relations
Despite continuous transformations of languages, including English(es) due to the
intersections of language practices, English monolinguality is still dominant within the
academy and beyond, not only in the US, but all across the world. It is the tendency to
abstract languages from their lived practices and their history and to assign them fixed
and stable character. In the context of the increasing diversity in language practices and
the persistence of monolingual beliefs, the issue of language difference has been
extensively discussed in sociolinguistics and in composition studies.
Most of the early language theories in Applied Linguistics, from which
Composition has drawn several insights, ignore how individual language activities are
often mediated by, and therefore transformed by, the micro-macro contexts, while,
simultaneously also transforming those contexts. As Alastair Pennycook says in his
article “English as a Language Always in Translation” and his recent book Language as a
Local Practice, many language approaches, such as, World Englishes, English as a
Lingua Franca, and Language Fortification, retain the tendency of taking languages as
discrete and stable entities, highlighting how new forms and structures have emerged in
localized varieties (see Braj Kachru’s Asian Englishes; Yamuna Kachru and Cecil
Nelson’s World Englishes), or proposing to develop a common core of English language
across all varieties (see Jennifer Jenkins’ Phonology of Language; Andy Kirkpatrick’s
“Which Model of English”; Barbara Seidlhofar’s “English as Lingua Franca”), or
defending national language against the hegemonic influence of English (see Phillipson’s
6

English Only Europe and “English for Globalization”, and Joseph and Ramani’s “English
in the World.”)3. As Suresh Canagarajah, in “Plurilingual Tradition,” Pennycook in
“Translation,” and Kramsch in “Privilege” argue, they seem to ignore the fact that
languages and cultures transform and are transformed by their interactions with other
language practices due to various factors associated with language, including rhetorical
and epistemological diversities. Similarly, while focusing on structural differences, they
also ignore the role of individual practices in transforming language structures. Thus,
they retain the traditional tendency of viewing languages as primarily governed by
preexisting system or structures, thereby retaining the assumption about language fixity
even when talking about language diversity.
Even the dominant notion of multilingualism suffers from the same problem.
Though the dominant model of multilingualism, unlike monolingualism, does
acknowledge the importance of different languages and cultures, in many cases, the
general understanding of multilingualism is used to refer to separate competencies in two
or more languages, as Canagarajah, Monica Heller, Pennycook, and Claire Kramsch,
along with many other French, European and Asian plurilingual scholars, such as Moore
and Gajo and Lachman Khubchandani, have said. In other words, languages are taken as
discrete systems where the “the ultimate goal for language learning was to become, feel,
and speak like an idealized native speaker” (Moore and Gajo 139). Hence, bilingualism
and multilingualism become nothing more than the pluralization of monoligualism
(Pennycook, LLP 10). Thus, the dominant notion of multilingualism, ignoring mediations

3

Similar critique can be found in Bruce Horner and Min-Zhan Lu’s “Resisting monolingualism in
‘English’: reading and writing the politics of language.” Here, they argue that in all the three existing
models—eradicationist, accomodationist, and SLA—they retain monolingual tradition of taking languages
as separate and fixed.
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across languages, adopts the same logic of instrumentalism as monolingualism, taking
language as a set of decontextualized skills to fulfill certain ends. Therefore, this
numerical version of multilingualism/bilingualism retains the dominant tendency to view
languages as discrete and formal systems. In other words, additive multilingualism
ignores the inevitability of “traffic” within, amongst, and between the artificial
ideological boundaries separating languages, cultures and peoples.
In order to avoid monolingual assumptions of the traditional version of
multilingualism, many linguistics such as Daniel Coste and Diana-Lee Simon, and
Danièle Moore replace multilingualism with the notion of plurilingualism, where they
argue that “the language competence of bilinguals should not be regarded as the simple
sum of two monolingual competences, but should rather be appreciated in conjunction
with the user’s repertoire of total linguistic resources” (Moore and Gajo 139). In contrast
to an additive model of multilingualism where multilingualism merely means two or
more separate monolingualisms, plurilingualism “allows for the interaction and mutual
influence of the language in a more dynamic way (Canagarajah “Multilingual Strategies”,
7). The plurilinguals take the difference built into the linguistic habitus as resources.
However, with its overemphasis on resources, in an attempt to counter monolingual
hegemony, this approach “concentrates on the individual rather than the community as its
angle of vision” (Moore and Gajo 141) and places more emphasis on the individual as a
“social actor, with agency and choice” (150).
Their static view of resources, their focus on individual choice and purpose, and
their emphasis on metalinguistic awareness go quite well with their human-centric view
of agency where agency is taken as the capacity to employ resources with deliberate
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intention and an understanding of kairotic moment (static notion of context). Such a
tendency of locating competence in individuals and identifying some individuals as
specifically “translinguals” illustrates the tendency of taking language away from practice
as understood in a broader perspective of material ecology. The tendency to advocate
code-meshing as a special ability of some multilinguals/translinguals, that is, the
tendency of fetishizing specific strategies, abstracts language from everyday practice. It
seems that plurilingual theorists’ concern to debunk monolingualist ideology risks
making code-meshing/shuttling between languages a specific competence for
multilingual speakers, a competence that multilingual speakers need and want to
transform and hone all the time.4
Technology, Writing, and Multimodality
English composition started discussing the role of digital technology in writing
practices since the 1980s. With the developments in communication technologies and the
need for people to communicate across culturs and geopolitical locations, increasing
number of people have started producing texts combining a variety of modes. As a result,
composing practices are becoming increasingly transmodal/multimodal. However, the
dominant ideology within the academy and beyond is still monomodal. Similarly, an
instrumentalist understanding is equally dominant, downplaying human aspects of
technology: “Although institutions are investing in technology infrastructure and support
at an astonishing rate… these investments are often driven by logics that fail to make
4

Even as Canagarajah critiques the Chomskian model of natural competence, he seems to have fallen
victim to a similar model by assuming the expertise of multilingual speakers as a natural competence to be
“honed by actual interaction.” It is quite different to think of a language repertoire as resources for
multilingual speakers to tap into in confronting difficult communicative situations and to think of it as part
of a natural competence applicable to all situations.
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humanistic perspectives a central concern” (Selber 1). Monomodal ideology and
instrumental views in a way go together with an ahistorical and asocial view of
technology and modes.
To counter an instrumental view of technology and monomodal belief of literacy,
scholars have developed critical (postcritical) and multimodal/multiliteracies approaches
to composing practices. As Selfe and Selfe and Stuart Selber contend, an instrumentalist
perspective, while eulogizing the “democratic” potential of technology, which Hawisher
and Selfe call “rhetoric of technology,” ignores how it is embeded in social and
ideological belief systems and can perpetuate and support “monoculturalism, capitalism,
and pathologic thinking” (Selfe and Selfe 486). Instead, these scholars take technologies
as “cultural artifacts embodying society’s values” (Hawisher and Selfe, “Rhetoric of
Technology” 55).
Similar to Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, Christina Haas, in her book
Writing Technology and many other articles, also critiques instrumentalist and
deterministic views of technology and contends: “An instrumentalist view of technology
carries with it all the dangers of an autonomous theory of language” (21). Haas equates
autonomous/apolitical views of language with instrumentalist views of technology.
To question and go beyond instrumentalist views of technology, these cultural
critics of technology often emphasize the role of a “critical perspective” or “critical
reflection” (see Hawisher and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe) or “metacognition” (see Cope
and Kalantzis) in order to demystify the ideological nature of computer interfaces and
technological designs.
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The problems of instrumental view of technology raised by critical literacy
theorists are very real and significant. That taking technology merely as a neutral tool that
in itself can liberate us can, as Cynthia Selfe says, “actually contribute to the ongoing
problems of racism, sexism, poverty, and illiteracy” (referenced in Selber 12). However,
taking technology as cultural artifacts embodying dominant ideological values without
attending to how those dominant values are produced and reproduced, thereby
transforming them, both by human and non-human agents, falls into the trap of another
form of determinism, as practice theorists and Latour point out.
There is another, perhaps equally influential, and in many ways quite similar,
tendency in computer and composition scholarship that critiques the ideology of
monomodality and advocates the promotion of multimodal literacy/multiliteracies (see
The New London Group; Kress and Van Leeuwen; Kress; Selfe; etc.). Gunther Kress,
whose ideas have massive influence in discussions of digital literacy practices in
composition, has developed a sophisticated theory of multimodality and calls for a “turn
to the visual” (see “English in the Crossroad”). His major focus on multimodal literacy
lies in his notion of distinct affordances of different modes depending on their internal
materialities:
One of the present tasks of a social semiotic approach to multimodality is
to describe the potentials and limitations for meaning which inhere [italics
mine] in different modes. For that, it is essential to consider the materiality
of modes. Speech uses the material of (human) sound; writing uses the
material of graphic substance. There are things you can do with sound that
you cannot do with graphic substance, either easily or at all; not even
imitate all that successfully graphically. (“Reading Images” 112)
In other words, according to Kress, writing and image have their own unique affordances,
and since our culture is becoming more and more visually dominated due to the rise of
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digital technologies, it is necessary for us to think about what specific goals these
different modes can accomplish better than the dominant mode of writing. In
distinguishing print literacy from visual literacy, Kress and Theo van Leeuwen even go as
far as developing a “grammar of visual design,” echoing the structuralist notion of
language.
Similar to Kress, many other scholars like Diana George, Cynthia Selfe, and Bill
Cope and Kalantzis emphasize encouraging and allowing students to use various modes
in addition to writing. We can find a similar additive logic in Cope and Kalantzis’s notion
that multimodality gives more agency and freedom to users as more modes offer greater
potentials.
Despite greater potential of helping many students who practice alternative
literacies, this dominant understanding of modality (and multimodality) risks iterating
what Brian Street calls “autonomous model of multimodality,” taking modes as fixed and
stable and assigning specific affordances to specific modes (“Future of ‘Social
Literacies’” 32). Such a perspective abstracts one feature from a mode, for instance,
spoken language, leaving out the ways in which, e.g., facial expressions and gestures, and
the social positioning of the speakers/listeners, contribute to the meaning of the speech.
Both in critical literacy and multimodal literacies, mode is taken as discrete and
stable. When we argue for an addition to or replacement of one mode by the other, we
tend to accept the value attached to the mode by dominant beliefs, e.g., writing with
linear argument or with verbal mode, while, in reality, it does have many dimensions and
possibilities depending on the dispositions of the users and the material ecology. While a
materialist focus on multimodal theory reifies modes from practices, critical literacy
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reifies technology from practices by taking them as the by-product of dominant
ideologies.
Both the theories of modality and that of language relations show some
fundamental problems that are closely linked with mediation and agency. This
dissertation will develop an alternative understanding of mediation based on cultural
materialist theories and new materialist understandings of mediation. The insights from
these theories will help us address the problems in theories of language relations and
multimodality.
Theoretical Background
The notion of mediation, as it is defined in recent philosophical accounts and
social theories, undercuts the idea of reflection, the correspondence theory of language,
or instrumentalist notions of technology/techniques. Among the theories that question
functionalist, structuralist, and positivist notions of language, technology, and reality, I
find practice theory(ies) particularly useful in describing the nature of mediation of
human actions, including our writing practices. Therefore, I’ll here briefly discuss some
important ideas from practice theory scholars like Raymond Williams, Pierre Bourdieu,
Anthony Giddens, and Alastair Pennycook. I will also discuss Bruno Latour’s actor
network theory and ecopsychological theories of affordances to expand a practice theory
notion of mediation and to incorporate material ecology into the equation. In other words,
the new materialism of Latour and ecological theories of affordances can complement the
theorization of micro-macro relations in practice theory. This theorization of mediation
will help me offer an alternative way to rethink the relationships between language and
technology in our current situation, which will redirect our attention to various social13

materiality of translingual and transmodal practices and linguistic and technological
aspects of our writing practices.
Cultural Materialist Theory of Practice
Raymond Williams both extends and critiques the materialist5 understanding of
orthodox Marxism. His major contribution lies in his rejection of abstraction and
reductionism in both vulgar Marxism and other positivist theories of language and reality.
He replaces the notion of reflection (whether used in Marxism or in realist/naturalist
accounts) with mediation, drawing our attention from a static notion of reality to the
dynamic relationship between human actions and socio-material processes. For him,
mediation is an “active and substantial process,” and therefore, less abstracted than the
idea of “reflection” (Marxism and Literature 99). Mediation, as such, transforms both
social conditions and human actors. Another important concept that Williams
complicates regarding mediation is determination, in a line similar to his critique of the
notion of reflection.
He critiques the reductionism of orthodox Marxist ideas of determination where
every human activity is a “direct or indirect expression of some preceding and controlling
economic content” ( Marxism and Literature 83) by redefining determination as “setting
of limits” and “the exertion of pressures” (87). In other words, he takes determination
also as enabling actions, thereby taking human “act of will and purpose” into account.
However, such acts and purposes are limited by the existing and emerging socio-material
conditions.
5

Here, I’m using the term materialist to refer to the Marxist focus on economic aspects of reality and their
reversal of the relationship between mind and matter, ideas and socio-economic reality.
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Social theorists Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens expand Raymond
Williams’ critique of positivist theories of language and reality and his focus on “the
material life processes as human activity,” as well as Williams’ rejection of reductioinist
orthodox Marxist notion of determination (96). In their case, their theories come as a
response to the humanist notions of agency and the structuralist and poststructuralist
emphasis on structural and discursive power. They focus on the dynamic interplay
between agency and structure, where individual actions and social structures mutually
presuppose, form, and transform each other.
Bourdieu questions the binary between subjectivism and objectivism, both the
theories that “treat practice as mechanical reaction, directly determined by the antecedent
conditions” and those that characterize practice as the product of “the conscious and
deliberate intentions of their authors” (OTP 73) by redefining the relations between
agency and structure through his notion of habitus: “The structures constitutive of a
particular type of environment . . . produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures….”
(OTP 72). His definition shows that habitus is largely stable or durable; it is structured by
and, at the same time, structures the social practices. Furthermore, it does not presuppose
deliberate intention of the actors.
Bourdieu introduces his notion of capital and field to further connect the
individual with the social and to characterize the nature of social practices. These
practices, in Bourdieu, are reproduced (and transformed) through the interplay between
habitus, objective social structures of the fields, and individuals’ access to the various
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kinds of capital. What I found important in his practice theory is his emphasis on the
embodied nature of beliefs and his consideration of spatial and temporal dimensions of
practices. Similarly, his notion of habitus provides some insight into understanding the
durability of dispositions about linguistic and other semiotic practices.
Anthony Giddens, similar to Bourdieu, critiques functionalists and structuralists
for their overemphasis on objective structures at the cost of individual agents. His
replacement of structure with the notion of structuration, which proposes the notion of
“duality of structure,” helps him counter structuralist determinism: “the structural
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they
recursively organize” (Constitution of Society 25). Similar to Williams, he emphasizes
process rather than stable state and views individuals as knowledgeable actors, though
such knowledge and reflexivity largely remain within the structural properties of a
system, thereby taking part in the reproduction of the system.
As in Bourdieu, in Giddens too, the possibilities for transformations are shown to
be minimal, only, during special circumstances such as conflict or breakdown or the
incompatibilities between interdependent systems of practices. At the micro level,
Giddens sees possible transformations due to the unexpected effects of material
conditions. Similarly, the tensions between interconnected practices can produce
disjuncture and fissures in structural principles, with a potential to bring about large
systemic changes.
Both Bourdieu and Giddens seem to have developed their theories with reference
to more or less closed societies. Therefore, critics like Michel de Certeau and Arjun
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Appadurai critique Bourdieu’s habitus and Giddens’ structuration. For de Certeau, the
practice theories of Bourdieu and Giddens, similar to Foucault’s theory of discourse, fail
to see the possibilities of micro tactics of resistance. Arjun Appadurai also found theories
of habitus and structuration problematic, especially in the context of the flow of semiotic
resources, cultural texts, symbols, and people in a globalized context that “move[s] the
glacial forces of habitus into the quickened beat of improvisations for large groups of
people” (Appadurai 6). However, we should be very aware that diversifications in
practices and improvisations in human activities do not necessarily mean equally
diversifying and transforming experiences in one’s habituses. Therefore, despite being
partly problematic, Bourdieu and Giddens’ notions of habitus and structuration still
provide us important insights into the durability of beliefs despite transformations in
practices.
Alastair Pennycook can be taken as an extension of the practice theories of
Bourdieu and Giddens to the field of sociolinguistics with special attention to the
processes of globalization. For him, language is a local practice where practice means
the “meso-political space” “between the local and the global” (Language as a Local
Practice 23). His major contribution lies in his theorization of agency in terms of
relocalization of language use by individual agents where language becomes a
“sedimented discourse” (46). His idea of language as a sedimented discourse and his
notion that every repetition is different, or, in his words, “repetition is an act of
difference” (36) helps us redefine creativity not merely in terms of deliberate acts of
deviation from norms, but as a result of everyday acts of relocalization of language
practices. Therefore, Pennycook helps us see language practices not as micro acts or the
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results of macro forces, but as an activity mediating these two on a mesopolitical level.
Similarly, it also helps us see creative language acts beyond abstracted notions of codemeshing or code mixing, in everyday language practice.
New Materialist Theory of Bruno Latour
Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook challenge humanism and structuralism,
questioning the idea that either one of them determines the other. Bruno Latour can be
taken as extending this trend by adding in the role of things/techniques/technology, or
what he calls “missing masses,” in shaping our actions (see “Missing Masses), thereby
redefining the notion of the social. Second, he contributes to practice theory by replacing
determination with translation (see“Technical Mediation”).
Latour rejects the notion of the social as stable and homogeneous and redefines it
as an assembly, collective, or a network of associations, thereby urging us to recognize
the heterogeneities within what we often call social, whether in sociolinguistic, socioeconomics, socio-cultural, etc:
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists,
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics,
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on
the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology,
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5)
So, despite Latour rejecting practice theory, he does extend and complement the practice
theory notion of the social as the interplay between the individual and structure, but by
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showing that structure actually is just an assembly of a heterogeneous mix of humans and
non-human agents, contributing to the mediation of what we call social practices.
Similarly, in his accounts of mediation, he rejects materialist6, humanist, and
social determinisms, and takes mediation as translation, that is, transformation of the
goals of our actions in a complex ecology of human and non-human mediators. The full
force of his theory comes with the combination of these two tenets, his redefinition of the
social and his replacement of determination with translation. This can be seen in his
description of his new materialist theory with what he calls ANT, but which, for him,
suggests, not so much actor network theory, but more as an ant, ant in its slow, laborious,
muddy walk, exploring the every traces of the agents, both obvious and missing, rather
than a “bird’s eye view” of the social where we take account of larger social aspects like
political history or economic condition.
Eco-Psychological Theory of Affordances
While talking about technology and languages, many multimodal theorists as well
as some language researchers have used the notion of affordances. But as I’ll show later,
almost all of them use it in what Latour calls a materialist way, i.e., taking affordances as
properties of the objects/environment (in our case, modes/technologies/languages). I find
it useful to draw from eco-psychological theories that have extensively discussed the
notion of affordances to relate the notion of affordances to technologies, including
languages.

6

Here, materialist refers to the tendency of assigning the agency behind any change solely to the
materiality of technique or tool. It is different from cultural materialism where material expands to include
socio-economic conditions shaping cultural practices.
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Gibson was the first theorist who defined affordances. He defined affordances of
an environment as “what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for
good or ill. . . . I mean by it something that refers to both the environment and the animal
in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the
environment” (127). Gibson’s definition accounts for the animal-relative nature of the
affordances of the environment. With a slight revision, later eco-psychologists such as T.
Stoffregen regard affordances as “emergent” dispositional properties of an animalenvironment system: “I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment
system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the
environment or the animal” (Stofferegen 115).
Anthony Chemero slightly advances Stofferegen’s definition of affordances by
rejecting his notion of affordances as property. Chemero asserts: “I argue that affordances
are not properties of the environment; indeed, they are not even properties. Affordances, I
argue, are relations between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects of
situations” (184). He further says that “affordances are features of the whole situations”
(185). Though Stofferegen’s and Chemero’s definitions seem quite similar in that both
assume affordances as emergent and both reject it to be a property of any single
component in animal-environment unit. However, Chemero’s use of the term “features,”
rather than “properties,” his notion of affordances as relations, and his use of the term
“situations” in place of a “system” mark a clear break from Stofferegen’s view. Though
Chemero does not clearly state that he includes factors other than animal and
environment in what he calls situations, we can extend it to mean not only the perceiver
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and the object or the environment, but also their relationships with other things both
physically present and absent in the situations.
Here, the point that I’m trying to highlight is that affordances are not the inherent
properties of an object or the environment. First, it is relative to the perceiver, especially
in terms of what Bourdieu would call habitus that tells her to take the object/environment
as something, not something else, thereby also co-constituting the individual observer
herself. Second, it depends on the whole situation, where it includes not only the object
(mode, medium, etc.) and the perceiver (readers/viewers), but also the overall situation
where the action or the perception takes place. From this point of view, affordances of
images or words depend not only on the features of them, but also on the relations of
them with other objects/things around them and the viewer/reader. As it is relative to the
audience/readers/viewers, the affordance of something can be quite different at various
situations. It often depends on the dispositions of the perceiver, his/her habitus that
comes from the sedimentation of his reading and writing patterns.
Problem Area
From the brief review of literature on multimodal literacies and
multilingual/plurilingual approaches, we can see that literacy studies is also moving in a
direction quite similar to language studies, whether in applied linguistics or in
composition: they both question hierarchization of languages or modes and highlight the
importance of seeing our students as “designers” and critics of meaning making rather
than mere imitators of conventions. However, while critiquing the dominant ideologies,
many multimodal and multilingual studies often ignore the constructed nature of modes
and languages. Similarly, in both multilingual and multimodal accounts, we still seem to
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adopt an additive model, focusing on “multiple” rather than exploring the transactions
across various modes, as we have started seeing in translingual studies. Such additive
models, as Yasemin Yildiz contends about the postmonolingual condition, unwittingly
perpetuate monolingual and monomodal beliefs despite their attempts to resist such
ideologies. The central question then is: how can we overcome such problematic
characterizations of linguistic and other semiotic practices?
Similarly, as composition is and has become more and more interdisciplinary, we
may need to explore more what we can learn from the insights from both
multimodal/transmodal studies and multilingual/translingual studies. The exigency of
such research and practice is becoming more prominent in the context of the rising
interactions across languages not only in writing and speech but also in various modes.
Similarly, the WPA outcome statement’s focus on encouraging use of different modes
and the Council of Europe’s explicit policy of plurilingualism also mark the importance
of this kind of research in our field. In exploring the issues of multimodality and
multilingualism, instead of separating the study of language from that of modality, or
vice versa, it is important to study them as aspects of the same writing/communication
ecology, examining the transactions across various modes and/or languages and
translations of meanings. Similarly, it is also equally important to examine why certain
modes/languages are associated with specific functions/purposes (writing with verbal or
visual or temporal; images as visual as opposed to verbal, etc) and how we could also
encourage alternative potentials of those modalities.7

7

I’m using modality and language as separate only as they have been used that way. But in reality,
language has several modal dimensions, while, at the same time, it is part of the multimodal
communication practices.
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Towards that direction, I attempt to bridge the gap between discussions of
multimodality and multilingualism/translingualism in composition scholarship by
examining multilingual and multimodal relations and theorizing them in terms of
mediation in general and socio-technical mediation in particular. The project involves a
selective study and critique of the ways in which multimodality and language relations
have been discussed and theorized in composition and other allied fields. Based on my
reading of the literature, I argue that the current body of literature on multimodality rests
on a few problematic assumptions: a) modes/technologies/languages have some inherent
affordances, b) they are separate, stable, and fixed with discrete potentials, c) users have a
control over what they want to do with multimodal or multilingual resources (thus their
focus on metacognition, metadiscursive or metalinguistic awareness). Similarly, there are
a few assumptions that require careful scrutiny in theories of language relations: a) it
often abstracts language from practices and makes generalizations without paying
sufficient attention to micro-macro agents of mediation, b) it romanticizes the agency of
multilingual users, ignoring the constraints they often have to struggle against, c) its
notion of resources is static.
Responding to the calls by Horner, Lockridge, and Selfe and by many other
language and literacy theorists for exploring ways to bridge the gap between multimodal
and translingual scholarship, I will try to show that reconceptualizing mediation from the
perspectives of a cultural materialist theory of practice and new materialist theory, where
mediation is not limited to human agents and social structure, but is understood in terms
of the complex material ecology of practice, can help us go beyond narrow divisions
between different modalities and between language and modality.
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An Outline of the Chapters
Chapter One: This chapter introduces my topic and the discussions around issues of
multilingualism and multimodality. It provides a brief overview of the literature on both
studies of language relations and that of multimodality. Then, it summarizes the major
theoretical approaches on mediation, especially from cultural materialist and new
materialist perspectives that I will be using throughout the dissertation, including the
practice theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook, and new materialism of Bruno
Latour. The chapter will end with a brief overview of the problem statement.
Chapter Two: This chapter reviews theories of mediation in detail, which will be used for
the analysis of language practices in Chapter Three and multimodality in Chapter Four.
Here, I present cultural materialist theories of materialism and phenomenological theories
of materialism, moving at the end to the possible ways to bring them together for the
better understanding of communicative practices.
Chapter Three: This chapter examines theories of language relations and offers an
alternative approach to understand negotiation of language difference. In examining
different language models, it particularly focuses on how monolingual tenets persist even
in theories that came as a reaction to and call for resisting monolingual ideology. After
critiquing models such as ELF, World Englishes, multilingualism, and plurilingualism,
this chapter offers what I call a mesodiscursive approach to language difference.
Chapter Four: I examine and critique theories of multimodality and technology in
composition and other related fields and offer alternative ways of viewing multimodality.
After providing a background to the discussions of technological mediation and
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multimodality, this chapter examines some important views on multimodal composition
and their problematic assumptions about various modes and their affordances.
Chapter Five: I’ll develop an alternative way of viewing translingual and transmodal
relations in an integrated way. After exploring overlaps and divergences, I will develop a
perspective for better understanding of such overlaps. This chapter ends with the
discussion of some pedagogical implications of rethinking linguistic and other semiotic
practices from a new materialist theory of practice.
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CHAPTER 2
PRACTICE THEORIES OF MEDIATION: OVERCOMING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN
CULTURAL MATERIALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL MATERIALISM

No place dominates enough to be global and no place is self-contained enough to be
local. As long as we try to use either local interaction or structure, or some compromise
between the two, there is no chance to trace social connections—and the cleverer the
compromise, the worse it would be, since we would simply extend the lease of two nonexisting sites. On the contrary, I am trying here to be as dumb as possible and multiply
the clamps to make sure we resist the temptation to cut away in two boxes—global and
local—what actors are doing, interrupting at once the deployment of their many fragile
and sometimes bizarre itineraries. (Latour, Reassembling 204)
The nature of writing is changing as a result of a variety of factors including new
developments in digital technologies and cross-linguistic practices. How do we
understand those differences in writing practices and continuation of what Horner, Selfe,
and Lockridge call SL/MN ideology in the way writing is understood in the academy and
outside? Many of us and our students today participate in writing practices, either as
writers or readers, that go beyond traditional notion of writing as print-based and
monolingual. Scholars in composition have developed theories of multimodality and
multilingualism separately, but there have been very few attempts at studying the recent
changes in writing comprehensively and learning from each other. One fundamental
reason behind that could be a limited theorization of the notion of mediation. Therefore,
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in this chapter, I look into how materialist theories of mediation, both old and new, can
provide us some ways to rethink our writing practices and pedagogical methods,
especially in abstracting languages and modalities, treating them as stable categories, and
ignoring material social factors affecting their use. I am using the theoretical lens of
mediation to approach both the obvious differences and underlying intersections between
studies of multimodality and those of multilingualism because I see that the long-standing
gap between these two fields and their characterization of languages and modalities as
discrete and stable seem to have their basis in their limited and problematic theoretical
assumptions about agency and mediation.
The word mediation has come to mean several things, from an act of reconciling
two opposite sides, acting as a tool for transfer of meaning or message, dividing things
into two equal halves, to an act of reflection (Williams, Key Words 204). It has been
problematic ever since we started deliberating on human actions and the factors shaping
such actions, far before philosophers we have come to know discussed the relationships
between language, authorship, work of art, and the world (Plato, Aristotle, and Panini). In
our modern history, we see variations of two major trends that have remained in place in
different forms: a) assuming human actions as solely shaped or determined by the
intention and will of the actor and b) seeing social systems (taken as stable and
homogeneous) as the determiner of all human actions, turning individuals to mere pawns.
Despite these two trends being two completely opposed perspectives, they do share a
fundamental problem, i.e., taking mediation as a linear phenomenon. And various
manifestations of such tendencies are dominant in our field of rhetoric and composition
even today. In most of these, the major problem is that of abstraction, either separating
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composition as a product and composition as an activity from everything else, or
separating the context from the messy relationships within and outside, thereby reducing
the inherent heterogeneities and disjunctions into a homogeneous entity. Such tendencies
can be seen in studies of language relation in their treatment of one language from its
material social practice, thereby taking languages as discrete systems, free from the
individual language acts. A similar tendency can be found in the studies of
multimodality; that is the tendency not only to separate and reify modalities, but also to
separate various modes from the complex interrelationships with what we traditionally
call mode of writing or speech. To avoid such problems, we need to expand our notion of
mediation to develop a more nuanced alternative, especially the one that tries to explore
any act, of writing or communication, in its complex ecology of relations and material
social practices. Here, I will discuss notion of mediation from materialist perspectives,
the refinement of which can offer us productive ways to address differences in writing
practices. I will particularly focus on expanding materialist theories of practice, both
Marxist and phenomenological, with special attention to theorists like Raymond
Williams, Pierre Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and Alastair Pennycook on the one hand,
and Martin Heidegger and Bruno Latour, on the other.
Though the roots of practice theory go at least as far back as to Aristotle’s
discussion of praxis and techne, in modern times, it is often referenced back to Karl
Marx’s overturning of idealist metaphysics, especially as he challenged “centuries of
Western rationalist and mentalist tradition” and established the legitimacy of “real
activity, what ‘sensuous’ people actually do in their everyday life, as an object of
consideration and as an explanatory category in social sciences” (Nicolini 29). It was the
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materialist trajectory that Marx gave to intellectualist traditions of the West that set up a
ground for understanding human actions based on their life in the world, not in their mind
alone: “[the various aspects of law] assert themselves without entering the consciousness
of the participants and can themselves be abstracted from daily practice only through
laborious, theoretical investigation” (qtd. in Nicolini 32). Similar to the Marxist line of
thought, phenomenological tradition, beginning with Martin Heidegger (or some say
Friedrich Nietzsche), also challenged idealist notions of language and reality and focused
on the role of embodiment and the embeddedness of human work. So, in this chapter, I
will trace these two trajectories in terms of their focus on practice and material processes
and see if we could find productive ways to utilize the strengths of both.
Cultural Materialism and Practice Theory
Despite initiating the materialist understanding of human actions, orthodox
Marxism remained largely reductive. As Raymond Williams claims in Marxism and
Literature, “the usual consequence of the base-superstructure formula, with its
specialized and limited interpretations of productive forces and of the process of
determination, is a description—even at times a theory—of art and thought as
‘reflection’” (95). Therefore, what is problematic in orthodox Marxism (what Williams
calls mechanical materialism), similar to the intellectual tradition it came to counter, is its
tendency to characterize art/literature/language/writing/work as reflection, truthful or
distorted, echoing idealist theory of mimesis (Platonic tradition/Romantic tradition, etc.)
and the nineteenth and twentieth century positivist theories of language and reality. To
avoid that problem, Williams replaces the term reflection with mediation, thereby
replacing the tendency of seeing the “world as object” and “excluding activity, with that
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of “seeing the material life process as human activity” (96). Mediation here was intended
to describe an active process:
To the extent that it indicates an active and substantial process,
‘mediation’ is always the less alienated concept. In its modern
development it approaches the sense of inherent constitutive
consciousness, and is in any case important as an alternative to simple
reductionism, in which every real act or work is methodically reduced
back to an assumed primary category, usually specified (self-specified) as
‘concrete reality’. (Marxism and Literature 99)
In other words, replacement of reflection with mediation might help us overcome the
reductive tendency in orthodox Marxism and recognize the co-constitutive role of the act
of mediation and the processes and conditions it mediates. However, he is also aware
about the possible complication in using the term mediation:
But when the process of mediation is seen as positive and substantial, as a
necessary process of the making of meanings and values, in the necessary
form of the general social process of signification and communication, it is
really only a hindrance to describe it as ‘mediation’ at all. For the
metaphor takes us back to the very concept of the ‘intermediacy’, which,
at its best, this constitutive and constituting sense rejects. (Marxism and
Literature 99-100)
Williams is complicating the term mediation so that it overcomes the problematic
meaning it tends to suggest despite it replacing the term reflection. Mediation, by its very
name, seems to suggest the very duality it wanted to avoid. But its positive and
constitutive sense, as Williams claims, largely rejects that customary meaning by
reminding us how such mediating activity not only transforms the possible consequences,
but also what it intended to mediate, thereby blurring the boundaries between the activity
of mediation, objective reality and its processes, and the product of mediation.
Williams extends his discussion of mediation with his reconceptualization of the
Marxist notion of determination. Orthodox Marxism is generally reductive, seeing every
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cultural activity as “a direct or indirect expression of some preceding and controlling
economic content, or of a political content determined by an economic position or
situation” (Williams, Marxism and Literature 83). In other words, they took
determination to mean “setting of limits,” the limits of a particular mode of production,
with a clear suggestion that social change is possible only through a complete overhaul of
the existing economic and social structures. Williams expands the notion of
determination to include not only “setting of limits” but also “the exertion of pressures,”
where to determine also means “to do something [as] an act of will and purpose” (87).
Here, what individuals do are, however, “always social acts” (87). Therefore, for
Williams,
‘society’ is then never only the dead husk which limits social and
individual fulfillment. It is always also a constitutive process with very
powerful pressures which are both expressed in political, economic, and
cultural formations and, to take the full weight of ‘constitutive’, are
internalized and become ‘individual wills’. Determination of this whole
kind—a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures—is in
the whole social process itself and nowhere else: not in an abstracted
‘mode of production’ nor in an abstracted ‘psychology’. Any abstraction
of determinism, based on the isolation of autonomous categories, which
are seen as controlling or which can be used for prediction, is then a
mystification of the specific and always related determinants which are the
real social process—an active and conscious as well as, by default, a
passive and objectified historical experience. (88)
Though Williams does not elaborate his constitutive notion of determination that much, it
somewhat resembles a more systematic discussion of the dynamic relationship between
agency and structure in Bourdieu and Giddens’s practice theory. In Williams, society no
more remains a static, “dead” structure, but is rather a dynamic and complex process,
both setting limits and enabling actions. Furthermore, his notion of determination, as with
his notion of mediation, rejects abstraction and isolation whether of human action (art/
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writing/languaging) or social reality. What orthodox Marxists call “objective social
structures,” for Williams, therefore, shape and are shaped by social processes, which
presuppose individual actions. The tendency of creating autonomous categories, with
fixed self-governing internal rules, is nothing but mystification.
In the same vein, Williams also counters structural Marxist ideas of
overdetermination despite its complication of the notion of determination by
acknowledging the role of multiple factors determining human actions. He does agree
that overdetermination avoids the Marxist tendency of reducing everything to base and
superstructure where base structure is again reduced to relations and means of
production. But at the same time, it maintains relatively autonomous character of
practices: “As with ‘determination’, so ‘overdetermination’ can be abstracted to a
structure (symptom), which then, if in complex ways, ‘develops’ …by the laws of its
internal structural relations. As a form of analysis this is often effective, but in its
isolation of the structure it can shift attention from the real location of all practice and
practical consciousness: ‘the practical activity…the practical process of development of
men’” (Williams, Marxism and Literature 88). Their continued focus on internal
structures and their isolation of such structures from fluid and ever changing practices
make them fall victim to the same economism that they tried to avoid. As he hints at, we
often tend to sacrifice complexity for the sake of analytical effectiveness and efficiency.
What we find most useful in Williams is his opposition to the tendency of
abstraction: abstracting structures from practices, taking categories in their isolation, and
therefore, failing to see the continuous processes of change despite durability of social
formations in some forms. This focus on practices and his challenge to the tendency of
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creating a dichotomy between structures and human actions is similar to Pierre Bourdieu
and Anthony Giddens’ critique of functionalism and structuralism in their dissolution of
such binaries.
Practice theory, in its initial phase, is often associated primarily with Anthony
Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu. Their social theory is often called social praxeology, which
assumes social life as contingent and ever changing. Their study of social phenomena
centers around the dynamic relationship between social structures and practices. Similar
to Raymond Williams, Bourdieu and Giddens make everyday human actions and social
and economic pressures that shape such actions their main subject of study.
Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu respond to humanist notions of agency and
the structuralist and poststructuralist emphasis on structural and discursive power
subjecting individuals to its norms by emphasizing the dynamic interplay between agency
and structure. In their accounts, human activities, including our language practices, are
mediated by the dynamic relationship between individual agency and social structure,
where individual actions and social structures mutually presuppose, form, and transform
each other, as interdependent and co-constitutive.
Bourdieu’s materialist theory of praxis combines a phenomenological
understanding of human actions with social and economic considerations from Marxist
thought. In his attempt to counter existing dualisms, between agency and
structure/individual and society, he develops a robust theory of praxis where his notions
of habitus, capital, and fields8 play central roles.

8

While Bourdieu’s connection of habitus with the field is very important to show how seemingly
individual is inherently social. But his notion of field itself is abstracted in its obliteration of the concrete
materiality of the field and the heterogeneities within it.
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He rejects all theories that “treat practice as mechanical reaction, directly
determined by the antecedent conditions and entirely reducible to the mechanical
functioning of pre-established assemblies, ‘models’ or ‘roles”’ and also those theories
that characterize practice as the product of “the conscious and deliberate intentions of
their authors” (OTP 73). He does so by redefining structure not as a set of preexisting
“rules,” or “system,” or all-encompassing Discourse governing every human activity, but
as patterns or regularities emerging out of constant interaction between objective social
structures and habitus. He defines habitus thus:
The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment . . . produce
habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as
principles of the generation and structuring of practices and
representations which can be objectively “regulated” and “regular”
without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively
adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or
an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being
all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the
orchestrating action of a conductor. (OTP 72)
Here are a few things from his definition of habitus: that it is largely stable or durable; it
is structured by and structures the social practices; it regulates and is regulated by the
regular patterns of actions and behaviors; and it does not presuppose conscious intention
of the actors or the conductors. He thus humanizes and historicizes structure while also
socializing agency. Similarly, his concept of habitus is “capable of connecting recursively
the individual/subjective and intuitional/objective dimensions” (Nicolini 55).
With the habitus, Bourdieu dissolves mind/body dichotomy as, for him, habitus
refers to “a set of mental dispositions, bodily schemas, and know-how operating at a preconscious level, that once activated by events, fields generate practice” (Nicolini 55). In
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other words, habitus is a form of knowing in practice, something like a feel of the game.
The development of habitus occurs through our daily repetitive activities without our
conscious thought. In this sense, Bourdieu’s conception of habitus is similar to what
Polanyi calls tacit knowledge or Merleau Ponty calls embodied knowledge.
However, Bourdieu’s theory is different from Merleau-Ponty’s, Polanyi’s, and
other phenomenological theories of tacit knowledge because of his strong focus on social
and material dimensions. Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, unlike otherwise similar
phenomenological constructs, is in a co-constitutive relationship with the social structure
representing specific material conditions of existence that characterize a class or social
group. This way, the habitus links individual conduct with a particular milieu, making
seemingly individual activity inherently social. Individuals engage in the practices that
continuously reproduce social conditions. This focus on material condition and specific
social class is what clearly distinguishes him from phenomenological theorists.
In connecting the social to the individual, Bourdieu, as stated earlier, introduces
two other forces—capital and field. And habitus produces practice through its interaction
with various types of capital and field. With his focus on these forces, he becomes able to
account for the role of power relations and structural properties of specific fields in
generating practice and affecting the habitus of the individuals in recursive manner.
It is therefore important to see the interactions between these three forces (habitus,
capital, and field) to understand the nature of actual practice.
For Bourdieu, fields are partially autonomous and are governed by their own
internal norms, values, and recognitions. But it works in recursive relation with the
habitus. That means, individuals’ participation in a field shapes the habitus, which, after
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being activated, reproduces the field. It is also equally important to consider how
individual’s actions are shaped by habitus, which “only operates in relation with the state
of the field and on the basis of the possibilities of action granted by the capital associated
with the position” (Nicolini 60). And capital for Bourdieu goes beyond mere economic
resources: “A general science of the economy of practices that does not artificially limit
itself to those practices that are socially recognized as economic must endeavor to grasp
capital, that ‘energy of social physics’… in all of its different forms…I have shown that
capital presents itself under three fundamental species (each with its own subtypes),
namely, economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital” (Bourdieu, in Bourdieu and
Wacquant 118-119). Because of the interaction of these three forces, actions of
individuals are mostly similar to, while also being different, from the members of the
same class.
Such an understanding of habitus means that it is a group or class phenomenon
that in some way harmonizes the practices of those in the same class or group without
their conscious awareness:
The practice of the members of the same group or, in a differentiated
society, the same class, is always more and better harmonized than the
agents know or wish because, as Leibniz says, following only (his) own
laws, each nonetheless agrees with each other. The habitus…inscribed in
bodies by identical histories…is the precondition not only for the coordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination. (Bourdieu,
Le Sens Pratique 59, qtd. in Nicolini 60)
However, due to the variations in the accumulation of capital and its value, habitus never
produces the exact same practice; each individual develops a recognizably different
trajectory. In Wittgenstein’s words, their habituses have family resemblance.
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The dynamics between variation and conformity leads to whether individuals act
consciously and deliberately, making their own choices out of various options available
or creating their own trajectory. For Bourdieu, people are both conscious and not so
conscious, making “moves and acting strategically,” but “unaware that their motives,
goals and aspirations are not spontaneous or natural, but are given to them through
habitus” (Webb and Schirato 58). In other words, what they think as their conscious
choice is but their “misrecognition” (Bourdieu, Logic 106). However, Bourdieu does see
some possibility of conscious actions that can go beyond the strong boundaries set by
their own habitus, but only during times of crisis and social breakdown.
Bourdieu does offer a systematic theory of the relationship between social
practices that people participate in and the objective structures of the field(s), theorizing
the persistence of traditional values and systems of domination. However, his theory, as
De Certeau and Arjun Appadurai claim, seems to find it hard to overcome the charge of
determinism for its overemphasis on the powerful constraints habitus poses on the
possibilities of conscious and strategic human actions. He does see some space for
conscious choice, but only during times of “exceptional crisis …when rules are in flux”
(Burawoy 201). As Burawoy claims, ground reality can often contradict with “palpable
transparency of exploitation” (201). In other words, a perfect match between habitus and
material reality in the field might be a little unrealistic.
Bourdieu theorizes practices primarily in terms of a class-based and relatively
more closed society than ours today; and therefore, his theory still looks somewhat
deterministic in a certain sense. However, he does talk about overlapping fields and the
resultant recognitions and misrecognitions, leading to social transformations. We can
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extend his theory in our context to try to match it with the more fractured and disjunctive
societies today, going beyond his notion of class to include other issues including
geopolitical difference, gender, race, nationality etc.
Similar to Bourdieu, the major contribution of Anthony Giddens lies in his theory
of structuration, through which he sought to overcome the binary of structure and agency.
He maintains that functionalists like Parsons and structuralists like Saussure and LeviStrauss had put overemphasis on objective structures at the cost of individual agents,
whereas the humanists did the opposite, undermining the role of structure and
overestimating the place of individual agents. In order to counter structuralist
determinism, Giddens proposes the notion of “duality of structure,” by which he means
that “the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the
practices they recursively organize” (Constitution of Society 25). Here structure and
agency presuppose and constitute each other rather than being opposed to each other. In
other words, he combines “two traditionally opposed sensitivities: the attention for the
intentional and meaningful conduct of human actors, and a consideration of the
constraints that limit the possibility of action” (Nicolini 44). Similar to Williams, Giddens
is also both drawing on, expanding, and problematizing Marx’s famous dictum that
human beings make history but not in circumstances of their own choosing (Giddens,
Constitution of Society 7).
Giddens tries to overcome the traditional boundaries between subjectivist and
objectivist tendencies by developing a social theory of structuration, “a theory of
recursive production and reproduction of society as praxis, in which the question of what
comes first becomes meaningless and dissolves” (Nicolini 45). His use of a neologism,
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“structuration,” implying the use of an intransitive verb in place of a noun, suggests that,
in his account, structure is not a stable state but a continuous process.
By emphasizing process, with his replacement of structure with structuration, and
by making knowledgeable actors necessary part of perpetuating and transforming
structures that organize practices, Giddens tries to avoid possibility of being seen as
deterministic, turning agents into structural dupes. However, at the same time, agents’
reflexivity is part of their practical consciousness, the knowledge with which they draw
resources from the structural properties of a system and contribute towards its
reproduction.
Therefore, structures for him are not dead husks, they have both a virtual and
actual existence; that it is both non-temporal and non-spatial: “According to the theory of
structuration, an understanding of social systems as situated in time-space can be effected
by regarding structure as non-temporal and non-spatial, as a virtual order of differences
produced and reproduced in social interaction as its medium and outcome” (Giddens,
Central Problems 3). Here, structure is not something that is out there existing at a
particular time and space; rather it is a memory trace that develops through sedimentation
across time and in relation to different spaces. Giddens says, “Structures do not exist in
time-space, except in the moments of the constitution of social systems. But we can
analyze how ‘deeply-layered’ structures are in terms of the historical duration of practices
they recursively organize, and the spatial ‘breadth’ of those practices: how widespread
they are across a range of interactions. The most deeply layered practices constitutive of
social systems in each of these senses are institutions” (65).
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Referring to a common practice of talking about structure in terms of the rules of
chess as isolated from context, Giddens says, “Nowhere in the philosophical literature, to
my knowledge, are either the history of chess (which has its origin in warfare), or actual
games of chess, made the focus of study” (Central Problems 65). The most important
thing that we can draw from his discussion of structure is that we can never talk about
rules isolated from layers of history and their real practices. So, structure is an emergent
property of action as much as action presupposes structure. The actuality of structure lies
only in its instantiation in action. Like what Bourdieu says about the transposability of
habitus, for Giddens, structures can be conceived as generalizable and transposable to
other situations.
In Giddens, one important aspect of structure is that it involves not only rules but
also resources, both human and non-human (authoritative and allocative, resembling
Bourdieu’s division of capital). And it is because of the combination of rules and
resources that individuals can “make a difference” or “intervene in the world, or to
refrain from such intervention” (The Constitution of Society 14).
Giddens brings the issue of power through his notion of resources. For him,
practices are “regularized types of acts” (Constitution of Society 75), where they are
“produced by knowledgeable actors who draw on rules (codes and norms) and resources
(material and symbolic)” (Nicolini 46). Here “resources are the main medium through
which power manifests itself and is exercised. Paying tribute to his Weberian legacy,
Giddens interprets power as the capacity of mobilizing people and things in the efforts of
producing some effect in the world: power is the capacity to make a difference” (Nicolini
46). Resources include both authoritative and allocative, the former akin to Bourdieu’s
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notion of social capital whereas the latter aligns with economic capital. In his nonorthodox use of the notion of power, he takes into account the capacity of individuals
accorded to them by material and symbolic resources. However, these resources are
mobilized in conjunction with the rules of the game. In other words, while rules and
resources make certain kinds of actions and practices possible, and certain others
remotely so, Giddens does see plenty of space for agents to act strategically in
accordance with their desires and interests. However, such actions are also limited in
some ways by the possibilities and alternatives afforded by the system (Giddens, Central
Problems 166).
In Giddens’ account of social practices, to some extent similar to Bourdieu,
agents’ discursive understanding of their material and social condition and the possibility
of acting beyond the limitations of the system or against them seem very hard. There are
two possible conditions: one, during special circumstances such as conflict or breakdown;
two incompatibilities between interdependent systems of practices often working in
tandem. As Nicolini says,
The interconnection among practices thus becomes the source of both
stability and change, so that practices are at the same time the locus of
ordering and reproduction and the locus of disordering and misproduction. Conceiving human beings as knowledgeable actors who draw
on rules and resources for the carrying out of their activity and
achievement of their aims implies that necessary feature of action is its
partial indeterminacy. (48)
Thus, Giddens sees the sources of changes in the micro level, i.e., in the context in which
practices are reproduced, with a possible transformation due to the unexpected effects of
materials conditions. Similarly, the tensions between interconnected practices can
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produce disjuncture and fissures in structural principles, with a potential to bring about
large systemic changes.
In theorizing agency and structure to understand social practices, Giddens is
slightly different from Bourdieu. Giddens says, “every social actor knows a great deal
about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member” (5).
He also distinguishes this practical consciousness from discursive consciousness:
More significant for the arguments developed in this book are differences
between practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which
actors draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and what I call
‘discursive consciousness’, involving knowledge which actors are able to
express on the level of discourse. All actors have some degree of
discursive penetration of the social systems to whose constitution they
contribute. (Central Problems 5)
But he believes that actors can have such discursive consciousness only at some critical
moments. However, it is for the same reason, several critics like Callinicos find Giddens,
in an attempt to challenge structuralist and fuctionalist reduction of human agents into
structural dupes, moving more towards “the pole of agency” (144).
However, it is for the reason almost contrary to the one used to critique Giddens,
that some critics find Bourdieu’s theory still largely deterministic. Though it seems that
Giddens’s and Bourdieu’s redefinition of structure as made up of both rules (for
Bourdieu, strategies) and resources avoids both material and ideal determinisms,
Bourdieu’s habitus, for many, tends to (Giddens’ structure is less so) “retain[s] precisely
the agent-proof quality that the concept of the duality of structure is supposed to
overcome” (Swell 15). As Bourdieu says, “As an acquired system of generative schemes
objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted, the habitus
engenders all the thoughts, all the perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those
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conditions and no others (OTP 95). In Bourdieu’s scheme, social transformation seems
quite remote. Giddens, due to the different levels of access to and different amount of the
accumulation of resources by agents, theorizes recursive repetition of structure as
transformation. However, he also does not envision a society as more fractured and
consisting of complexly intersecting and conflicting layers of ideologies and practices. In
other words, both of them seem to have developed their theories with reference to more
or less closed societies (even in seemingly closed societies there are different sets of
discourses).
It is for a similar reason that Michel de Certeau finds Bourdieu’s habitus and
Giddens’ structuration problematic. For him, the practice theories of Bourdieu and
Giddens, similar to Foucault’s theory of discourse, fail to see the possibilities of micro
tactics of resistance. For Bourdieu, practices are largely driven by habitus, whereas for
Certeau, human beings are conscious agents who can “navigate among the rules, play
with all the possibilities offered by traditions, make use of one tradition rather than
another, compensate for one by means of another.” They are capable of “taking
advantage of the flexible surface which covers up the hard core, they create their own
relevance in this network” (Certeau 54). The societies that Bourdieu studied did go
through serious upheavals, where Certeau could see many instances of conscious and
tactical practices of resistances that local people were engaged in, where as Bourdieu,
perhaps due to the habitus he developed through his own theory and research, and partly
due to the overwhelming presence of colonial ideology influencing the local people in
Algerian society, did not see those acts as displaying inventiveness and strategic
awareness beyond what their habitus allowed them.

43

In a similar line, Arjun Appadurai also questioned theories of habitus and tacit
knowledge, especially in the context of the effects of globalization on individual
habituses. Appadurai thinks that the flow of semiotic resources, cultural texts, symbols,
and people in a globalized context works to “move the glacial forces of habitus into the
quickened beat of improvisations for large groups of people” (Appadurai 6). Appadurai
analyzes the global circulation of texts and discourses to argue that people mix and mesh
available resources to produce hybrid texts and identities. The possibility of instantly
sharing knowledge, information, and resources in the world today perhaps supports what
Appadurai says about the process of glocalization. However, we should be very aware
that diversifications in practices and improvisations in human activities do not necessarily
mean equally diversifying and transforming experiences in one’s habituses. In other
words, one problem that Arjun Appadurai and many language theorists as well make is to
see a synergy between practices and habituses/perceptions9. Therefore, despite being
partly problematic, Bourdieu and Giddens’ notions of habitus and structurations have not
lost their relevance and importance even in the present context.
Alastair Pennycook extends the practice theories of Bourdieu and Giddens in light
of recent developments. In other words, Pennycook tries to develop a practice theory of
language considering what Appadurai calls glocalization. His Language as a Local
Practice comes out of the application of the theory of practice to language. In other
words, he develops a linguistic theory of practice where he defines language not as a
system but as a practice. By practice he means “bundles of activities that are organized
into coherent ways of doing things” (25). In this view structure emerges as a coherent
9

I will elaborate this in the discussions of language theories and theories of modalities in the following
chapters.
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ways of acting through repeated activities. This view of language echoes what Bourdieu
and Giddens say about structure, which is nothing but the product of the continual
interplay between habitus and social practices. The central tenet in Pennycook, similar to
what Bourdieu and Giddens think, is that language/social structure is a dynamic thing that
perpetuates through repetitive activities of language users. Then the question is how does
he account for agency in this repetitive nature of language practice?
For Pennycook, human agents are neither completely determined nor fully free. It
is these individuals who give continuity to language practices mediating between the
macro space of, in Bourdieu’s terms, “objective structures,” and the micro space of
individual actions. Language practices that individuals engage in are “in a sense, the new
discourse, the new way of describing that level of mediating social activity where we do
things both because we want to and along lines laid down by habit, propriety, cultural
norms or political dictates. It is therefore useful to explore the meso-political space of
practice that lies between the local and the global” (emphasis added, 23). In other words,
he is using practice as a middle term between big-D Discourse (invoking J. P. Gee’s
distinction), meaning “abstraction of world view,” and little-d discourse,
implying “everyday language use” and “asks how they connect, how this meso-political
level organizes local activity in relation to broader social, cultural or historical
organization” (123). In this meso level, individual language practices are both similar and
different; their repetition involves newness despite it iterating the past usage. In this
sense, Pennycook theorizes agency in terms of relocalization of language use by
individual agents where language becomes a “sedimented discourse” (46).
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Pennycook’s notion of relocalization and sedimentation with regards to language
practices are central to his revision of past theories of practice. His conceptualization of
language retains the temporal and geographical sense of context that Giddens and
Bourdieu use. In other words, every language use should be seen in terms of the history
of its use (movement for Pennycook) and the spatial contexts it is used in. Every
language use occurs in a different time and place, repeating the same activity but in a
different spatio-temporal locality. This idea of repeating an activity in a new context
echoes Bourdieu’s notion of transposability of (linguistic) habitus or generalizability of
structure in Giddens. Though Bourdieu sees little scope for change in such regular
practices, Pennycook believes that every repetition is different, or, in his words,
“repetition is an act of difference” (36).
This is where Pennycook extends practice theory to, in a sense, its logical end. In
other words, it is a logical extension of Bourdieu’s idea that “habitus never produces the
same practices twice and, in fact, each individual develops a personal trajectory”
(Nicolini 61). The difference between the two is that Pennycook sees such repetition as
new and different whereas Bourdieu sees it as a variation of the same practices within the
limits posed by the habitus.
So, Pennycook proposes a new way of defining creativity, not as “newness,
difference, divergence from what has gone before” (35). Here, every local use of
language is “as much about change as it is about staying the same” (36). In this way
Pennycook overcomes the tension in language studies, especially in structuralism,
between the individual and language as system. In structuralist accounts, newness can be
a break or deviation from grammar or structure. But Pennycook, drawing on Giddens’
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theory of structuration and Calvet’s theory of language ecology, regards grammar not as a
preexisting set of norms but as an emergent set of patterns that are restructured by their
interaction with individual practices. In other words, Pennycook views structure as the
effect of sedimented repetition.
In this process of sedimentation, Pennycook sees individuals as having agency,
though limited:
How does difference happen? In two ways: humans are, of course, capable
of changing things, though often much less than we like to think. By and
large, we go on doing more or less the same thing over and over. But we
can make intentional changes to what we do, and these changes may
become sedimented over time. There are also small, unintentional
slippages, changes to the ways we do and say things, and these too may
start to be repeated and become sedimented practices. And, as I have
argued in this chapter, what appears to be the same may in fact also be
already different. (49)
This notion of sedimentation offers a new dimension to the understanding of practice as
repetitive activity. Every contribution to sedimentation constitutes change: that is,
reiterating sedimented practices contributes to their sedimentation, making them more
sedimented while also recontextualizing those practices. In this sense iteration of the
same contributes to difference and is different. Thus Pennycook sees linguistic activities
in terms of both individual choice and unintended consequences.
While Pennycook adds an important dimension to practice theory that can be very
useful in understanding students’ writing practices, his theorization of language as a local
practice, despite its use of Bourdieu, Giddens, and similar other theorists who view social
practices as situated in relations of power, does not seriously consider power differentials
in the relationships between various language practices. Similarly, his theory is focused
more on what happens than on how we think of language practices. In other words, his
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focus is more on practices than on perceptions even though these two are, as Louis-Jean
Calvet contends, always in some sort of co-constitutive relations (8).
Phenomenological Tradition and New Materialism: Heidegger and Latour
These practice-based, materialist theories with Marxist orientation in some form
complicate and explicate the relationships between agency, objective social structures,
and practices very well. However, as Bruno Latour claims, they leave out important
components of social practices: that is, the things in the material world around us that in
some way play significant roles in the mediation of our actions and practices. In other
words, we also need to consider what Latour calls the “missing masses” or the “mundane
artifacts” (“Missing Masses” 225).
Another tradition that will be useful in understanding writing as a socio-material
practice is phenomenological materialism, especially the strand that begins roughly with
Heidegger and continues in various forms in the present in works of new materialists like
Bruno Latour and Thomas Rickert. While Marxist/socialist materialism challenged the
relationship between structure (social) and agency (human), phenomenological
materialism challenged the relationship between human agents and the material world,
trying to understand the structure of human consciousness in its initial phase, but to
develop into a more nuanced theory of the relationship between our subjective experience
and objective reality (understood very differently from Bourdieu and Giddens’
understanding of objective structures). In a way these two materialisms highlight the
embeddedness of our experience and embodiment of our understandings. And if we can
recover the Marxist ethos, embeddedness goes beyond considering simple connectedness
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to consider issues of power and how it circulates and is exercised. Similarly, by bringing
power into the understanding of materials, we start seeing how materials themselves also
exercise power, though in a very different way, making us reconsider how we define and
understand agency and mediation.
Phenomenology, in its early years, especially in Husserl, focused on the “structure
of consciousness” and human perception of things. Intentionality and subjective
experience were central to the investigation into the nature of phenomena. As Taylor
Carman claims, “Husserl wanted phenomenology to be a pure presuppositionless,
systematic scientific description of consciousness…Husserlian phenomenology is thus a
description of subjectivity, not of the objective world, but it is emphatically not empirical
psychology…” (XVII). Husserl is highly reductive, advocating bracketing the actual
existence of ourselves and that of things. His phenomenology is “the systematic scientific
description of the ideal essences belonging to pure, transcendental subjectivity” (Carman
XVII).
Heidegger, on the other hand, takes phenomenology away from the subject-object
dichotomy and concentrates more not on the “things-in-themselves” but on things as they
are in everyday practice. Heidegger, in his classic work, Being and Time, puts forward a
strong critique of the subjectivist phenomenological tradition and offers his own theory of
phenomena as things in the world or being in the world. The following description of
Heidegger’s theory clarifies his distinction from Husserl and many others who see the
world in terms of abstracted categories or essences:
So, for instance, whereas traditional ontology regarded all entities as
objects, or substances with properties, Heidegger points out that ordinary
things in our daily environment—tables and chairs, hammers and nails,
doors and doorknobs, automobiles and street signs—do not show up in
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which we first see as an object with properties and then interpret or judge
to be useful for hammering; it is first of all, and above all, something to
grab, something for hammering. So, too, a doorway is not just a
rectangular aperture in a wall but something to go through. Such things
are not occurent or “present-at-hand” … but available or “ready-tohand”…. Even less is a human being a mere object with mental properties
added on, but a doer and a sufferer, an agent and a patient, not a what but a
who, not something with extra psychological features in addition but
someone living a life, emerging from a history and plunging into a future.
(XV)
Here, Heidegger’s attention to objects (actually things) is not an attention to the
essence/substance of them or to their objective features. It also is not a focus on objects in
terms of what they can do for us. Rather, his focus is not on the hammer as an object or
hammer in terms of its features, nor on how we conceive of the hammer or how we make
sense of it in terms of its use to us, but on hammering, the thing in use or process rather
than the thing in itself. Similar to Raymond Williams, Anthony Giddens, and Pierre
Bourdieu, in some sense, Heidegger is trying to walk a fine line between objectivism and
subjectivism, or to avoid both altogether. Similarly, his focus on objects in use or action,
in what we might call practice, in the act of hammering, makes him do what the other
theorists in practice theory did in terms of social structure and agency.
For Heidegger, being in the world is always being with the others, but not with
what Giddens and Bourdieu would call the “social.” Rather, being is considered always
in relation to the environment, taken as a differentiated state of relationships and
existence among a variety of beings. This is what relates Heidegger to social theorists and
what also at the same time distinguishes him from them.
The example of hammering also connects Heidegger with practice theorists in his
emphasis on human acts as preconscious:
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The carpenter does not need to ‘think a hammer’ in order to drive a nail.
His or her capacity to act depends upon the familiarity with the act of
hammering. His/her use of the practical item ‘hammer’ is its significance
to him/her in the setting ‘hammering’ and ‘carpentry’. When the carpenter
is unimpeded in his/her hammering, the hammer with its properties does
not exist as an entity: in the usable environment, the understanding of
situations is pre-reflexive, and the world of objects thus becomes ‘simply
present.’ (Nicolini 34)
The hammer acquires a separate existence only when it stops working or when it breaks
down. Our conscious understanding, which is not the understanding of hammer as such,
comes into play only when there is a breakdown. Again, in a different way, this is what
Bourdieu and Giddens said about the possibility of having discursive
awareness/conscious in the times of conflict and social breakdown. The act of coming to
consciousness makes the object unusable in Heidegger whereas, such coming to a
discursive consciousness in Bourdieu and Giddens makes it possible to see the workings
of ideology and make strategic decisions about resistance or change. What Heidegger is
contributing to our understanding of our acts is the need to consider things in their actual
use, not in the sense of resources, but in their own right.
Heidegger’s later insistence on the primacy of discursive practice, practice in
language, and his hint that the possibility of thinking differently lies only in our ability to
question our own language practice draws him closer to practice theorists:
Later in his career Heidegger affirmed that language is the ‘house of
being’, arguing that although we have language at our disposal in a way
we are also at the disposal of our language. Language and language
practices are therefore a critical aspect of everydayness, and only by
questioning our language practices can we open a clearing through which
we can experience potentially different ways of experiencing and acting in
the world. (Nicolini 38)
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Heidegger’s emphasis on practice and his treatment of things in relation to other aspects
in the environment have set a good ground for later new materialist theorists to develop
their robust theories of materialism.
However, it’s not clear from Heidegger what role things play in our social life. In
other words, since he is concerned more with being than with human actions and
consequences, it is not clear how he would think of the role of objects/things in mediating
our actions in the world.
Heidegger’s focus on everyday practice, specifically in his rejection of the
division between subject and object, has been extended in certain ways in works of new
materialists such as Bruno Latour in their treatment of objects as agents and their
consideration of the ecology of mediators. Though Heidegger did not consider things and
technologies in terms of their agency, his rejection of instrumental and humanistic
understanding of things and technologies offers some new grounds for new materialists to
develop their nuanced understanding of the role of things and technologies in social
practices.
Bruno Latour critiques humanists, materialists, and critical theorists for their
tendency of ignoring how what they normally take as tools/objects change or transform
the goals of action or programs that human actors try to accomplish. He claims that the
whole history of the Western social and philosophical theories has left “objects” or
techniques, the “missing masses,” out of its accounts. He thus focuses his attention on
those missing masses and how recovering them from their silence makes us rethink our
customary notions of agency, structure, and practices.
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Latour is also dealing with the same issue that has bogged down many theorists
we discussed so far: agency and determinism. His is an attempt to resolve the
“technological determinism/social constructivism dichotomy” (“Missing Masses” 225).
The answer to the question of determinism for Latour is not how much we are free or
whether we are free, it is rather to acknowledge how we are not the only actors:
To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive
attention away from humans and look also at nonhumans. Here they are,
the hidden and despised social masses who make up our morality. They
knock at the door of sociology, requesting a place in the accounts of
society as stubbornly as the human masses did in the nineteenth century.
What our ancestors, the founders of sociology, did a century ago to house
the human masses in the fabric of social theory, we should do now to find
a place in a new social theory for the non-human masses that beg us for
understanding. (227)
Latour agrees with the social theorists that social systems are developed and maintained
through interactions and negotiations between people, institutions, and organizations. But
he claims that artifacts are also part of such negotiations. He does not mean that machines
and things also have conscious awareness and intention. But he does mean that they play
an important part in retaining or transforming social order.
Latour’s treatment of objects is similar to practice theorists’ treatment of structure
in terms of how objects/structures limit and at the same time enable certain actions while
making other actions difficult. Latour neither falls victim to social constructivism nor to
instrumentalism or materialism10. But he takes the role of artifacts/things differently,
taking them as one of the mediators in the assembly of mediators, thus playing an
agentive role as do other mediators like human actors.

10

Here I’m using it in Latourian sense in which materialism means the tendency to explain the
consequences of human actions solely in terms of the essence of the material technology used.
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In terms of discussing the role of artifacts or technologies, his notion of mediation
as translation is central to distinguish him from other social theorists. To illustrate the
difference between how he takes artifacts and how their role is understood by other
traditions, I found two examples Latour uses to discuss very appropriate. In his essay “On
Technical Mediation,” he uses the Dedaelian analogy to relate technical mediation to the
strategies Dedaelus used to outwit others. What I find useful is his notion that technical
mediation is not a “straight line”; it is circuitous, curved, or contrived. And this is so
because he introduces “objects” or “techniques” between “actor” and “goals,” which
distorts the straight line between the actors and their intended goals, changing the nature
and/or the course of intended outcomes:
In the myth of Dedalus, all things deviate from the straight line. The direct
path of reason and scientific knowledge—episteme—is not the path of
every Greek. The clever technical know-how of Dedalus is an instance of
metis, of strategy, of the sort of intelligence for which Odysseus (of whom
the Illiad says that he is polymetis, a bag of tricks) is most famed. No
unmediated action is possible once we enter the realm of engineers and
craftsmen. A Daedalion, in Greek, is something curved, veering from the
straight line, artful but fake, beautiful and contrived. (29)
Latour critiques materialist,11 humanist,12 and social constructivist notions of technology,
all of which tend to be determinist in some ways, and therefore assume a straight line
between the doer and the done, thereby developing a linear theory of mediation. He uses
the example of the gun debate in the US to make his point. An extreme position of the
supporters of gun control is that “guns kill people,” whereas, on the contrary, the NRA

11

Latour is using this term not in a Marxist sense. By materialist perspective, he means to refer to the
tendency to assign every responsibility to the object or technology for whatever the result or the end is.
12
Heidegger uses the term “anthropological” to refer to what Latour calls “humanist.” Heidegger uses this
term to mean technology as human activity. What Heidegger is doing is critiquing the tendency to think of
technology in terms of things external to technology itself rather than in terms of its “essence” or “being.”

54

claims that “People kill people, not guns” (30, 31). Latour calls these two positions
“materialist” and sociological/moralist respectively:
In the materialist account, everything: an innocent citizen becomes a
criminal by virtue of the gun in her hand. The gun enables of course, but
also instructs, directs, even pulls the trigger…. Each artifact has its script,
its ‘affordance,’ its potential to take hold of passerby and force them to
play roles in its story. By contrast, the sociological version of the NRA
renders the gun a neutral carrier of will that adds nothing to the action,
playing the role of an electrical conductor, good and evil flowing through
it effortlessly. (31)
For materialists, “we are what we have—what we have in our hands, at least” (31),
whereas, for what Latour calls sociologists or moralists, “the Neutral Tool” is “under
complete human control” (32). Latour sees a third, more common, possibility: “the
creation of a new goal that corresponds to neither agent’s program of action…. I call this
uncertainty about goals translation” (32). By translation, Latour means “displacement,
drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link that did not exist before and that to some
degree modifies two elements or agents” (32). For him, “the twin mistake of the
materialists and the sociologists is to start with essences, those of subjects or those of
objects. That starting point renders impossible our measurement of the mediating role of
techniques. Neither subject nor object (nor their goals) is fixed” (33). In other words, the
tendency to being either with individual intention or with social ideology/context clouds
possible understanding of events and practices.
For Latour, it is through use that both humans and nonhumans display their
agency and engage in what he calls the “swapping of properties” (46). He believes that
the responsibility of actions should be shared by/distributed not solely to human agents,
but also to nonhuman participants: “Purposeful action and intentionality may not be
properties of objects, but they are not properties of humans either. They are the properties
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of institutions, dispositifs. Only corporate bodies are able to absorb the proliferation of
mediators, to regulate their expression, to redistribute skills, to require boxes to blacken
and close. Boeing-747s do not fly, airlines fly” (46). He believes that when humans
engage in any practice, they engage with nonhumans in what he calls “the swapping of
properties” (46).
Latour’s focus on materials is not only an addition of one more mediator in social
relations. That addition destabilizes the notion of social formation based on the
dichotomy between an individual and the social. Therefore, Latour questions the notion
of the social or structure as theorized in structuralist account and critical sociology. He
replaces the social with the term collective or assembly, actually recovering the original
meaning of the “thing,” which comes from “ding,” designating not an object but a
“certain type of archaic assembly” (“Dingpolitik” 12).
He is actually against the tendency of explaining away differences in our practices
by invoking the “social” or “ideology” or “discourse” as if they are the root causes where
everything else are mere instruments. In his view,
‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything including what the other
glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by many other types of
connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists, socio-linguists,
social psychologists, etc ) take social aggregates as the given that could
shed some light on residual aspects of economics, on the contrary,
consider social aggregates as what should be explained by the specific
associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology, law,
management, etc. (Reassembling 5)
For what Latour calls sociology of translation or association, social is not something
homogeneous. Rather, it is a site of mobile associations and connections. That is why he
critiques not only orthodox Marxism and structural theories of culture and language, he
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also questions the notion of habitus/structuration//field in practice theory as all of these
assume a uniformity of norms:
It is a commonplace, in critical theory, to say that techniques are social
because they have been socially constructed. But this pronouncement is
vacuous if the meanings of mediation and social are not made precise. To
say that social relations are “inscribed” in technology, such that when we
are confronted with an artifact, we are confronted, in effect, with social
relations, is to assert a tautology, a very implausible one. If artifacts are
social relations, then why must society work through them to inscribe
itself in something else? Why not inscribe itself directly, since artifacts
count for nothing? By working through the medium of artefacts,
domination and exclusion hide themselves under the guise of natural and
objective forces: critical theory thus deploys tautology—social relation are
nothing but social relations—then it adds to it a conspiracy theory—
society is hiding behind the fetish of techniques. But techniques are not
fetishes, they are unpredictable, not means but mediators, means and ends
at the same time; and that is why they bear on the social fabric. (51)
Thus, for Latour, treating artifacts merely as embodiments of cultural values is ignoring
both human and nonhuman agency.
Similarly, despite their claim of materialism, their version of materialism falls
short because everything material becomes nothing more than either resources or values
(field): “To be sure, the distinction between material infrastructure and symbolic
superstructure has been useful to remind social theory of the importance of non-humans,
but it is very inaccurate portrayal of their mobilization and engagement inside social
links” (Latour, “Durable” 103). Their reduction of material agents to resources and
capital takes materialism away from the consideration of materials in their concrete forms
to things in the possession of humans. Thus things lose their agency and the social loses
its heterogeneity.
Now, if the social is an assemblage, associations and displacements of an array of
mediators, both what we call local and global or micro and macro, how do we account for
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them? How do we study and understand social phenomena like writing (which is itself a
mediator) if we do not take resort to “Context,” ideology, or discourse? Latour wants us
to discard such all-encompassing and stabilizing notions and just retrace the connections
by following the actors/mediators:
The aim of this second part is to practice a sort of corrective calisthenics. I will
proceed in three steps: we will first relocate the global so as to break down the
automatism that leads from interaction to ‘Context’; we will then redistribute the
local so as to understand why interaction is such an abstraction; and finally, we
will connect the sites revealed by the two former moves, highlighting various
vehicles that make up the definition of the social understood as association.
(Reassembling 172)
In other words, he suggests we “render the social world as flat as possible” so that we can
view every new link. This flattening rescues social theory from the tendency of
mystification. He wants us to open the mysterious package called “the social” for
inspection. Instead of looking at reality from a macro view (traditional sociology, sociolinguistics, …), or micro perspective (ethnomethodology); global or local; we should see
them as local/micro that have their tentacles stretching wide and far as much as they are
situated in the here and now. As Latour says, “An action in the distant past, in a faraway
place, by actors now absent, can still be present, on condition that it be shifted, translated,
delegated, or displaced to other types of actants, those I have been calling nonhumans.
My Word Processor, your copy of Common Knowledge, Oxford University Press, the
International Postal Union, all of them organize, shape, and limit our interactions” (50).
Both the tendencies of forgetting micro by focusing on the macro or considering every
event or activity as purely local are problematic. When we consider every thing or event
as in itself a part of an assembly and linked with other mediators (institutions, objects,
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humans, perceptions, languages, etc.), potentially both “local” and “global,” through
translation and delegation, creating a micro and macro does not hold strong.
In short, Bruno Latour can also be taken as extending the practice theory trend of
challenging humanism and structuralism by adding in the role of artifacts/technology in
shaping our actions. He, like Giddens and Bourdieu, questions the binary between
subjectivism and objectivism, but by highlighting the need to consider the role of
“objects” in mediating actions, which, however, destabilizes practice theory notions of
the “social,” “habitus,” or “field” as these were largely considered stable despite their
criticism of humanist or structuralist determinisms.
Though practices are not the primary units of analysis in Latourian sociology of
associations, his theory does enrich the notion of practice by extending both cultural
materialist notions of practice and phenomenological materialist ideas of practice. The
active and full participation of mundane artifacts makes us rethink not only the things,
but also the sources of durability and change of social systems. With Latour the notion of
mediation becomes diversified.
Conclusion
Two materialist theories of mediation and practice I’ve reviewed here provide
some important insights into the nature of human actions and their relations to the sociomaterial world, not reduced to abstracted categories, but in their concrete material forms.
I see the cultural materialist theory of practice and the phenomenological materialist
theory of practice complementing each other, drawing our attention to both the
relationship between agency and structure on the one hand, and agency and the material
world on the other. While Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook’s focus on practice helps
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us see seemingly isolated acts as part of a nexus of sedimented practices, Latour’s call to
pay attention to the agency of missing masses makes us see how durability and change in
practices do not merely depend on human agents and social structures, but equally on a
network of actors, both human and non-human, both present and present in their seeming
absence. In reality, practice theory can show how discussion of human and non-human
agents in the absence of the nexus of practices can look as abstracted as practice theory
itself theorizing practice without paying attention to the agency of artefacts and
technologies. For instance, Bourdieu’s notion of field lacks the materiality of field in its
abstraction as values or norms whereas Latour’s guns become abstracted from the
practices of gun use in the US.
New materialist notions of agency as distributed and mediation as translation
makes us rethink the linear theories of mediation we have been accustomed to, whether it
is unidirectional or bidirectional. Practice theory (both cultural materialist and
phenomenological) challenged humanist and structural unidirectional theories of
mediation by viewing agency and structure as co-constitutive through recursive relations
between practices, agency, and structure. But models of that co-constitutive relation
remained largely limited to social structure and human agents, thereby making it hard to
account for the agentive roles of things excluded in that economy of mediation. More
ecological perspectives, like that of Thomas Rickert (ambient rhetoric) and Latour (actornetwork) provide us ways to account for agents of mediation beyond stable and
abstracted notions of the social and the individual. In other words, we talk about
relationship between technology and culture (ideology) or individual and technology, but
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do not often consider how our abstracted notions of technology, language, and modality
can be construed as part of a wider network of agents and practices.
Another important insight these theories offer is that practices and habitus shape
each other. Though new materialism rejects the notion of habitus the way it is used in
practice theory, it does not ignore the role of ideologies as one among the various
mediators, often dissembling the notion of ideology into various agents partaking in its
operation. Though practices and perceptions (representations) shape each other, we
should not understand that to mean a complete harmony between the two. It is possible,
and often realistic, to see the discrepancy between practices and
perceptions/thinking/ideologies. And this is very important when we analyze people’s
linguistic and multimodal practices because conflating the two gives us a mistaken
understanding of the linguistic situation and the potential of interventions.
Similarly, as human agents’ understanding and awareness changes depending on
their relationships with other actors in the ecology of mediation, the distinction between
discursive (in later theories, metadiscursive) vs. practical consciousness becomes
problematic. Going beyond thinking of human consciousness in relation to habitus and
doxa, new understanding of agency as distributed across networks of mediators and a
nexus of practices makes it hard to think of “reflexive”, “discursive” or “metadiscursive”
consciousness independent of such connections. However, no situation, whether those of
social breakdown or conflict, or constant intersections of cultural and linguistic practices
due to globalization, can make us free-floating agents capable of going beyond the links
we participate in. It is only a matter of delinking (from a set of network, often due to an
introduction of a new agent) and relinking (to a transformed network). And complete
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delinking often does not happen. That is why we see a discrepancy between practices and
dispositions.
In our current context, the nature of writing and its relation to writers and readers
have gone through some significant changes. In that context, it is important to understand
those changes not only in terms of variations in modalities and languages, or by
connecting them with larger forces alone like ideology or culture; but, rather, in a more
comprehensive way, trying to follow all the potential agents affecting our communicative
practices. Similarly, this rethinking of mediation also requires us to go beyond the
tendencies of abstracting practices and stabilizing discrete categories.
We can do so if we attend to the original meaning of the word composition from
its Latin root “composicion,” which meant an act of “putting together, connecting,
arranging” (Online Etymology Dictionary). Besides the two things this definition
suggests, composition as an “act” and an action of assembling things together, Latour
also reminds us to see the word “composition’s” close affinity with the word “compost,”
suggesting the explicit and implicit flavor a work of composition carries, often “due to
the active ‘de-composition’ of many invisible agents” (“Attempts” 474). Therefore, when
we think about composition/writing, we should pay attention to the panoply of (f)actors
that affect the act and the product of composition, rather than theorizing and analyzing
composition abstracted from these connections/invisible agents.
There are a few implications of thinking of composition this way. First, similar to
the implicit argument this whole chapter is making, this notion of composition reminds us
to discard the tendency of abstracting composition, whether it is from the materiality of
the text in a broader sense (technologies, languages in their material forms, and material
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conditions shaping and being shaped by such texts) or the history and network of
practices they participate in. Therefore, the dictum “follow the things13,” or follow the
traces of the actors captures the spirit of an ecological approach this chapter is
advocating.
The next two chapters show how dominant theories and studies of language
relations and composition and those of modality and technologies adopt problematic
tendencies of abstracting composition from practices due to the underlying linear theories
of mediation that they uphold. In the third chapter, I will critique additive models of
language ecology where languages are taken as fixed and stable, rather than viewing
them as material social practice always in translation due to the constant processes of
sedimentations. After the review of such tendencies, I will develop what I call a
mesodiscursive theory of language relations where I focus on relations and intersections
across language practices and their material social conditions, rather than the customary
focus on language structures or creative innovations in language use. In other words, I’ll
examine theories of language relations in terms of distributed mediation and demonstrate
how the tendencies of taking languages as discrete entities reifies language practices and
ignores the material social constraints affecting language use.

13

The term “things” is understood here as an “assembly.” So, things do not mean only the material objects,
but their histories, their role in specific practices they participate, and their material potentials and
limitations.
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CHAPTER 3
MEDIATION OF LANGUAGE DIFFERENCE AND COMPOSITION

Schools and workplaces in the US and all around the world are facing a
tremendous pressure to address the issue of language difference (see David Martins’
Transnational Writing Program Administration, Darin Payne and Daphne Desser’s
Teaching Writing in Globalization, etc.). Our classrooms are becoming more and more
multilingual and multidiscoursal (Matsuda; Canagarajah) with the constantly expanding
trend of globalization facilitated by the advancements in digital technologies, rapidly
increasing trend of immigration, and the rise in global commerce and trade. In the United
States, as Paul K. Matsuda and A. M. Preto-Bay and Kristine Hansen have said, the
number of multilingual students has grown exponentially in recent times. Data released
by the United States Department of Education shows that “while the population of five to
twenty-four-years-olds grew by 6% between 1979 and 1999, the number who spoke a
language other than English at home increased in the same period by 111%” (referenced
in Preto-Bay and Hansen 38). The report predicts that “by 2015, 30% of the school-aged
children will be children of immigrants, either first or second generation” (Preto-Bay and
Hansen 39). This data does not even include international students. In the global context,
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‘non-native’ speakers of English far outnumber its ‘native’ speakers (Crystal; Leung).14
As English is used in different discursive and material contexts, here in the U.S. and
beyond, it has been widely diversified by its interaction with various other language
practices. Then the central question that many of us are asking today is how can we
address the differences in language use in writing inside and outside classrooms? This
chapter tries to briefly assess some of the existing trends in language theories and offer an
alternative way to address the issue raised above.
Let me present an anecdote before moving to a discussion of the theories of
language difference and some inherent problems in them. In my recent conversation, a
colleague from my program recounted her experience working with a student in her
composition class. When she found several grammatical errors in his writing, e.g., wrong
use of article, clumsy and long sentences, she immediately thought of sending him to
writing center so that a ‘multilingual’ TA could solve his problem. She assumed that he
must have been an ESL student with a distinct kind of language. But the next day when
she met the student after her class and inquired about his background, she realized that he
actually was from what we normally call the mainstream community. She was genuine in
trying to understand his problem and helping him solve it. However, it is this tendency of
abstracting language from its use and making handy generalizations that indirectly does a
disservice to teachers’ genuine attempts at helping out students who desire and are also
forced to struggle to adapt to the abstract notion of standard language. Somewhat similar
to what Walter Mignolo says, it is important to question the tendency to link a particular
14

The notion of native speaker norm has come under challenge, as several linguists such as Paikeday
contend that the native speaker is “merely an ideal or a convenient linguistic fiction - myth, shibboleth,
sacred cow - an etherlike concept with no objective reality to it, albeit embodied in a quasi-privileged class
of speakers of each language” (p.21). Therefore, I am using the terms like “native” and “non-native” just
for convenience.
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group with a specific kind of language and culture, e.g., in this case, assuming that all
multilingual TAs can handle the issue of language diversity better than ‘monolingual’
TAs and that all ESL students have similar problems:
In other words, what the current stage of globalization is enacting is
(unconsciously) the uncoupling of the ‘natural’ link between languages
and nations, languages and national memories, languages and national
literatures. Thus it is creating the condition for and enacting the relocation
of languages and the fracture of cultures. Indeed, the very concept of
culture (and civilization in Huntington’s perspective) is difficult to sustain
as homogeneous spaces for people of common interests, goals, memories,
languages, and beliefs. (42)
As Mignolo contends, there lies a serious problem in such conceptions of language (or
culture or place): that certain kind of people use a certain kind of language, associating
language with place or people, with an assumption that languages and cultures are
separate and stable categories. As Louis-Jean Calvet says, the notion of language as such
is a mere abstraction from practices, especially in moving from the actual language use to
a handy notion of language as a stable category: “From these practices, which are very
concrete, linguists have extracted an abstraction, language ...” (6). And he further
contends that language as such does not exist in practice though it does exist in our belief:
“Here we come up against a paradox: there is something which does not exist, which
nobody can point to …, and which yet does exist in the eyes of everyone” (6). In other
words, when we think of language use inside or outside our classrooms, we need to think
of it not as mere abstraction, e.g., standard English or standard Indian English (suggesting
the uniformity of language use based on stable forms/norms), but as a material practice,
shaped by and shaping our dominant perception (representation) of it (abstract notion of
language), actual language use, and the accompanying modes, media, and artifacts
affecting the goals of language users. However, when we analyze notions of language or
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linguistic models often used in composition scholarship and outside this field, and also in
our teaching practices, we find an explicit or implicit presence of monolingual
assumptions.
In general, monolingualism refers to the tendency of taking only one language as
the norm. However, more specifically, it is, as Yasemin Yildiz defines, “much more than
a simple quantitative term designating the presence of just one language. Instead, it
constitutes a key structuring principle that organizes the entire range of modern social
life, from the construction of individuals and their proper subjectivities to the formation
of disciplines and institutions, as well as of imagined collectivities such as cultures and
nations” (2). In her analysis, the present condition, which she calls the postmonolingual
condition, marks the “field of tension in which the monolingual paradigm continues to
assert itself and multilingual practices persist or reemerge” (5). So, she urges us to
understand the present language practices and politics in the West as multilingual
attempts to resist the monolingual paradigm, though with the persistence of monolingual
assumptions even in many multilingual works. Her example of the conceptual artwork
Wordsearch, in which the artist uses one word each from 250 languages spoken in New
York, and translates them in all these languages shows how seemingly multilingual work
can uphold the monolingual paradigm. Despite it being multilingual in the sense that it
uses multiple languages, it “fits within a monolingual framework by identifying the
contributing individuals in terms of one language only” (Horner, “Review of The
Postmonolingual Condition 355).
This monolingual tendency of identifying one language with one ethnicity, nation,
culture, and writing tradition assumes “languages as discrete, stable, internally uniform,
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and linked indelibly to what is held to be each writer’s likewise stable and uniform
location and social identity” (Lu and Horner, “Matters of Agency” 583). This belief
appears in several forms. As Yildiz contends, even in our own attempt to resist
monolingualism and its consequences, as in her example of Wordsearch, we end up
retaining some of the assumptions of monolingualism, sometimes pluralizing
monolingualism in an attempt to promote multilingualism, whereas sometimes
overemphasizing the agency of the users of certain linguistic background, thereby
locating agency in individuals than in the interplay between a variety of (f)actors and
nexus of practices.
In this chapter, I will analyze some of the dominant language models that, despite
their attempt at resisting monolingualism, retain some of its assumptions, and offer an
alternative approach to language use and language relations in an attempt to go beyond
such assumptions and limited theorization of language mediation. The problematic nature
of these language models has become increasingly apparent as a consequence of recent
demographic and other social changes—e.g., global immigration patterns, increasing
intersections of language practices, and facilitations of such intersections by new forms
of technologies.
I will develop a theory of language relations that, first, seeks to go beyond the
paradigms of the dominant language theories that regard languages as discrete and stable
entities and, second, also critiques the romanticized version of multilingual agency where
multilinguals are represented as naturally capable of shuttling across languages.
Therefore, I argue that we need to go beyond the focus either on stable language
structures or on the free-floating agency of individual language users, and locate
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language use in specific practice in its spatio-temporal contexts. In doing so, we need to
pay attention to the mesodiscursive relations where language practices, their
representations, and the network of actors shape, interact, and co-construct each other.
When we consider language structurations and agency in this mesodiscursive way, the
focus shifts from limited considerations of agency and ideology to account for (f)actors
that contribute to the production of difference/sameness in communicative acts.
Major Language Models
English monolingualism is still dominant in our teaching practices even if it has
been challenged in recent scholarship on language both within writing studies and
beyond. It is the tendency to take languages in their abstraction, removing them from
their lived practices and their history. It “fails to recognize the actual heterogeneities of
language practices” in specific situations (Horner and Lu, “Resisting” 141). Many
alternative models such as World Englishes, English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), Defense
of National Language (DNL), Multilingualism, and Plurilingualism15 have been
developed to counter and to go beyond monolingual assumptions. However, despite these
models’ appreciation of the value of diversity in languages and cultures, they still retain
some of the fundamental assumptions of monolingual ideology, especially in their
reification of language practices. In other words, all these language models end up being
different permutations of the same monolingualist ideology in assuming language
competence as stable or in locating language ability in individual language users. Even if
some accounts, e.g., the recently developed translingual approach, do overcome

15

These terms have been used with a variety of meanings. I’m here considering the dominant
understandings of these models and how they are problematic.
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monolingual tendency, as Juan Guerra contends, they fall short in treating language as
practice in its entirety, often limiting themselves to the interplay between individual
language users and language ideologies. In the next section, I present how language
theories, both in applied linguistics and composition, fail to treat language as a lived
practice mediating and mediated by an array of (f)actors both present and present in their
absence in any semiotic activity. I contend, following Latour, Calvet, and Pennycook that
any analyses and assessment of language use should observe the complex network of
mediations affecting and shaping language activities, including student writing. I argue
that this approach to language differences, which I call mesodiscursive, may help some
teachers avoid not only the tendency to take languages as stable and discrete systems and
contrarily the tendency to romanticize the competence of multilingual users, but also that
of limiting discussions of language difference to broad categories like language ideology,
social context or to abstracted language strategies like code-meshing or code-switching,
thereby ignoring the heterogeneities and complexities immanent in any communicative
situations.
In applied linguistics, as Alastair Pennycook says in his article “English as a
Language Always in Translation,” approaches like WE, ELF16, and DNL give more focus
to “form” rather than practice by either highlighting how new forms and structures have

16

Some writers also use the term EIL (English as an International Language) somewhat similarly and with
similar larger logic. As Barbara Seidlhofer states, “ELF is part of the more general phenomenon of ‘English
as an International Language’ (“English Lingua Franca,” 339). The basic assumption of EIL that English is
a global language where as other languages are local is deeply flawed and also serves the hegemonic
interest by ignoring how many other languages are also used in international contexts. Similarly, the
general EIL tendency to equate English with opportunity and upward mobility also marks abstraction of
language from its complex roles and uses.
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emerged in localized varieties, 17 or by proposing to develop a common core of English
language across all varieties,18 or defending national language against the hegemonic
influence of English.19 In all these models, Pennycook maintains, despite variations in
their focuses, languages are taken in terms of abstract rules and forms, ignoring how
languages actually work and develop through practice.
There are some linguists even within ELF studies who question the tendency of
taking ELF as a stable variety. They rather view ELF as function. For instance, Patricia
Friedrich and Aya Matsuda, drawing on others who view ELF as function and critiquing
those who view it as a variety, contend:
We use the expression ELF as an umbrella term to describe functions of
English within the broadest spectrum and context of English use
possible…. We posit that in contexts where English is used as a lingua
franca, each speaker uses a linguistic variety that he or she happens to
know and then employs various communicative strategies to carry out
successful interactions …. Using a framework that conceptualizes ELF as
a function, rather than a linguistic variety, captures the dynamic nature of
situation-based linguistic choices, recognizes the importance of
nonlinguistic factors … in communication, and allows us to study the ELF
phenomenon multidimensionally and holistically. (22).
Friedrich and Matsuda, similar to Canagarajah in many of his publications20, do question
dominant ELF theory in their focus on fluidity of English use in specific lingua franca
contexts. However, they still do assume that speakers in such contexts do bring their
language variety, while employing a variety of linguistic and extra-linguistic strategies to
successfully communicate. Their approach, while focusing on the function of English
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Braj Kachru’s (2005) Asian Englishes and Yamuna Kachru and Cecil Nelson’s (2006) World Englishes
are good examples of the World Englishes model.
18
See Jennifer Jenkins’ Phonology of Language and Andy Kirkpatrick’s “Which Model of English”;
Barbara Seidlhofer’s “English as Lingua Franca” as examples of the English as Lingua Franca approach.
19
Phillipson’s English Only Europe and his “English for Globalization”, and Michael Joseph and Esther
Ramani’s “English in the World” represent the DNL approach to the hegemony of English language in
global scale.
20
See, for instance, Canagarajah’s “Lingua Franca English.”
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language in ELF situations, does retain a monolingual tendency present in dominant ELF
and WE approaches in their inability to see how even the varieties that such users use are
never stable in non-ELF situations too.
In short, all these approaches assume languages as having separate and stable
cores and seem to ignore the fact that languages transform and are transformed by their
interactions with other language practices due to various factors associated with
language, including diverse rhetorical and epistemological differences, shifts in the
demography of language users, and changing roles and positions of them in constantly
changing language ecologies. In other words, they don't locate language in practice, as a
"local practice," in Pennycook's phrase, but as something that exists prior to and separate
from practice, which is then put into practice.
Similarly, while focusing on structural differences, they also ignore the role of
individual practices in transforming language structures. In other words, these approaches
do acknowledge transformations in the nature of English language due to various broader
socio-historical changes. However, they tend to fall victim to the same logic of stability
of language norms that they critique in advocating for or believing in the new set of
norms as standards. They thereby not only gloss over the role of individual agency in
negotiating and transforming both local and global, micro and macro structures, but also
homogenize the heterogeneities in every local use of language and discount the agentive
role of several non-human actants. Thus, they retain the traditional tendency of viewing
languages as primarily governed by preexisting systems or structures, thereby retaining
the assumption about language fixity even when talking about language diversity.
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Another permutation of the monolingual ideology appears in the monolingual
version of bilingualism/multilingualism. The dominant model of multilingualism, unlike
general notions of monolingualism, does acknowledge the value of different languages
and cultures. However, in many cases, the general and dominant understanding of
multilingualism suffers from the same problem that the other approaches such as WE,
ELF, and DNL suffer. In this additive model of multilingualism, multilingualism is used
to refer to separate competencies in two or more languages. In other words, languages are
taken as discrete systems where “the ultimate goal for language learning was to become,
feel, and speak like an idealized native speaker” (Moore and Gajo 139). In such cases,
bilingualism becomes “double monolingualism” (Heller 48) and multilingualism “little
more than pluralization of monolingualism” (Pennycook, Language as a Local Practice
10). As in the monolingual tradition, language competence is measured in terms of native
speaker norms of separate languages. Such an additive model of multilingualism is based
on the assumptions of the discreteness and internal uniformity of all languages. In this
version, what counts is monolingual representation of multilingualism rather than
questioning such representation based on the complexity of language practices on the
ground. They completely negate translingual mediations and resultant transformations. In
other words, though this form of multilingualism goes beyond an “English Only” form of
monolingualism in terms of recognizing the importance of appreciating the value of
different languages, it fails to see languages as mediated by material social practices
while themselves shaping them in turn. In this model, the sole focus is on generalized
formalistic notions of language and language competence. Thus multilingualism does not
serve the broader purposes of enhancing understanding and critical awareness about
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different discourse practices and fighting the monolingual tendency of demanding perfect
use of a language, free from any traces of the influence of other language. Rather, as
Pennycook says, “the struggle over diversity as numerical plurality …. this focus on
glossodiversity at the expense of semiodiversity…obscures the potential role of language
education in the production of diversity” (“Translation” 34). And additive
multilingualism ignores the inevitability of “traffic” within, amongst, and between the
artificial ideological boundaries separating languages, cultures, and peoples.
In order to avoid monolingual assumptions of the traditional version of
multilingualism, many language theorists have offered alternative ways of rethinking
about multilingualism. European linguists, such as Daniel Coste and Diana-Lee Simon,
and Danièle Moore, have put forward their notion of plurilingualism and suggest that “the
language competence of bilinguals should not be regarded as the simple sum of two
monolingual competences, but should rather be appreciated in conjunction with the user’s
repertoire of total linguistic resources” (Moore and Gajo 139). In contrast to additive
model of multilingualism where multilingualism merely means two or more separate
monolingualisms (Canagarajah; Heller; Pennycook), plurilingualism “allows for the
interaction and mutual influence of the language in a more dynamic way” (Canagarajah,
“Multilingual Strategies” 7). In short, a plurilingual approach considers linguistic
differences that multilinguals bring with them in language negotiations not as a problem
or a deficit but as a resource, thereby rejecting the major tendency of monolingual policy
to keep languages separate and advocate mastery in one, idealized form of dominant
language. I will extend this notion, however, with an equal emphasis that the differences
in linguistic traditions and cultural values, and the dominance of the monolingual
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ideology even in multilingual individuals, can work as constraint in working across
cultures and languages. Thinking of language competence in terms of resources and
repertoires, first, goes against the notion of language as practice; second, it places
competence in individuals’ ability to collect such resources and use them critically as
they desire. In other words, I will also problematize the notion of resources as used in
plurilingualism where it suggests language features as entities that users can pick and
choose, rather than viewing them as language potentials that users can utilize based on
their history of that language use in specific situations, however, with an awareness that
they may not acquire the result they desire.
With its overemphasis on resources and individual competence, plurilingualism
often undermines constraints, leading towards romanticization of the agency of
multilingual language users, which, by placing competence on individual users, retains a
monolingual tendency in plurilingual guise. In an attempt to counter monolingual
hegemony, this approach, as in the case of Moore and Gajo, “concentrates on the
individual rather than the community as its angle of vision” (141) and places more
emphasis on the individual as a “social actor, with agency and choice” (150). The idea of
romanticization becomes further substantiated by the fact that plurilingual theorists try to
highlight their idea that multilingual individuals, due to their multilingual resources,
exercise metalinguistic and metadiscursive awareness (Jesner; Moore). As Moore and
Gajo claim: “Heightened awareness has been described as one key asset available to
bi/plurilinguals, which can be explained by a salient difference regarding the arbitrariness
of signs, and is dependent on the number of languages involved” (147). It is true that
multilingual practices can potentially enable multilingual language users to become more
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conscious about their language use. However, these theorists’ characterizations of
multilingual people’s experiences as a “‘plurilingual strategic tool-box’—or ‘plurilingual
asset’” and their focus on individual competence rather than linguistic practice(s), push
them towards what Latourians would probably call the humanistic fallacy (Moore and
Gajo 147).
In emphasizing metadiscursive awareness, the plurilingualists tend to
underestimate how social relations, material limitations, and the force of dominant belief
can pose powerful constraints to individuals. Therefore, this trend of overemphasizing
agency and metadiscursive awareness pushes multilingualism towards its potential
romanticization. Suresh Canagarajah’s notion of plurilingual competence and his theory
of shuttling between languages offer us an apt example of such romanticization of
multilingualism.
His account of shuttling between languages presents multilingual writers as if
they can easily hop on and hop off languages due to their membership in local
multilingual communities: “the LFE [Lingua Franca English] speakers come with the
competence in many respects, more advanced than that of the child because of the
multilingual practice enjoyed in their local communities—which is then honed through
actual interaction” (2006, “Place of World Englishes” 928). It is perhaps true that some
multilinguals develop a more open and tolerant attitude towards language difference due
to their exposure to diverse linguistic and semiotic practices. But the problem with this
plurilingual notion is that it tends to assume competence as already ingrained in
individuals, whether multilingual or monolingual. Canagarajah does acknowledge that
competence is emergent and that it needs to be sharpened through interaction. However,
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he at the same time believes that LFE speakers “come with” or bring with them a more
advanced level of competence than monolingual users as if it were something that they
would carry with them and take out and use when necessary, thus suggesting the stability
of multilingual expertise. This is similar to the “tool-box” notion of multilingual
resources/experiences that we just saw in Moore and Gajo.
Similarly, in discussing multilingual competence, it is important to distinguish
between users’ fluency in different languages and the kind of ideology they believe in. In
other words, it is important to understand the relationship between orientation/disposition
and practices and to distinguish between the two. For instance, a student may have some
experiences of working across languages in particular settings and some fluency in many
languages--say, Hindi, English, Nepali, and Newari--while at the same time believing in
monolingual ideology that we should use or strive to use only one language, in its purest
form, in writings (or speaking). It does not mean that they are not developing multilingual
competence; it rather means that there sometimes is a big chasm between what such
students practice and what they believe in. However, at the same time, it is equally
necessary to see whether the discrepancy between practices and perceptions transform
perceptions. And this discrepancy between lived practices and abstracted representations
of such practices in policies and ideologies makes language negotiations of multilinguals
even more difficult and frustrating. However, plurilingual theorists, in an effort to counter
the debilitating effects of the dominance of monolingualism in the academy and outside,
tend to ignore such difficulties and labor, and rather end up romanticizing multilingual
competence.
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Additionally, the habitus built through the multilingual experiences in local
communities may also pose constraints in negotiating language difference in other
situations due to the specific nature of the habitus. First, the nature of communication
changes with the changes in the participants in new situations, transforming the same
language user into a different individual due to the constant shifts she needs to make in
her linguistic and extralinguistic strategies depending on who the other participants are
and their language beliefs and practices. Second, this account will be incomplete, and
therefore misleading, if we assume only the human participants as in control of
communicative acts, deliberately and freely picking, discarding, and manipulating the
other elements of a communicative ecology. For instance, when we assess or analyze any
writing of a composition student only in terms of his/her language identity
(multilingual/monolingual/ESL, etc) and the state of language ideology, we risk ignoring
how that student’s specific material condition, classroom infrastructure, her/his history of
language learning, etc, have influenced her language beliefs and practices. Therefore, we
need to try to take account of the other agents that in any way modify or mediate
communicative acts and its results. In doing so, as Bruno Latour believes, it will be a
mistake to simply lump everything that affects communication or any other semiotic act
as multilingual or monolingual identity, ‘social context’ or language ‘ideology’ in blanket
fashion. Rather, we should try to locate each and every potential agent or delegate that
changes the nature and goals of communicative acts as much as possible. To think of any
semiotic act, including writing, only in terms of the writer/language user and ideology
(monolingual/multilingual/plurilingual) and assuming every other aspect as
manifestations of the dominant ideology or the reflection of social context (taken as
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homogeneous) as we find in many accounts of language negotiations, is to ignore how
things other than humans and ideologies also mediate activities of writing and
communication.
Let us take an example of Ramakanta Agnihotri’s study of plurilingual practices
in India, especially his description of taxi drivers’ communicative practices toward the
end of his essay. He presents his observation that “almost every auto-rickshaw and taxi
driver in Bangalore is functionally competent in three or four languages” (8). He
contends at the end of his article, based on his descriptions of multilingual practices
similar to that of taxi drivers, that multilingualism should be practiced and promoted in
classrooms. It is not clear, however, that first, they would do well outside their locale,
though their prior experience might help them negotiate language practices as cab drivers
elsewhere. This is because their language habitus is always shaped by the local context of
their language use. Second, the plurilingual practices in informal and out-of-class
situations may not appropriately capture the dynamic of language relations in formal
academic situations where participants, their relations and roles, language beliefs of the
participants, language policy as manifested in assignment prompts and course
descriptions, etc. make the nature of language negotiation very different. The tendency of
equating plurilingual experiences in one context, especially in out-of-class informal
situations, with those in very different circumstances, e.g., classroom writing, succumbs
to the tradition of abstracting language practices by arguing that the same thing happens
in formal writings. In other words, it is important to note that despite their multilingual
experiences, many students are governed by monolingual belief, and therefore, struggle
to acquire an idealized monolingual competence. However, it will also be a big mistake

79

to think that all classroom situations are similar because most of the teachers and students
are governed by monolingual ideology.
The example of the Malayasian student that Canagarajah uses from Min-Zhan
Lu’s study shows how he seems to have ignored the powerful presence of English
monolingualism that shapes students in ways to make them avoid “error” as much as
possible. In other words, this example shows how “functional competence” to shuttle
across languages may not be enough in many classroom situations. This study clearly
shows how difficult it is for the students to actually shuttle between languages when the
classroom situation often makes them feel that they need to use perfect “standard”
English. In other words, the expectations within and outside the academy, both actual and
perceived, make them actually want to reproduce the dominant discourse. Even in such a
highly encouraging situation, the Malaysian student in Lu’s study chose to reiterate the
“conventions” of “standard” English. So, appreciation of deliberate acts of code-meshing
should be complemented by our close attention to implicit traces of difference, especially
in the use of the same language structure/vocabulary for difference in meaning. It seems
that plurilingual theorists’ concern to debunk monolingualist ideology risks making codemeshing/shuttling between languages a natural competence for all multilingual speakers,
a competence that multilingual speakers want to hone all the time.21 When we focus on
such code meshing practices, we may dismiss how a large number of people are not only
forced to but also desire to imitate the norms of the “standard” language, which, however,
results in the transformation of meaning even in their reiteration. My major concern is
21

Even if Canagarajah critiques the Chomskian model of natural competence, he seems to have fallen
victim to a similar model by assuming expertise of multilingual speakers as natural competence to be
“honed by actual interaction.” It is quite different to think of language repertoire as resources for
multilingual speakers to tap into in confronting difficult communicative situations and to think of it as part
of natural competence applicable to all situations.
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that, by focusing on some code-meshing practices of expert writers and not fully
describing what explicit and implicit (f)actors that have made such language acts
possible, we are dismissing the struggles that thousands of students are engaging in in
their attempt to “master” standard English, thereby ignoring what Min-Zhan Lu calls
“living-English” or what Calvet calls language practices.
After all, Canagarajah and other plurilingual theorists’ contention in favor of
code-meshing (which actually looks like code-switching), with examples of established
writers like Geneva Smitherman and K Sivatambi, or some students like Buthaina, serves
as another instance of the tendency of reification of language use. As Juan C. Guerra
contends in his recent article “From Code-Segregation to Code-Switching to CodeMeshing,” writers like Canagarajah and Vershawn Young ignore practice while focusing
on policy (37). Guerra argues that Canagarajah and Young conflate code-switching with
code-segregation, while I contend, they also create false sense of division between codeswitching and code-meshing:
Despite his affinity for code-meshing, Canagarajah at times still sounds
like an advocate for code-switching as progressive scholars conceptualize
it: ‘Rather than developing mastery in a single ‘target language,’ he
contends, students should strive for competence in a repertoire of codes
and discourses. Rather than simply joining a speech community, students
should learn to shuttle between communities in contextually relevant
ways’. (8)
Guerra disagrees with most of the translingual scholars in composition, including
Canagarajah, Young, Horner, and Lu due to their conflating of code-segregation with
what he calls a progressive form of code switching. It is true that such a form of codeswitching offers productive ways of countering the effects of monolingual hegemony.
However, at the same time, by his own implicit division between progressive and what

81

we may infer as regressive forms of code-switching, it becomes clear that translingual
scholars’ critique of accommodationist (code-switching) approach as monolingualist
appropriation of code-switching does have an important significance. In other words,
while Guerra is right in pointing that theorizing language difference should not ignore
practice, translingual scholars are right in pointing out the fundamental similarities
between what Guerra would call a progressive form of code switching and regressive
notions of code-switching (code-segregation). Though Guerra contends that he focuses
on practice while others focus on policy, I contend that both do tend to partially focus on
practice, while also interrogating language policies, however ignoring to account for the
heterogeneities of factors affecting any communicative act, and therefore, limiting
practice to either code-meshing (Canagarajah and Young) or code switching or both
(Guerra). When we focus on practice, we should go beyond advocating code-meshing,
code-switching, or any other strategy, to describe and analyze a complex ecology of
semiotic practice where we do not limit ourselves to language users and language
ideologies. The case of the highlighting deliberate and intentional instances of
codemeshing as creating instances of language use similar to innovative uses of language
in modernist writers like James Joyce or accomplished writers like Geneva Smitherman
actually reproduces the same humanist logic of agency and creativity. The point here is
not whether our students can or cannot do so, it is rather the tendency of taking such
instances as isolated from practice. Even the often cited examples of linguistic
inventiveness are part of practices. While the example of “can able to” and Buthaina’s
use of Arabic script in Canagarajah’s study are explicit instances of codemeshing, the
Malaysian student’s seeming reiteration of the “norm” of the SWE, in her use of “may be
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able to,” in place of “can able to” does create difference in meaning. However, these
different instances should not be equated as intentional uses of creative code-meshing
afforded to multilingual users due to their plurilingual “tool-box/assets.” Rather, different
ecologies of mediation in these different cases shape the way English was used (with
Arabic script or without any apparent difference). Our focus should be on what sociomaterial conditions and what nexus of linguistic and other social practices enables or
constrains students’ varying uses of language.
In summing up the discussion of the romanticization of multilingualism, we can
say that some plurilingual theorists regard multilinguals as “free-floating” individuals
boosted by their history of language use and unrestrained by the actual contexts in which
their negotiating expertise needs to be constantly relocalized through transformative
meaning making. By highlighting individual competence or lack thereof, these
plurilingual theorists contribute to the tendency of the false stabilization of such
expertise, rather than seeing it as always emergent, shaped by and shaping specific local
contexts. They seem to have ignored how changing configurations of the range of power
relations and the power differential ratio in each relation, in addition to the varying
degree of availability and the role of material artifacts, can affect communication. In the
context of the still persisting monolingual tradition in US composition, we need to pay
attention to how and whether students forge difference in meaning even in reproducing
standard discourse conventions. The singular focus on code-meshing can risk
encouraging teachers to only look for obvious differences and ignore the meaning
potentials of seemingly repetitive, imitative acts. Unfortunately, such a tendency, as
Theresa Lillis and Carolyn McKinney contend in their brief comment on current
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language theories, disregards practice in favor of simplistic notions of rhetorical
appropriateness and awareness (427).
Mesodiscursive Approach and Language Use
As discussed so far, the three major tendencies that I find problematic in terms of
theorization of language use are, first, reconstructing a stable linguistic core, thereby
ignoring both local heterogeneities and historical changes (WE, ELF and DNL); second,
pluralizing monolingualism (additive multilingualism); and third, romanticizing
multilingual competence (plurilingualism). In essence, all three categories are
manifestations of an underlying monolingualist ideology locating language ability in
individuals and marking their identity as fixed and tied to language use, whether
multilingual, plurilingual, or monolingual. All three also treat language use or practice as
fixed, though in different ways. Going against the two former tendencies and
complicating the third, this paper proposes, based on Pennycook’s theory of language as
a local practice, Calvet’s notion of language ecology, and Latour’s idea of sociology of
translation, what I call a mesodiscursive approach to language diversity, which focuses
on practice, however, without excluding policies and ideologies. In calling this practice
theory approach to language difference “mesodiscursive,” I am trying to go beyond a
limited notion of practice in the social theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, and Pennycook to
synthesize their notion of practice with Latour’s notion of mediation in what is generally
called actor-network theory. By using the term mesodiscursive, I intend to focus not on
something between micro level activity and macro forces (e.g., ideology), but on the need
to always observe and analyze how a specific way of language use mediates and is
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mediated by a network of (f)actors, both human and non-human, both materially present
and absent, in a particular moment of that language use.
Alastair Pennycook has developed a theory of language based on the practice theories of Bourdieu
and Giddens, among many others. His theory highlights the always local nature of language use, however,
with a recognition that it gets somewhat predictable due to the sedimented patterns emerging out of
repetitive nature of language use. He conceives practice as a midway between little “d” discourse and big
“D” discourse, thereby offering a way to avoid both the stability of language norms and a romanticized
theory of multilingual agency implicated in other approaches discussed above. Here, language structure is
conceived, unlike in structuralism, as the sedimented patterns emerging from its repetitive use in a
particular local space (Pennycook, Language as a Local Practice 9). In defining language as a local
practice, Pennycook first seeks to go beyond the traditional notion of “context” and takes local to mean the
particular space as related to other terms like “regional, national, global, universal . . .,” where it is not
opposed to what is global, but can also be constitutive of and constituted by such things as global (4). And
he gets out of the tendencies of taking language as a mere instrument of a larger Discourse on one hand and
taking it as always contingent and fluid. Therefore, he calls language a practice that goes midway between
the little “d” discourse and the big “D” Discourse (as in Gee).

He derives his theory of practice from, among others, Bourdieu and Giddens, who
use the term “practice” and “habitus” to “steer a course between the grand and seemingly
deterministic theories of critical social science, where human action is a by-product of
larger social structures, and the voluntaristic views of humanism” (Pennycook 27). In this
sense, instead of focusing on abstract system and pre-existing standards, we need rather
to highlight how structural patterns emerge and evolve over time through language users’
reiterations of patterns of language use in specific locations.
Pennycook’s adoption of practice from social theorists like Bourdieu and Giddens
gives a richer dimension to the existing notion of language practice where practice is
taken merely as an application, similar to the notion of a specific use. His sense of
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historicity (the temporal dimension of language practice) in his use of the term practice
and his sense of spatiality in his use of the term local offer us a way to view language
neither merely in terms of its origin and development nor merely in terms of ahistorical
structure or norms.
In his account, the interplay between the individual use and the shared habitus
during a particular instance of exchange makes both the assumptions of radical
contingency and stabilty unrealistic. Here, individual language use and social
structurations of language are co-dependent and co-constitutive. Therefore, as Pennycook
says, every individual language practice is a “mediating social activity where we do
things both because we want to and along lines laid down by habit, propriety, cultural
norms or political dictates. It is therefore useful to explore the meso-political space of
practice that lies between the local and the global” (Emphasis mine; LLP 23).
It is important here to mark how Pennycook departs from language and literacy
scholars like J P Gee who have adopted Foucault’s notion of discourse as allencompassing system. Pennycook, on the contrary, views it as a mesopolitical space
between the little ‘d’ discourse and big ‘D’ Discourse, suggesting his critique of the dual
tendencies of taking language use apolitically as individual speech interaction and taking
it as a part of larger system of discursive power. Pennycook, following Bourdieu and
Giddens, brings social theory from its obsession with individual freedom and discursive
interpellation to view these two phenomena as mutually co-constitutive.
In other words, we need to pay attention to the meso space of relations instead of
an over attention to the micro at the cost of ignoring the macro as we saw in plurilingual
accounts of language negotiation or an over attention to the macro while undermining the
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role of the micro as we saw in the other three approaches just discussed above. What
individuals do does not depend only on what they want; it is also guided by the
structuring forces in global-local relations of power.
Hence, I intend to highlight the relation between language norms as perceived by
the users and dictated by the dominant representation of such language, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, individual practices, especially the idea that they constitute and
transform each other. Discarding the idea of language structure as preexisting system or
individual language users as free-floating agents, I propose to view language structures
as, in Giddens’ sense, both the “medium and the outcome” of individual language
practices (25). So, the focus here is not on “either/or” but on the interplay: how language
shapes an individual and how an individual transforms it. Therefore, the meso, the inbetween position, suggests the dynamic space that is characterized by the tensions
between individual agency and social-historical constraints often represented by forms of
various domains of representations. In thinking about the relationships between the
dominant discourse and individual agency we need to attend to the role dominant belief
plays, especially how it can pose constraints to individual agency. However, at the same
time, as I’ll discuss a little later, we also need to be careful not to think of ideology as
affecting individuals homogeneously.
Louis-Jean Calvet’s notion of language ecology where he emphasizes studying
language not as abstraction but as a concrete material practice complements Pennycook’s
theory of language as a local practice. Calvet emphasizes two things: representations and
practices, each shaping and affecting the other. While Pennycook’s notion of practice
adds a temporal dimension to Calvet’s more spatial/horizontal notion of practices, the
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equal focus of Calvet on representations adds the role of power relations and ideology on
language use, but not as sole arbiter of meanings. Similarly, Calvet urges us to see
language in relation to other aspects of the ecology, including various other modes.
While Pennycook and other practice theorists are right that the dichotomy
between and a singular focus on agency and/or structure is not productive and can not
accurately describe the dynamics of social actions, including language use, it is also
equally necessary to expand their practice theory from the interplay between individual
agency and social structure to recognize the heterogeneities of factors in what they
customarily call social structure and bring them as participants as much as we focus on
individuals. In other words, we need to recognize not only individuals and social
ideologies, but also objects and symbols, not as carriers of human motives or social
ideologies, but as mediators in their own right in our actions and their consequences.
Pennycook replaces context with local to avoid the assumption of stability
associated with context. However, similar to the social theorists he adopts, he still limits
the scope of the mediators of any actions to individuals and the social (in the form of
habitus, practice, etc.), thereby not exploring the full complexities of the relations of
mediations across all potential (f)actors, both human and non-human alike. In what I see
as an extension of practice theory, Bruno Latour problematizes the notion of social in
fields like sociology (sociolinguistics too) and critical theory, especially to avoid the
assumption of homogeneity and stability in the existing view of the social:
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists,
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics,
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on
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the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology,
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5)
To avoid the sense of fixity, he uses terms like collective and associations. In his theory,
what we often tend to understand as social context is but a collective, meaning
associations and relations among various (f)actors in a given situation. By emphasizing
associations in place of social context, he is pointing to local heterogeneities in what we
call social context, and fluidity in the relationships between various (f)actors affecting
what we call individual actions. In some sense Latour’s notion of the collective is similar
to Calvet’s notion of ecology though they use different terminologies.
What I see all these three theorists as doing in terms of social theory (of language,
technology, or any social action) is trying to focus on the relations and associations
between and across various aspects of the ‘social’ situation. While Pennycook and other
practice theorists focus on relations between individual agency and social structure
through practice, Latour adds non-human actors affecting specific acts in communicative
practices. Therefore, I’m using the term mesodiscourse and mesospace to capture these
various notions of relations, not only between micro and macro (individual and social),
but also across human and non-human actors.
It is important here to mark, as Bruno Latour contends in his book Reassembling
the Social, the importance of seeing an individual as a part of a particular network of
actors and their constantly shifting (or not so constantly) associations. It is those
associations with which Latour replaces the stable notion of the “social” in sociology and
critical theory. With this shift in terminology, what he is trying to do is not to ignore the
“social” in the discussion of individual actions, but to point to the heterogeneities within
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the “social,” often resulting from shifting associations, emergence/introduction of new
participants, or/and the exit of old participants, or constant transformations of these
participants. And his notion of actor/participant incudes not only humans, but also nonhumans. What I see Latour doing here is updating practice theory by reminding us that
any practice, including that of language, involves not only an individual and the social
(manifested in various forms, including dominant ideologies), but also artifacts or
objects.
In using the term mesodiscursive relations, I am trying to expand Pennycook’s
use of the term mesopolitical practice. His account of language as mesopolitical practice
does help us avoid the binary between notions of discursive interpellation and individual
freedom by making us aware that they constitute and transform each other. However, it is
better to come out of the spatial sense of “meso” in the sense that it seems to take a
midway between macro and micro factors. At the same time, I find the usefulness of the
term meso in a different sense: as relations between actants in a network of complex
mediation, rather than a midway between the micro and the macro. Similarly, I also don’t
yet want to discard discourse here for a few reasons. First, I want to use it in one of the
original senses: “a running to and fro” or “action” of “run[ning] about.” This sense of the
term “discourse,” coupled with the term “meso,” does evoke the sense of network
between a variety of actants affecting any individual act. Second, I don’t want to discard
how ideology or discourse do partly shape our beliefs and language use. However, I don’t
use discourse as an abstract system of norms, but as representations that operate through
different material things, institutions, and individual practices, which in turn, transform
discourse practices themselves. In not discarding Pennycook’s adaptation of language as
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a discourse practice, the phrase “mesodiscursive approach” tries to acknowledge that it is
important not to gloss over the role of dominant ideologies and power relations operating
in our society and institutions in perpetuating dominant beliefs in certain ways. But at the
same time, rethinking discourse from a materialist perspective offers us a way to see
durability (or lack of) as a function not of internal workings of a system, but of material
conditions and other (f)actors making durability or transformation possible. Viewing
language use from a mesodiscursive perspective, therefore, helps us both to imagine
possible ways for transforming dominant assumptions of monolingualism in terms of
specific situations and for understanding the reasons behind the durability of
monolingualism in different guises in our institutions. In other words, we pay attention
not to mysterious notions of power, which have the potential to make us passive or desire
to reproduce the idealized conventions of powerful discourse, but to the real possibilities
of initiating change through disruptions in existing relations of mediations.
At the same time, the focus on relations across various mediators of actions in a
mesodiscursive approach should not assume the prior existence of any participant or
ideological system. Rather, the focus here is on moving from the traces of difference,
e.g., “error” in student writing, to the possible factors contributing to that difference,
without trying to reduce heterogeneities and avoid uncertainties by taking recourse to any
sweeping notions, e.g., ESL, multilingual, or mainstream students.
In short, taking a mesodiscursive approach to language relations means analyzing
language use as a material practice, which is constantly mediating and mediated by
different other language practices, perceptions, writing technologies, artifacts, and
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specific contexts and histories of language users. However, it is always possible that one
or a few (f)actors might dominate others in various specific situations. For instance, in
formal classroom situations, teachers’ language beliefs, students’ own perceptions of
language norms, and institutional policies might play a greater role than writing
technologies used (e.g., the use of blog or wiki or blackboard). Whereas, in informal and
more open spaces like Facebook and blogs, the affordances of technologies and writers’
history of the uses of those technologies might play a greater role, it will be a mistake to
ignore seemingly minor mediators because incremental changes in our institutions are
more realistic than radical.
This way of theorizing language relations and language use tends to avoid the
tendencies of taking languages as discrete and multilinguals as free-floating agents. In a
few examples below, I’ll try to present how plurilingual and other accounts of language
practice are problematic and how we can reinterpret these examples alternatively and
perhaps more productively. In presenting and analyzing these cases, I will particularly
focus on a) the difficulty of language negotiations, often resulting from the tendency of
assuming discreteness of different language traditions and b) the problem of reifying
language from its use, ignoring specific conditions and material (f)actors enabling or
limiting translingual/multilingual practices.
Arjuna Parakrama’s De-hegemonizing Language Standards, as the title itself
suggests, explores ways to resist the hegemony of standard English. He also critiques the
World Englishes model of language use and language relations for its hierarchization of
English varieties:
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I aim, in this manner, to show that even the most liberal and sympathetic
of linguists—of whom Kachru is an outstanding example—cannot do
justice to these Other Englishes as long as they remain within the
overarching structures that these Englishes bring to crisis. To take these
new/other Englishes seriously would require a fundamental revaluation of
linguistic paradigms, and not merely a slight accommodation or
adjustment. (16-17)
Besides his critique of World Englishes model, what I find interesting, perhaps more so,
is his reflection on his own struggle to use a non-standard variety. His reflections in this
book gives us a clear sense of how dominant ideology can restrain individuals in trying to
negotiate across languages:
I had wanted to write the whole of this book in forms of non-standard
English, but it became too difficult because I am very much a product of
these standards I wish to problematize. This task to change the way we
have looked at language, in concrete as opposed to abstract terms, is
hard—really hard because it has much less to do with individual ability
than structural and discursive hegemony. (vi)
What Parakrama’s example shows is the idea that when one tries to “master” a
language/discourse, one is also nearly mastered by that discourse so that it’s difficult for
her/him to get out of it and practice delegitimized discourses22. Parakrama’s case also
reveals a few other things. It clearly shows how being multilingual/multidiscoursal in
Pennycook’s sense of semiodiversity is so hard. Parakrama was a graduate student
writing his dissertation on the issue of the standardization of English. He was clearly a
bilingual, perhaps bilingual by birth. And he was also trying to deliberately subvert the
dominant discourse. But he still finds it extremely difficult to shuttle between languages.
The difficulty, however, results also from Parakrama’s own sense that language varieties
are discrete and stable, e.g., Sri Lankan English, standard English, etc. He seems to have
understood subversion in terms that dominant language ideology has provided for him:
22

As I will discuss later, such a belief of Parakrama, however, is based on his false notion of discrete and
stable varieties of any language and his belief in the Foucauldian notion of discourse as all-encompassing.
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thus even in his attempts to subvert dominant practice, he reinforces the legitimacy and
dominant position of that ideology.
When considering writing practices of our students, it is extremely important to
pay attention to the kind of difficulty Parakrama mentions.23 However, on the other hand,
it does not mean, as he seems to suggest, that his and similar other attempts to
problematize standardized discourse do not have any impact on language ecology.
Moreover, his writing, with several obvious and not so obvious instances of both
intentional and unintentional uses of what is normally considered non-standard English,
and not only its acceptance by the university, but also its impact on himself and others
show individuals, in the presence (or absence) of different other participants, do and can
contribute to changing or transforming dominant conceptions of language. In other
words, his attempt to problematize the ideology of English monolingualism, whether by
using “non-standard” English or the “standard” one, does contribute to the changes we’ve
seen over the years in our understanding of and thinking about language. However, to
narrowly assign the role of making his writing successful to any single aspect, e.g., the
attitude or the expertise of his supervisor, his multilingual background, or his use of this
or that form of language, is to abstract his language practice and its effects from the
ecology of its practice. His case is just an example: I cannot and should not claim that it
is representative of any larger group of language users. I’m highlighting the difficulty and
labor involved in such language negotiation to remind us that shuttling across language
traditions is not as common as we tend to think based on a few instances of multilingual
scholar’s language use. Similarly, I also want to caution us to not think of the hegemony
23

For a similar account of the difficulty and labour-intensive nature of language negotiation, see Guillaume
Gentil’s (2005) “Commitments to academic biliteracy.”
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of the dominant discourse of standard English as inescapable while understanding the
potential difficulty and labor involved in negotiating such discourse. The issue here is not
whether multilinguals can or cannot shuttle between discourses. It is rather more
concerned with what (f)actors contribute to different responses of language users to the
need of language negotiation. Here, following Latour, I’m pointing to the need to go
beyond the anthropocentric logic of many plurilingual theorists, as evidenced in the
following text from Canagarajah:
We would focus more on the changing contexts of communication,
perhaps treating context as the main variable as writers switch their
languages, discourses, and identities in response to this contextual change;
rather than treating writers as passive, conditioned by their language and
culture, we would treat them as agentive, shuttling creatively between
discourses to achieve their communicative objectives. As a precondition
for conducting this enquiry, we have to stop treating any textual difference
as a unconscious error. We must consider it as a strategic and creative
choice by the author to attain his or her rhetorical objectives. (“Shuttling”
591)
Here, I do agree with Canagarajah that equating individual identity and their writing with
any culture or language is problematic. However, I also see a serious problem in his
treatment of the agency of individuals, especially multilinguals, as independent of context
though he considers context as the main variable. He does not see contextual (f)actors as
modifying the objectives and consequences of individual actions; rather, he sees such
individuals as capable of manipulating context to “attain his or her [their] rhetorical
objectives.” This is why Theresa Lillis and Carolyn McKinney contend that current
translingual theories disregard practice when they focus on a simplistic notion of
rhetorical awareness. Similarly, it is equally important to see context not as
homogeneous, but as a heterogeneous mix of various agents. Therefore, individuals’
language use should be understood and analyzed by dissembling the “context” as
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relations across an array of mediators. For instance, Parakrama’s difficulty to practice
what he considers delegitimized linguistic tradition (separate from SWE) comes partly
from his own perception of language systems as discrete, similar to the understanding in
the academy where he was working, and many other potential factors not explored in his
book due to his reduction of the heterogeneous factors to ideology or hegemony of
standard English.
In other words, though, for Parakrama, the difficulty of breaking away from his
language habitus built through years of language practice is real, part of the difficulty in
such situations also arises from the fact that he, like many other multilingual students,
imagines that there is a distinct alternative way of writing that he should master. In other
words, he is caught up in what the dominant has defined as alternative to the dominant.
While Parakrama’s example shows us the difficulty resulting from one’s nearcomplete entanglements into the dominant language ideology and a false conception of
languages as discrete and distinct varieties, there lies, in some cases, another kind of
difficulty, the difficulty to switch from the home/local discourse to the dominant, and
often due to similar underlying reasons.24 For many students who do not have strong
familiarity with and regular training in the dominant discourse practices, the problem
would be, when they are asked to write in the idealized version of a dominant discursive
tradition, that of transitioning from their familiar discourse practices to the dominant one
both because they are not familiar with writing practices in, say, the university setting in
the US and their own and their teachers’ misconceptions about language and writing.
Think of students coming with experiences of different epistemological and discourse
24

I’m referring to such a division between home/non-dominant discourse and the dominant one just to
highlight the fact that there are different practices, but not to say that such a division is water-tight. I do
acknowledge that no discourse remains completely unaffected by others.
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practices and now studying in the US academy. They often need to work hard to fulfill
the expectations of or what they perceive as the expectations of the dominant academic
discourse. Their past experiences that shape their habitus often tend to contradict with the
dominant discourse practices in the present. To take one example, many students who
come from different academic and cultural traditions may find the combative nature of
academic writing in the West as very disorienting and challenging. At the same time, they
may also think they need to be more combative than in fact they need to be. Or, they
might get a sense that all Western Writing is combative—that is, that Western Academic
Writing is a uniform and stable entity to which they need to completely submit.
Furthermore, the problem here lies not only because such students hold wrong
conceptions about the nature of Western Academic Writing, but also because most of the
teachers also hold similar views though they would practice writing differently. As recent
ethnographic explorations of teachers’ perceptions and practices have shown, they often
demand students to stick to rigid notion of standards while they themselves transform
such standards in their own writings (see Andrea Olinger, “Instability of Disciplinary
Style”; also Lea and Street; Monroe’s edited collection on writing disciplinarity; Thaiss
and Zawacki).
The case of a recent immigrant from India, Neha Shah, presented in Stephen M.
Fishman and Lucille McCarthy’s study, can cast light on the difficulty of many students
as discussed above. In the writing intensive Intro to Philosophy class, the instructor,
though very sympathetic to the ESL student, thinks Neha is underprepared for his class.
On the contrary, Neha thinks that she would easily pass the course. This mismatch
between what the instructor and the ESL student think results not only from their
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conflicting expectations, but also from the different assumptions and experiences that
they had about academic writing. The instructor expects Neha to write and read in a way
based on an ideal notion of Western argument-based writing tradition. He wants her to
understand the argument in philosophical texts, critique the position, and take a unique
position of her own on a particular topic. Neha first thinks that she will easily pass this
course because she had already completed her Bachelor’s degree from India. But the way
she would write in India was vastly different from the instructor’s expectations. She
would not focus on producing argument-based text. Her writing, from the perspective of
the instructor, would often meander, just making sketchy presentation of background
information and her understanding of the assigned texts, without much thinking about
offering an argument about the text. The other major problem for Neha is that she does
not find the texts and the curriculum of this course exciting. And when she writes, she
seems to blend her personal and cultural background into her interpretation of the text.
The difficulty she goes through, as she herself says in an interview with the researcher,
lies in the fact that her knowledge and education have not been recognized in the current
university: “She explains that the disruption in her plans caused by this conflict between
American and Indian systems made her feel ‘sad and sorry’ for herself. ‘[I am like] a
traveler [who] does not know which way is correct road to get his or her place’”
(Fishman and McCarthy 198). That is why she goes through a lot of ambivalence
regarding the courses she is taking. This is also reflected in her apathy towards the
philosophy course she is taking. Moreover, it’s difficult for her to connect to many of the
intellectual and cultural values she is supposed to analyze and appreciate in the
philosophy class:
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By contrast, Neha, as a "traveler" between two cultures, a newcomer to
this one, entered Steve's class with different interests and background
knowledge--different cultural capital--than her American classmates
(Bourdieu, 1982). As a result, she found herself, once again, experiencing
bicultural tension, saying that course content was confusing to her,
sometimes even upsetting. For example, she was puzzled about her
classmates' emotional involvement in discussions of racism after they read
Fanon, Carmichael, and hooks. (Fishman and McCarthy 200)
Many of the things discussed in class did not make much sense to her. At the same time,
her appropriations of course materials in her writing was not appreciated and encouraged.
This is one major reason why the instructor finds Neha’s writing incoherent and
disorganized. Perhaps, Neha could have done much better had the instructor opened up
ways for Neha, and also for other students, to tap into her own cultural and language
potentials to enhance her writing and discussion.
Both the instructor and Neha hold similar belief about language, that writing
traditions are stable and distinct, and therefore, they assume, Neha has to rigidly follow
the idealized version of Western Academic Writing (or for Neha, the instructor should
recognize her own distinct style). In reality, Neha is engaged in the construction of the
knowledge of philosophy based on her cultural background, academic training, and her
changing material-social conditions. Her interpretation of the issues of racism and
individual freedom in different Western texts through her own individual experiences of
casteism in India could have offered new avenues for understanding social and
philosophical issues differently, both for Neha and the whole class.
Neha’s case, while not completely representative of all ‘non-native’ students, also
manifests some material and other challenges many minority students face. Besides
taking two other courses, she was working as a teaching assistant and also working 45
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hours a week outside campus on two jobs. As many other studies have also shown,
students like Neha have several commitments while also passionately trying to succeed
academically for better job prospects in an “alien” world. The pressure from the
instructors and their own concern about possible challenges due to their linguistic
difference make students like Neha try to imitate standard discourse where there actually
is no “standard” standard discourse. There, students often go through strong sense of
frustration and humiliation while trying very hard to adapt to the new situation. In such
situations, it is important for us not only to encourage code-meshing, but also to pay
attention to the difference such students create while trying to repeat the dominant
discourse patterns.
What Neha’s and Parakrama’s examples show us is both the potential and risk,
greater potential for transforming linguistic and cultural beliefs as a result of an apparent
tension between practices and beliefs, but at the same time a great risk given the
dominant belief about language norms in academic institutions and language users
themselves. These two examples, in different ways, also demonstrate the labor and the
challenges in language negotiations as a result of problematic assumptions of discreteness
of language traditions, where they actually are always emergent, subject to continual
reconstruction.
What a mesodiscursive approach reminds us is we as teachers of writing should
focus on what material-social conditions enable or facilitate developing a disposition
towards language use that recognizes the value of difference and works against false
assumptions about the nature and uses of language and other communicative mode. Here,
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it is important to mark that dispositions are more than mere attitude. Formations and
transformations of dispositions are dependent on continual reinforcements of beliefs
through individuals’ involvement in practices and material-social conditions or changes
or breaks in such relations between language use, practices, and material conditions.
Therefore, our role as teachers of writing is to help develop conditions and recognize the
value of differences to help students overcome problematic assumptions about language
norms and to appreciate their own strength. What this mesodiscursive approach shows is
the need to think beyond the agency/structure dichotomy in analyzing difference in
writing and expanding our notion of practice to diversify the notion of the social and to
include the role of agents other than humans.
For instance, in the case of Neha, she becomes barely “successful” and that
success has been associated with her interaction with the teacher and her peers because of
which she could better understand the expectations of her teacher and his idealized notion
of argumentative writing in the discipline of philosophy. However, that success actually
fails to recognize the meaning potential that her different understanding of the issues of
philosophy and that of writing she could contribute to the class. Moreover, we also need
to see what other factors contributed to both the possibility for her to pass the course and
the silencing of her voice in indirect ways. Did the readings they did in class; the racial,
gender, and other composition of the class; the way classroom was structured, the options
they were allowed to use (writing/speaking/other audio-visual modes, etc.), her own
socio-material conditions (TAship, her work outside the university, the need to support
her family that recently migrated from India, etc.) and her writing practices outside the
classroom, etc. contribute in any way to the nature of her participation in class and her
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writing? That particular study does not provide much information on this because its
focus is largely on how an “ESL” student struggles to adapt to the education system in
the US, with specific attention to the discreteness of education systems and languages.
Therefore, it does not follow the traces of differences and explore relations between
Neha’s use of language, the language practices she has been participating in, and
language beliefs. It rather ends up just recognizing the role of the interactions with
teacher and with the peers as it assumes the only purpose of Neha’s learning to write is to
adapt to the conventions of Standard Written English.
In other words, despite it being an excellent and systematically done case study,
its assumptions about language use and language relations affect what it sees. It is the
same in the case of Parakrama as he, despite questioning the ideology of English
monolingualism, ends up being trapped in the same logic that he seeks to challenge. And
one fundamental reason that lies behind problematic treatments of language is the limited
notion of mediation: language use seen in terms just of ideology/hegemony rather than
exploring how such ideologies work and what happens when ideologies become
delegated through material social agents and practices. It is important not to reduce
Neha’s difference in writing to a single thing like monolingual ideology, her cultural
background, writing traditions, etc. All of these may play different roles, but they work
differently in different situations. That is why Neha’s experience and expertise are very
different from Buthaina’s or Parakrama’s. The tendency of labeling them as different
manifestations of the same problem (monolingual ideology, cultural differences, etc.)
does not take us any where than mystifying experiences of students like Neha.
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Finally, it is also important to not abstract writing from other communicative
practices and modes. While, as Theresa Lillis contends, sociolinguists take writing as
completely separate from other communicative practices like speech, composition has
customarily been relegating other modes to the margin while solely focusing on writing
as alphabetic print composition. Similarly, development of new forms of technologies
and the accompanying trends of globalization take us to a very different writing ecology.
While new forms of technologies have made it easier to practice what has been called
multimodal composition, they have also created a situation where interactions across
linguistic practices have become more common. Therefore, there has been an increasing
trend in composition to study the role of technology on writing. The next chapter
addresses the issue of the relationship between writing and technology and how thinking
of that relationship from a practice theory perspective (in a broader sense) can provide us
more productive ways to understand the nature of writing in the present context.
Conclusion
In short, the focus in many language theories on stable norms or on metalinguistic
awareness of multilinguals not only marks the problem of reification of language acts
from actual practices, but also of, indirectly, covering up the actual problems language
users face in negotiating differences and the potentials of transforming their own writing
and the dominant writing practices through such negotiations. Going beyond the focus on
stable forms or special competence of multilinguals, it is important, as Calvet and Latour
suggest, to see practices in concrete situations and consider the ecology of
communicative acts in terms of relations and associations between diverse mediating
(f)actors. In short, it is the focus on the mediations occurring in the meso space of
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relations, that is, the network of mediators, in place of micro or macro forces, that marks
the difference of this approach from other dominant models. It is more important to look
for incremental ways of developing translingual/multilingual dispositions both in teachers
and students than either advocating radical subversion through the use of non-standard
academic traditions or highlighting the special competence of multilingual students to
shuttle across different discourses.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPOSITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND MULTIMODALITY25

As with language interactions, developments of digital technologies have also
affected how we compose, think about composition, and teach composition. There have
been several calls for rethinking composition curriculum and pedagogy in recent times
(Yancey; Dobrin; Selfe; etc.), especially with a focus on multimodality and writing in a
digital context. This chapter explores what it means to write in a digital age, examining
dominant views in composition about the relationship between technology, modality, and
writing; and suggests some alternative ways of thinking about and theorizing such
relationships in the context of recent developments in writing ecology. In particular, this
chapter urges us to resist the tendency to limit modality to fixed properties and functions
and to focus on their fluid nature and the interactions across them, locating them in sociotechnical practice. It argues that locating modality in practice helps us avoid exclusively
materialist26, ideological, and humanist tendencies.
The development of different forms of technologies affects overall aspects of our
life, including how we read, write, and teach. But the debate is on how or in what ways.
25

This chapter is limited in its scope to the analysis of dominant literature on the relationship between
writing and multimodality. As I’ve developed a general theory of mediation for the study of language and
technology in Chapter 2, in this chapter, I will limit myself to reviewing dominant understanding of
multimodality and offering alternative reading of it.
26
Here, I’m using the term materialist in the way Bruno Latour uses it. It refers to the tendency of taking
technologies and their effects only in terms of the material features of those technologies. This use of the
term materialism is completely different from a cultural materialist understanding of materialism.
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The debate in this regard covers issues such as how we define technology, its role, and
the relationship between technology and other aspects of material-social life, including
the users/designers, ideologies, specific materialities of different forms of technologies,
and what Rickert calls ambience. I see the present attempts at defining multimodality and
the role of technology in our field in a way similar to what Yildiz contends about the
multilingual authors’ attempts to get beyond a monolingual paradigm, while at the same
time retaining monolingualist assumptions in different forms. The dominant notion of
multimodality in composition and literacy studies, despite focusing on multimodality, is
still monomodal in nature. Similarly, the critique of what Raymond Williams calls
technological determinism often takes, in some sophisticated ways, a form of ideological
determinism. Critiquing both and expanding the cultural materialist notion of technology,
this present chapter offers an ecological approach that urges us to avoid abstracting
composing practices and to pay attention to both the salient and ambient aspects of
mediation.
Background to Technological Mediation: McLuhan and Williams
Bruno Latour, very similar to Raymond Williams in many ways, divides technical
mediation into three categories: instrumentalist, materialist, and ideological27.
Discussions of multimodality and technological mediation in composition display all
these tendencies in various forms, while also trying to go beyond them. And the roots of
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Both Williams and Latour critique social and materialist determinisms. But they depart in terms of how
they define technology and how they take determination. Latour does not distinguish between technique
and technology where as Williams makes a clear distinction, where technique suggests mere material or
formalistic aspect of technology where as technology represents techniques in their practice, with social
and cultural values associated with them. While Latour does not distinguish between the two, he does see
technique not in its materiality alone, but in terms of its relation to the network of mediators in a dynamic
ecology of human and non-human assembly.
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such tendencies go at least to the monumental work of Marshall McLuhan and Raymond
Williams’ critique of McLuhan in the 1950s and 60s. Therefore, before discussing
dominant notions of multimodality and technological mediation in composition, I will
provide a brief background that will help us contextualize present discussions and look
for alternative possibilities for better (of course a matter of contention) understandings of
technological mediations and issues of multimodality in relation to composition.
Marshall McLuhan is similar in some ways to Martin Heidegger in his critique of
instrumental and humanist theories of technology. Both take technology as a force
shaping human life in profound ways. While Heidegger calls our attention to the
“essence” of technology itself rather than how it is used or the ways it contributes
towards “getting things done”, Marshall McLuhan critiques what he calls the “narcissistic
hypnosis” and advocates a materialist understanding of technology28:
In accepting an honorary degree from the University of Notre Dame a few
years ago, General David Sarnoff made this statement: ‘We are too prone
to make technological instruments the scapegoats for the sins of those who
wield them. The products of modern science are not in themselves good or
bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value.’ That is the
voice of the current somnambulism. Suppose we were to say , ‘Apple pie
is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that determines
their value.’ …. Again. ‘Firearms are in themselves neither good nor bad;
it is the way they are used that determines their value.’ … There is simply
nothing in the Sarnoff statement that will bear scrutiny, for it ignores the
nature of the medium, of any and all media, in the true Narcissus style of
one hypnotized by the amputation and extension of his own being in a new
technical form…. It has never occurred to General Sarnoff that any
technology could do anything but add itself on to what we already are.
(Understanding Media 11)
28

As I’ve mentioned in the second chapter, McLuhan’s understanding of materialism is very different from
a cultural materialist understanding. I will discuss that when discussing Williams’ critique of McLuhan.
McLuhan was also responding to the theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon and Warren
Weaver in which the focus is completely on the transfer of information without any noise (of the
materiality of the medium) in between the sender and receiver of the message. McLuhan, contrarily,
contends that it’s the medium that determines not only the message, but also the configurations of the
whole social and individual world.
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His emphasis on the specific material nature of different technologies or media and their
effects on the overall social structure and human understanding marks a clear break from
the tendency of taking technology merely as a tool or instrument for the fulfillment of
human intentions. In other words, his theory of media charts a new territory for the study
of communication media and their relation to the organization of social structure and
human understanding by drawing our attention to the medium or technology itself rather
than the “message/content” or its relation to human use. While instrumentalist theories do
not see any meaning in considering the differences in various technologies, McLuhan and
his followers reverse that understanding and think that it is the specific material nature of
different technologies that shape social life differently. Therefore, he shifts his focus from
the instrumentality of technologies/media to their materiality or their specific forms:
In a culture like ours, long accustomed to splitting and dividing all things
as a means of control, it is sometimes a bit of a shock to be reminded that,
in operational and practical fact, the medium is the message. This is
merely to say that the personal and social consequences of any medium—
that is, of any extension of ourselves—result from the new scale that is
introduced into our affairs by each extension of ourselves, or by any new
technology. (Understanding Media 7)
For McLuhan, every new technology has a causal effect at the social and personal level.
For instance, he talks about a light bulb, which many of us do not think of as a medium
because it does not seem to have any message. However, McLuhan claims that a light
bulb changes how we live and how we structure our life around light and darkness.
Similarly, he contends that mechanical technology and automation create two different
patterns of human association and work; e.g., automation leads to “depth of involvement
in their work and human association that our mechanical technology had destroyed” (7)
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where as mechanical technology created a fragmented world with alienated individuals
because the “technique of fragmentation … is the essence of machine technology” (8).
McLuhan also sees how specific media have certain specific effects and
limitations due to their unique material qualities. For instance, he divides media into
“cool” and “hot,” which shape our perceptions differently depending on their properties.
Their coolness or hotness does not have anything to do with human use or the content
they carry. Rather, they are determined by the level of participation of the
audience/viewers/readers/users they ostensibly require because of their material
characteristics:
There is a basic principle that distinguishes a hot medium like radio from a
cool one like the telephone, or a hot medium like the movie from a cool
one like TV. A hot medium is one that extends one single sense in “high
definition.” High definition is the state of being well filled with data. A
photograph is, visually, high definition.” A cartoon is “low definition,”
simply because very little visual information is provided. Telephone is a
cool medium, or one of low definition, because the ear is given a meager
amount of information. And speech is a cool medium of low definition,
because so little is given and so much has to be filled in by the listener.
(22)
Here, hot and cool media are distinguished in terms of how much information an
audience needs to gather to get a complete picture. He thinks a “cool medium like
hieroglyphic or ideogrammatic written characters has very different effects from the hot
and explosive medium of the phonetic alphabet … The printed word with its specialist
intensity burst the bonds of medieval corporate guilds and monasteries, creating extreme
individualist patterns of enterprise and monopoly” (23). Thus, McLuhan theorizes
technologies and media in terms of their internal logic and clear distinctions depending
on their ostensibly inherent properties. Therefore, he considers technology as a language
with a distinct grammar of its own. And that grammar and internal logic of new
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technologies radically shift social structure and human relationships. This goes closer to
the linguistic determinism in Whorf and the similar technological determinism in Walter
Ong’s division between literacy and orality.
However, McLuhan does acknowledge that every medium contains the traces of
another medium, e.g., internet containing the features of print. Therefore, he believes,
quite similar to the later theory of remediation developed by David Bolter and Richard
Grusin, that every new medium is a remediation of the old one. But, despite his critique
of instrumentalist and humanist accounts of technology and his focus on the specificity of
different media and their role in social relations and human understanding, his dismissal
of social aspects of technology takes him towards technological determinism. And the
traces of his deterministic thinking can be found in composition and literacy studies, from
Walter Ong’s distinction between oral and written cultures to Kress’s distinctions
between different modalities in terms of their inherent properties. McLuhan’s critique of
the instrumentalist notion of technology, his division of media into different kinds based
on their material properties, and his materialist formalism provide a good background to
contextualize and make sense of current theories of technology and modality.
Raymond Williams’ social theory of technology and his critique of technological
(McLuhan) and social determinisms (the economism of orthodox Marxism and similar
tendencies in some later Marxist schools of thought) provide us another way to
understand and to relate to the dominant understandings of technology and modality in
composition. Williams, while being positive about the possibilities of technological
innovations, contends that such developments and their uses are shaped by the social
relations of the world where they are introduced. In other words, he theorizes technology

110

in terms of the complex relations and interactions between technical developments and
the priorities and needs of the society, especially those of the powerful groups.
Williams tends to agree, in his early assessment, with McLuhan’s study of media,
especially with regard to McLuhan’s attention to specificity: “Much of the initial appeal
of McLuhan’s work was his apparent attention to the specificity of the media: the
differences in quality between speech, print, radio, television, and so on” (Television
127). McLuhan does not lump all “new” technologies or media into one category and
valorize or condemn them. Williams finds, in his early understanding, McLuhan’s
attention to specificities of media as a move away from abstraction. Therefore, he
appreciates him for taking into account unique material limitations and potentials of
different media forms, which, if taken in their complexities, could have provided us with
great insights about the complex issue of determination. However, with McLuhan’s
continual shift towards technicist and formalistic assumptions, Williams, in his later
works like Television, strongly criticizes McLuhan for erasing all social and historical
contexts from discussions of technology:
The work of McLuhan was a particular culmination of an aesthetic theory
which became, negatively, a social theory […] It is an apparently
sophisticated technological determinism which has the significant effect of
indicating a social and cultural determinism […] If the medium—whether
print or television—is the cause, of all other causes, all that men ordinarily
see as history is at once reduced to effects. Similarly, what are elsewhere
seen as effects, and as such subject to social, cultural, psychological and
moral questioning, are excluded as irrelevant by comparison with the
direct psychological and therefore ‘psychic’ effects of the media as such.
The initial formulation—‘the medium is the message’—was a simple
formalism. The subsequent formulation—‘the medium is the message’—is
a direct and functioning ideology. (129-30)
Williams, as the above quotation shows, rejects two tendencies in the treatment of
technology and its relation to society and culture: determinism and formalism. First, he
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rejects determinist logics, both in terms of the emergence of technologies and in terms of
their effects.
In determinist accounts, technological development is taken as an autonomous
process whereby the inner logic of a particular technology unravels in a predictable, often
inevitable, fashion and changes the world into which it is born. For instance, the
discovery of the printing press is seen to have led to the Enlightenment or telegraphy
leading to the Industrial Revolution or the Internet leading to an information age. One of
the assumptions of deterministic thought is that “a new technology … ‘emerges’ from
technical study and experiment. It then changes the society or sector into which it has
‘emerged.’ ‘We’ adapt to it because it is the new modern way” (Towards 2000 129).
Such a tendency takes McLuhan’s theory towards formalism as he assumes that
technology emerges independent of all social and political conditions and needs.
Williams therefore dismisses materialist formalism in McLuhan in that he “fails to factor
in the social and historical context (and content) of technological progress” (Banita 99).
Such accounts ignore how social power and intentions play any role and assume that a
technology or a series of technological developments impose their own order or pattern
over the efforts of individuals to use such technologies for specific purposes. On the
contrary, Williams tries to bring back social context to show how “technologies are called
into being through the needs and desires of corporations, states, groups, or individuals”
(Freedman 427).
It is here very important to see how Williams’s cultural materialist understanding
of technological practices is different from McLuhan’s in terms of how they use the term
technology and medium. The difference of Williams’ understanding of technology from
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McLuhan’s formalist understanding can be seen in McLuhan’s conflation of medium
(technical innovation, technique, or skills) with technology and Williams’ clear
distinction between the two. As McLuhan isolates technology from its connection with
social values and usage by concentrating on its formal characteristics, he does not see any
reason to distinguish technology as skills or tool from its realization in its use in specific
socio-material contexts. On the contrary, Williams describes the latter as “first, the body
of knowledge appropriate to the development of such skills and applications and, second,
a body of knowledge and conditions for the practical use and application of a range of
devices” (Williams Towards 2000, 227). He is more interested in how a technical
invention becomes an “available technology” rather than McLuhan’s version of a
technique unraveling along its own internal logic. In other words, for Williams,
technology is a relationship; it is “necessarily in complex and variable connection with
other social relations and institutions” (qtd. in Freedman 429). He sees technology as the
mediation between technique/medium/technical inventions and general social institutions.
Despite his focus on social aspect of technology, he also equally critiques
sociological determinism of all kinds, including orthodox Marxism and the Frankfurt
school view of technology/mass media as a form of mass deception. These theorists see
technologies merely as tools for the dominant class to exploit the masses and the
audience/users as cultural dupes. Williams calls this tendency of abstracting technology
from practice a symptomatic view of technology:
The second class of opinion appears less determinist. Television, like any
other technology, becomes available as an element or a medium in a
process of change that is in any case occurring or about to occur. By
contrast with pure technological determinism, this view emphasizes other
causal factors in social change. It then considers particular technologies, or
a complex of technologies, as symptoms of change of some other kind.

113

Any particular technology is then as it were a by-product of a social
process that is otherwise determined. It only acquires effective status when
it is used for purposes which are already contained in this known social
process. (Television 13)
In this view, technological developments are just symptoms of other social or economic
changes. In technological determinism, technological innovations are the sole agents
where as in sociological determinism, technologies are mere by-products of some other
changes and have no agency of their own. For instance, this sociological argument would
believe that if certain technologies were not invented, e.g., the internet, neo-liberal
capitalism would have found some other means to maintain its control over large portions
of the population. In other words, what technologies are used and who uses them do not
matter much compared to the role of ideologies and economic/social structures.
Williams does acknowledge that both these positions, sociological and
technological determinisms, make some important points. But both sides are equally
hugely problematic because they, “though in different ways, [have] abstracted technology
from society” (13). They view it “either [as] a self-acting force which creates new ways
of life, or …[as] a self-acting force which provides materials for new ways of life” (13).
Williams walks a fine line between these two extremes. His approach differs from
technological determinism in that it would restore intention to the process
of research and development. The technology would be seen, that is to
say, as being looked for and developed with certain purposes and practices
already in mind. At the same time the interpretation would differ from
symptomatic technology in that these purposes and practices would be
seen as direct; as known social needs, purposes and practices to which the
technology is not marginal but central. (Italics in the original; Williams,
Television 14)
In Williams’ account, the developments and effects of technologies are not independent
of social needs and purposes and those needs often reflect the interests of the dominant
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groups and institutions in a society. As his study of the development of broadcast
television shows, he locates causality within “known social needs” arising within broader
social relations of production, social institutions, and the reproduction of a specific social
order. However, he does see reciprocal relations between social needs and the potentials
of the technological uses: “Williams’ model of technological development appears to
suggest that innovation is contingent on periods of social change—he writes that new
systems of communication like photography, cinema and broadcasting were ‘incentives
and responses within a phase of general social transformation’” (Freedman 430). This
shows that Williams does not completely discard a Marxist theory of determination.
His general theory of determination as the “setting of limits and the exertion of
pressures” was designed to counter what he saw as the essentialism of the vulgar Marxist
model of base and superstructure, but keeping the important role of broader economic
and social relations. That is why he thinks that television and radio “were the applied
technology of a set of emphases and responses within the determining limits and
pressures of industrial capitalist society” (27). In other words, the development of a
particular technology is bound up with profound social changes that, in turn, would be
affected by the performance of that technology. However, he at the same time thinks that
there is always a moment of choice. That there is no pre-determined form or function to
communication technologies. Eventual outcome depends on the selections and
preferences of human actors, but definitely within the limits and pressures provided by
existing economic and political systems. While he does believe that the choices of the
most powerful groups in society determine the shape and the pattern of the uses of
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technologies, he does see some possibility for individuals to put technologies to
alternative uses.
In short, Williams believed that technologies were developed to fulfill social
needs whereas social needs and purposes were transformed by the uses and further
developments of technologies. In other words, in insisting on the social nature of
technologies, he shows a dialectical relationship between the social and economic
contexts and the effects of technologies on societies. His approach also points out the
contingent nature of technological development, while also acknowledging how such a
development largely reflects the interests of the hegemonic groups.
Williams’ reading shows the difficulty of walking a fine line between
technological and sociological determinism. His redefinition of determination as limits
and pressures posed by the existing economic and social structures and his focus on the
reciprocal influence of social needs and the impact of the uses of technologies goes closer
to Bruno Latour’s new materialist approach to technical mediation where he replaces
determination with translation. Therefore, Latour’s new materialism, which he calls a
sociology of translation/associations, is an attempt to avoid social and materialist
determinisms by taking into account agentive roles of not only humans and ideologies,
but also that of non-human agents like technologies and other material artifacts. As
discussed in Chapter Two, while not discounting the role of macro forces like ideologies,
economic structures, culture, etc., he at the same time sees them not as homogeneous
systems, but as an amalgam of a multitude of participants contributing to the durability or
change of the existing system. In that sense, technologies are neither the sole determiners
nor mere tools. They cannot be thought of as having fixed effects or meanings as their
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meanings are the functions of a host of (f)actors working in complex relations with each
other in varying situations. In all their complexities, Williams’ critique of determinist
thought and Latour’s notion of translation help us better understand the issue of modality
and technology in writing.
Mediation and Modality in Composition: Materialist and (Post)Critical Perspectives
The discussion of the relationship between technology, multimodality, and
composition began to appear increasingly since the late 1980s and early 90s, with a
proliferation of works in this area after the turn of the century. The primary focus of this
scholarship has been the idea that “new” technologies (new media) have completely
changed the nature of writing and therefore, composition should shift its attention from
the teaching of writing as a monomodal practice to multimodal composition/visual
literacy/new genres of writing. Multimodal scholars challenge the dominance of the
monomodal nature of writing and communication. Gunther Kress, Cynthia Selfe, Anne
Wysocki, Bill Cope and Mary Kalantzis, and several others have shown us how dismissal
of modes other than print writing is problematic as it excludes the potentials of meaning
making using a whole range of available modes. However, even in our discussions of
multimodality, we still tend to follow the logic of monomodality in some form, especially
due to the tendency of reifying the notion of mode. Similarly, our discussion of
technology, whether it is in terms of the uses of modes or media, whether talking about
the technologies of speaking and writing, or in terms of the affordances of digital
technologies like Facebook, Twitter, or Flicker, tends to either focus on the affordances
based on the material/formal properties of those technologies or in terms of larger social
forces like ideology, culture, or society. Both these tendencies show us the difficulty of
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working against the paradigms from within those paradigms themselves. In other words,
whether it is from what Latour calls materialist or critical perspectives, we tend to
abstract technologies from the complex web of relations and meanings, thereby leaving
dominant assumptions unchallenged. In what follows, I discuss the residual materialist
tendencies in the discussion of multimodality in composition and literacy studies on the
one hand and the reifying of multimodal practices by reducing technologies to mere
symptoms of the dominant ideologies on the other.
There have been different kinds of arguments about the need to address the effects
of diverse forms of digital technologies in writing practices. The two major tendencies
that appear in different forms, sometimes overlapping each other or expressed in
combined forms, often critiquing the instrumentalist notion, are materialist and critical.
While being very different from each other, especially in terms of the need for promoting
multimodality and the use of digital technologies for teaching learning practices, they do
share one fundamental problem: that is, abstracting the notion of technology and
modality from practices and assigning a fixed value or meaning to them. Despite the
critique of the dominance of monomodal ideology, many multimodal theorists leave
unchallenged existing notion of specific modes, especially in advocating additive models
of multimodality. What Selber calls a postcritical approach goes beyond the critical
approach’s complete dismissal of the issue of technologies and modalities in composition
and urges us to use technology and deal with it, but with critical reflection.
The questions we should begin with are how do we define modality or mode?
How do we assign certain values to certain modes? Do modes and technologies have
specific properties and functions/effects? What mode is writing? Is it a single mode or is
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it always already multimodal? Why do we see or value only one modal aspect of what we
call writing? The answers to these questions will determine how we think of
multimodality as an alternative to writing or any other assumed modes like speech,
moving images, still images, audio, etc.
Materialist Approach
The materialist approach to multimodality shows some remnants of the theory of
technology I discussed in relation to Marshall McLuhan. Whether it is in the notion of
multiliteracies in the New London Group article or in Kress’s notion of multimodality,
literacies and modalities are often taken as separate and fixed, with some inherent
properties of their own. And those material properties are often associated with fixed
functions. Here, I’ll focus specifically on Gunther Kress’s theory of multimodality,
especially because that notion has remained perhaps the most influential in the treatment
of modality in composition.
Gunther Kress calls our attention to the effects of new media, especially the
significance of visual representations, and the need to address the challenges and
opportunities brought about by the shift in communication landscapes. He contends that
“the semiotic changes are vast enough to warrant the term ‘revolution’, of two kinds: of
the modes of representation on the one hand, from the centrality of writing to the
increasing significance of image; and of the media of dissemination on the other, from
the centrality of the medium of the book to the medium of the screen” (“Gains and
Losses” 6). This is similar to what Kathleen Blake Yancey says about the transformations
brought about by new media: “Literacy today is in the midst of a tectonic change”
(“Made Not Only with Words” 298). Such claims about “revolution”, “tectonic change”
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etc. abound in the literature on the relationship between literacy and technology, in some
way echoing McLuhan’s claim about the effects of new technologies on every aspect of
social and personal life. The changes in the semiotic practices they demonstrate are of
course real and significant. But it is also equally important to interrogate the implications
of such claims of “newness” and “revolution.” The risk of such claims is to ignore not
only the intersections and overlap between the “new” and the “old,” but also to limit them
to fixed and definite meanings. In other words, we need to be wary about, as Anne
Wysocki and Paul Prior remind us, limiting or constraining the roles and meanings of
technologies and modalities to certain fixed functions, which has led many in
composition to forward an additive model of multimodality. Gunther Kress’s theory of
multimodality reflects that tendency.
Kress has developed a sophisticated theory of multimodality and the affordances
of various modes. The major tenet of his theory, as he claims, is an attempt to go away
from the traditional tendency of abstraction in linguistic representations and advocate
image-based representations for their clarity and transparency: “In an attempt to gain new
insight into possibilities for representing, multimodal descriptions—and multimodal
semiotics in particular—have turned away from the enchantment of linguistics with
abstraction that had dominated the 20th century…. By contrast, the emphasis in
multimodal work is very much on the materiality of the resources for representation”
(“Gains and Losses” 12). He thus contrasts his social semiotic theory of multimodality
with structuralist theories of linguistics where the focus is more on competence than on
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performance, more on the abstracted conventions than on actual practices29. A
multimodal approach, on the other hand, as he claims, emphasizes the specificity of the
material nature of different modes of communication/representation:
Central assumptions of multimodal approach to representation and
communication are (a) that communication is always and inevitably
multimodal; and (b) that each of the modes available for representation in
a culture provides specific potentials and limitations for communication
…. The first assumption requires us to attend to all modes that are active
in an instance of communication; the second requires us to attend to the
specific meanings carried by the different modes in communicational
ensembles…. (“Gains and Losses” 5)
His emphasis on the multimodal nature of every communication and his focus on the
specific materialities of the modes of communication do help us see the potentials and
limitations of communicative practices. But, at the same time, his highly generalized
notion of culture and society and his materialist or “modalist” approach to
communication make him fall victim to another form of abstraction: abstracting the
notion of the social and that of technology and modalities from practices (Lillis,
Sociolinguistics of Writing 21). In particular, Kress’s notion of affordances of various
semiotic modes and his association of materialities with fixed affordances pushes his
theory towards what Lillis calls a modalist approach or what Brian Street calls the
“autonomous model of multimodality” (32).
Kress theorizes new media and the potential transformation of the shift from the
old forms of modes and media to the new ones in term of the materialities and
affordances that new modes and media have. Kress’s major point is that different modes
have their distinct materialities with vastly different affordances. He contends:

29

It is true that Chomskian grammar and structuralist theories ignore practices and promote abstraction
(convention, structure, rules, grammar). However, despite Kress’s emphasis on specificity, he does not
focus on practices.
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One of the present tasks of a social semiotic approach to multimodality is
to describe the potentials and limitations for meaning which inhere [italics
mine] in different modes. For that, it is essential to consider the materiality
of modes. Speech uses the material of (human) sound; writing uses the
material of graphic substance. There are things you can do with sound that
you cannot do with graphic substance, either easily or at all; not even
imitate all that successfully graphically. (“Reading Images” 112)
In other words, what he says is that writing and image have their own unique affordances
based on their materialities, however, by reducing the speech act to sound (for example,
ignoring the role of gesture and facial expression), and of writing to only “graphic
substance,” ignoring the full material process of writing. Therefore, it is necessary for us
to think about what specific goals or functions these different modes can accomplish.
The primary difference, according to Kress, between speech and writing is that
the former uses “sound” where as the latter uses “words.” However, both of these
traditional modes have some fundamental similarities: that they happen in time, “one
sound, one word, one sentence follows another. The logic of temporal sequence is the
major principle of ordering of languages such as English” (“Reading Images”112). And
this affordance of writing/speech, the organization through temporal sequence, often
implies causality. So, traditional writing or speech makes us understand reality in terms
of events and actions occurring in a certain temporal order. But visual representation, as it
uses image in place of words, offers a distinct way of understanding. Kress says that
image works by the logic of simultaneity rather than by that of temporal order:
The logic of space works differently: In the message entity (the image), all
elements are simultaneously present—even though they were, of course,
in many forms of image—in drawing or in painting, though not in
photography—placed there in time and even though the viewer traverses
the image-elements in time. So, it is the viewer’s action that orders the
simultaneous present elements in relation to her or his interest. In spatially
organized representation, the elements that are chosen for representation
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are simultaneously present, and it is their spatial arrangement that is used
to make (one kind of) meaning. (“Reading Images”13).
So, in visual representation, the affordances of the spatial are used, for instance, color,
size, placement, and composition. In contrast to the dominance of narratives in
writing/speech, the new culture of the visuals is dominated by the logic of “display”
(Kress, “Gains and Losses” 14). In image-dominated representation, the most important
factors are the simultaneous positions (salience) and the relations between those things in
different positions.
For Kress, another important aspect of the difference between writing and imagebased representation is that “words are highly conventionalized entities, and only exist in
that manner” whereas images are open. Therefore, Kress believes that words are “always
general and, therefore, vague,” often empty of meaning, whereas images have “infinitely
large potential of depictions—precise, specific, and full of meaning” (“Gains and Losses”
15). He further contends: “The former [words] tends to occur in the fixed order of syntax,
line, page, text; the latter tend to occur in an open order fixed by the reader and/or
viewer’s interest. This leads to the paradox of speech and writing as having a finite
number of open, relatively vague elements in fixed order, and image or depiction having
a possibility of infinitely many full, specific elements in an open order. (“Gains and
Losses” (16). In these ways, writing and visual representations have distinct meaning
potentials and different ways of representing the world, one focusing on causality and
order and the other focusing on space and relations, often leading to very different
understandings of the world.
Kress’s theory of affordances is very useful to think about what functions
different texts can perform and how we can make better choices about representation and
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construction of meaning. In this context, we need also to acknowledge, as Kress calls for,
the ubiquitous nature of multimodality and rethink writing and representation in terms of
the affordances of different modes used in them. However, there are a few problems in
Kress’s theorization of these different forms of representation in terms of their
affordances. The major problem with Kress is that he operates through binary logic. As
Paul Prior says, “he proposes a series of strong binaries of mutually exclusive
affordances—each of which is associated with a particular mode” (24). While Kress
views affordances as properties of the specific modes, determined by culture and
history30, fixed and stable, many others believe that it is relational and emergent. James
Gibson, while defining affordance originally, cautioned us that it was meant to “imply the
complementarity of the animal and the environment” (127). Gibson also highlights, as
Prior’s analysis shows, the “fuzziness of categories, noting that objects such as hammers
may afford—with relative ease or difficulty—a great many kinds of action. Kress, on the
other hand, proposes a set of hard binary dictions between words and images. Words in
his account are finite, sequential, vague, conventional, authored, narrative and/or causal,
and open to critique. Images are infinite, spatial, specific, natural and transparent, viewed,
and available only for design” (26). The point here is that Kress takes images and words
as mutually exclusive and assumes that affordances are the properties of the modes
(environment in the theory of ecological psychologists), and in so doing, neglects the idea
that it is relative, relative to the user, context of use, and the practices of which it is a part.
With a slight revision to Gibson’s original definition, later psychologists such as A.
Chemero and T. Stoffregen regard affordances as an “emergent” quality (Stofferegen
124). This is how Chemero defines it: “I argue that affordances are not properties of the
30

He mentions that only in mantra-like fashion and then goes on to describe modes in materialist way.
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environment; indeed, they are not even properties. Affordances, I argue, are relations
between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects of situations” (184). He
further says that “affordances are features of the whole situation” (185).
Here, the point that I’m trying to highlight is that affordances are not the inherent
properties of an object or the environment. First, an affordance is relative to the perceiver
and the practices of the perceiver in an act of perceiving. Second, it depends on the whole
situation, where it includes not only the object (mode, medium, etc.) and the perceiver
(readers/viewers), but also the overall situation where the action or the perception takes
place. From this point of view, affordances of images or words depend not only on the
material features of them, but also on the relations of them with other objects/things
around them and the viewer/reader. As it is relative to the audience/readers/viewers, the
affordance of something can be quite different at various situations. Just think about a
book. Yes, it is in general to be read, often in a sequential order. But it can be used as a
weapon, as a pillow, a support while leaning on a wall, as a form of office or home
decoration, or as I remember from my childhood days, a thing to be exchanged for
chatpate31 or ice-cream bar. Even when it is read, how it is read often depends on the
disposition of the reader that has been developed through the sedimentation of his/her
reading and writing practices, which, though, are likely to be diverse and fluid, even for
individuals. We might read newspapers differently than academic journals, but
sometimes we read each of these differently. Perhaps, this is why we often have the habit
of reading images not only in spatial terms but also in sequence. And at the same time
there are many images which are basically “sequential” in nature (Prior 27), for instance
31

A kind of spicy snack that consists of bhuja, boiled potato, lemon juice, red chillies, and some spices. We
used to exchange pages of books or notebooks for chatpate and the seller would use those pages as
containers for selling chatpate.
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“film…, print comics and process diagrams” (27). Even if Kress makes a binary between
images and words by making one “free and open-ended” and also “full of meaning” and
“always specific” and the other always “vague” and “general,” we can find even the
images being highly bound by long traditions and conventions on the one hand and the
communicative practices of the users:
In fact, to accept Kress’ argument that images are inherently filled with
precise meaning would require that we ignore most practice in visual arts
and design…. Rather than accept the binary model that Kress proposes,
particular the notion of visual precision, we propose a third way. We
believe that images simultaneously occupy both nodes, and that this is, in
fact, their great power. Symbolic images have the capacity to
simultaneously be precise and ambiguous. What is represented may be
specific, but meaning requires interpretation. Images merge visual
conventions with individual vocabularies; they fuse public discourse with
personal subjectivities. (McDonagh, Goggin, and Squier 85)
McDonagh, Goggin, and Squier show how fixing function with form is very
problematic and how detaching technologies from their use gives a false notion of their
affordances.
The binary logic also works in terms of Kress’s division between the medium of
screen and that of print. He thinks of writing on a page and depiction on screen, words
and images as operating by completely distinct logics. He ignores the fact that traditional
modes of organization of meaning through words on pages affect how images and texts
are organized and understood on screen. As Manovich says, the medium of screen, in
many ways, follows the logic of the organization of text in books (66). In many respects,
as Cope and Kalantzis also say, many of the texts in traditional mode could have been
read in nonlinear ways, for instance, newspapers, magazines, dictionaries, encyclopedias,
cook books, restaurant menus and so on. It would perhaps be better to see how these
different modes have been affecting each other and producing in many case hybrid texts.
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As P. Prior says, citing Bolter and Grusin, “computer screens borrow from texts and
pages and texts borrow from computer screens,” in other words, “where Kress sees a oneway sequence of unique semiotic objects, Bolter and Grusin see blurred, complex, and
mutual relations” (26).
Finally, Kress does say that modes are the “culturally and socially produced
resources for representation” (“Gains and Losses” 7). He further claims,
The same is true for the ‘grammar of visual design.’ Like linguistic
structures, visual structures point to particular interpretations of
experience and forms of social interaction …. Meanings belong to culture,
rather than to specific semiotic modes. And the way meanings are mapped
across different semiotic modes, the way some things can, for instance, be
said either visually or verbally, other only visually, again others only
verbally, is also culturally and historically specific” (Grammar of Visual
Design 2).
The above quotation demonstrates that Kress (and Leeuwen) clearly connects modes and
their meanings with culture and society. But when he does so, first, he sees the
relationship between culture and modes or technologies as unidirectional, culture
determining meanings of modes. Second, he views cultures as stable, homogeneous
things though they do acknowledge that semiotic practices and their meanings in different
cultures are different. That is why he claims that the grammar of visual design he, in
collaboration with Van Leeuwen, develop applies to the Western culture. Therefore, his
argument goes like, different cultures shape modes differently and that is why, he claims
that a universal grammar of visual design cannot be developed. But , he claims, in the
West, visuals and organization follow a certain grammar. Thus, he treats “the West” as a
stable and internally uniform culture despite the evidences that show the contrary (see
Appadurai). This at best mistakes what might be dominant practices and meanings for
specific modes at a given time for the full range of these and their vulnerability to

127

change. Therefore, his social semiotic theory reflects the tendency of what Latour calls
the “sociology of the social” (“Reassembling 9) or what Williams would call social
determinism, as much as his discussion of affordances shows his theory to be closer to
the autonomous model of multimodality. His logic of separateness and fixity of modal
affordances and his conception of multimodality as a collection of various distinct modes
make his theory similar to an additive model of multilingualism.
Similar to McLuhan’s division between hot and cold media or Walter J Ong’s
division between technologies of writing and orality, Gunther Kress’s division between
speech and writing; book (print) and screen; or linguistics and multimodal representations
in terms of their formal properties and specific functions or potentials places him closer
to materialist determinism. However, he is also different from them in acknowledging the
role of cultural and social contexts in the understanding of different modes. At the same
time, his treatment of the social, similar to what Latour calls sociology of the social1, is
itself also abstracted. Therefore, Kress displays the traces of both materialist and
sociological determinisms though the former one is more pronounced. Overcoming these
two problems, we should explore how other modal aspects have been silenced. Similarly,
while it is true that materiality does matter, it does not necessarily determine its potential
uses.
(Post)Critical Approach to Technology and Modality
I here need to make a distinction between what Stuart Selber calls critical and
postcritical approaches. Critical theorists and scholars not only question instrumental
views of technology but also completely dismiss technology as an important issue for
discussion in writing classes. They take technologies merely as cultural or ideological
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tools. Their dismissal of technology is understandable in the context of the dominance of
instrumentalist views of technology in the academy and outside. But in their dismissal,
they also uphold another determinist view, i.e., ideological determinism. Unlike
materialist theorists like Kress and Van Leeuwen, whose focus was largely on developing
a grammar of multimodal representations based on the unique affordances of specific
modes and technologies for understanding the increasingly visual nature of
communication, critical theorists’ major focus is on exposing the “prevailing myths”
about computers and the pervasively present uncritical celebration of the democratic
potentials of digital technologies (Selber 4). Their major purpose is to debunk
instrumentalist views of technology. Postcritical theorists do share with critical theorists a
critique of the ideological nature of technology and interface designs. But they focus on
cautious and reflective use of technologies and available multimodal resources for the
benefits of teachers and students. However, they also retain one major problem, that is,
taking ideologies as largely stable. Besides, despite their major focus on critiquing
ideological aspects of technologies, they also retain some materialist traits like Kress and
others.
First, a major target of postcritical theory is the instrumental view where any kind
or form of technology is taken as an instrument to accomplish certain goals. As Hawisher
and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe say, such a perspective, while eulogizing the “deomcratic”
potential of technology, ignores how it is embedded in social and ideological belief
systems and can have the potential also to perpetuate oppresive beliefs (Selfe and Selfe
63). As Stuart Selber claims, the dominant tendency in the academy has been completely
instrumentalist, ignoring its human aspects: “Althogh institutions are investing in
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technology infrastructure and support at an astonishing rate—so astonishing, in fact, that
it is futile to cite growth statistics, which increase dramatically from year to year—these
investments are often driven by logics that fail to make humanistic perspectives a central
concern” (1).
Multimodal theorists like Cynthia Selfe, Gail Hawisher, Richard Selfe, Bill Cope
and Mary Kalantzis, along with many others, have also emphasized the need to shift our
attention from a singular focus on print literacy to multimodal literacy. Most of them do
critique instrumentalist views of technology. In doing so, they do point to the humanistic
and social aspects of technology. Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, in “Rhetoric
of Technology” and “The Politics of the Interface,” as in many other articles, have
cautioned us about the potential consequences of uncritically eulogizing the democratic
nature of digital technologies if we do not pay proper attention to the ideological
influence of dominant culture on technology design.
Hawisher and Selfe critique a pervasive tendency that they call a “rhetoric of
technology,” meaning the trend to “foreground positive benefits” of using computers
“without acknowledging possible negative influences as well” (58). Selfe and Selfe also
claim that the uncritical use of technology can perpetuate and support “monoculturalism,
capitalism, and pathologic thinking” (486). In their discussion of technology, Selfe and
Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe take technologies as “cultural artifacts embodying
society’s values” (“Rhetoric of Technology” 55). In this way, like many other scholars in
new media studies, such as Stuart Selber and Adam Banks, Selfe and Selfe caution us
about the potential dangers of using technology in our classrooms without situating it in
broader socio-political contexts.
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Similar to Selfe and Selfe, and Hawisher and Selfe, Christina Haas, in her book
Writing Technology and many other articles, also critiques instrumentalist and
deterministic views of technology. She contends: “such an instrumentalist view sees
technology as merely a tool—a natural and transparent means to produce written
language, which is somehow imagined to exist independent of that means. The last
decade of work in cultural studies of scientific and other discourses suggests that
writing—also a technology—is not transparent, that it carries beliefs and value systems
within it…. An instrumentalist view of technology carries with it all the dangers of an
autonomous theory of language” (21). Haas equates autonomous/apolitical views of
language with instrumentalist views of technology.
The problems of instrumentalist and materialist views of technology raised by
critical literacy theorists are very real and significant. That taking technology merely as a
neutral tool that in itself can liberate us can, as Cynthia Selfe says, “actually contribute to
the ongoing problems of racism, sexism, poverty, and illiteracy” (referenced in Selber
12). And at the same time, the issue of access to up to date technologies and reliable
social and pedagogical support for the disadvantaged population, as Stuart Selber,
Cynthia Selfe, and several others have said, is of vital importance, which often is
overlooked by the instrumentalist view of technology. Similarly, technologies do have
potentials to perpetuate dominant cultural values, thereby silencing other voices.
However, it can be problematic to think of technology merely as cultural tools.
To question and go beyond instrumentalist views of technology, these cultural
critics of technology often emphasize the role of a “critical perspective” or “critical
reflection” (see Hawisher and Selfe, and Selfe and Selfe) or “metacognition” (see Cope
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and Kalantzis) in order to demystify the ideological nature of computer interfaces and
technological designs. These are very important aspects of mediation that we need to pay
attention to as our awareness and material conditions do partially shape how technology
operates and what roles its users/producers can play. However, we also need to equally
see how, despite ideological designs and unequal distributions, technology in its use may
lead to many unintended consequences and how users can improvise and accomplish
certain functions unthought-of by the designers of technologies. In other words, we need
to take technology as agent, or not merely as tools to accomplish a priorily determined
goals, but having potentials to change or transform those goals. Similarly, we need to
take users not merely as pawns in the hands of dominant ideology, but as both being
shaped by and also shaping those ideological values in their work as improvisers.
In other words, while analyzing uses of technologies, whether it is writing, a black
board, a cell phone, or Facebook, we should be prepared to see beyond users, ideologies,
and these technologies as mere neutral tools or cultural artifacts. Yes, their meanings and
potentials are largely limited by dominant ideologies and the critical reflection of users,
but it will be a mistake if we take them only in terms of how the dominant ideologies or
discourses (or power) would want us to see in them. First, ideologies are not mysterious
forces; they operate through, as Latour believes, observable materials (obvious and not so
obvious), human and non-human. As Latour claims, “It is so important to maintain that
power, like society, is the final result of a process and not a reservoir, a stock, or a capital
that will automatically provide an explanation. Power and domination have to be
produced, made up, composed” (64). And when power or ideology works through
mediators, networks of technologies and human agents, it gets transformed in turn.
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Hence, technologies, non-human aspects of mediation, do not simply carry and
transfer dominant ideological values to the users. Not only that users work in different
social contexts, but technologies also have other various dimensions (excess) that modify
the intended meanings or messages. Therefore, when technologies go into the hands of
users, based on the participation of users in a variety of networks of practices, both
linguistic and others, some potentials of technologies unthought of and unrecognized
become revealed. Just think about writing as a technology and how English writing from
the British Empire was thought to create “civilized” middle men for them to be able to
understand and control the colonized. That was one of the reasons why English literature
was taught, especially to inculcate Western values. But, as Homi K. Bhabha says, even
imitation/reiteration of those values produced mimicry, which actually transforms those
values rather than creating passive followers. Many people did try to imitate Western
style, e.g., wearing ties and suit, but, however, with other attire like a locally made cap
(“topi”). Think how the meaning and value of a “tie” would change when it is used by a
student in a local school in India or Bangladesh, coupled with indigenous dresses. It
might perhaps show the economic status of his/her family, their knowledge of Western
culture, etc. But, it also assumes several other meanings. The act of reiteration, using the
tie, but in a different context, while being similar in the practice of wearing the tie in
English culture, changes its meaning. That student can use the tie as a replacement for
handkerchief to wipe his/her face or to clear his or her nose. It can sometimes potentially
work as a way of resistance, knowingly or unknowingly.
An important aspect of a critical approach to technology is to see how US culture
in general and teaching of composition (English) in particular has been dominated by
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monomodal ideology. Similar to the multilingual/translingual approach’s call for paying
attention to linguistic practices other than English, most of the multimodal theorists often
argue for bringing back to focus modes silenced and delegitimized by the dominant
ideology. US composition’s promotion of writing at the cost of other modes displays a
deeply-seated belief that, as literacy theorists like Shirley Brice Heath have shown,
privileges the literacies practiced by the dominant group.
Diana George critiques the tendency in composition to relegate visuals to low
status. Even when they were incorporated, she argues, they were merely taken as a
“prompt for writing” (18). She urges us to incorporate visuals in composition teaching,
not only as objects of analysis, but also as a part of the design process. In her class, she
had her students compose arguments through the uses of images/visuals. She draws on
the notion of design from the New London Group, similar to Kress’s claim about design
in relation to new media, and contends that design, rather than analysis/critique, should
be the focus of composition. Furthermore, critiquing Anthony Blair’s dismissal of visuals
for their inability to make an argument, George claims that visuals can and do argue:
“Visual arguments make a claim or ascertain and attempt to sway an audience by offering
reasons to accept that claim” (29). She also claims that “students have a much richer
imagination for how visuals might enter composition than our composition journals have
yet to address” (28).
Diana George’s emphasis on incorporating visuals and challenging the dominant
ideology of monomodality comes in the line of The New London Group (NLG). The
NLG’s influential piece “A Pedagogy of Multiliteracies,” as the group claims, develops a
new approach to literacy pedagogy addressing the emerging globalized situation:
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“Literacy pedagogy has traditionally meant teaching and learning to read and write in
page-bound, official, standard forms of the national language, literacy pedagogy, in other
words, has been a carefully restricted project—restricted to formalized, monolingual,
monocultural, and rule-governed forms of language” (60-61).
The NLG, like critical literacy theorists such as Brian Street and Shirley Brice
Heath, do see literacy as deeply embedded in the politics of power and ideologies.
However, the lack of attention to modes other than print or alphabetic literacy in the early
critical literacy theorists made them come forward with their idea of multiliteracies. The
theory of multiliteracies differs from literacy as social practice in at least two ways: “The
first argument engages with the multiplicity of communications channels and media; the
second with the increasing salience of cultural and linguistic diversity” (Cope &
Kalantzis 5). In other words, as Cope and Kalantzis state, this theory “focuses on modes
of representation much broader than language alone” (5) and makes its central focus
multimodality:
We argue that literacy pedagogy now must account for the burgeoning
variety of text forms associated with information and multimedia
technologies. This includes understanding and competent control of
representational forms that are becoming increasingly significant in the
overall communications environment, such as visual design in desktop
publishing or the interface of visual and linguistic meaning in multimedia.
(NLG 61)
That means literacy should be expanded to more than words. Cynthia Selfe also
emphasizes the need to pay critical attention and allow multiple modes for composing
practices. Selfe, in her “Aurality and Multimodality” and “Students Who Teach Us,” is
very much concerned about the potential of the existing monomodal focus in composition
teaching to exclude socially, ethnically, and linguistically marginalized student
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populations. She argues that we should empower such students by recognizing their
multimodal literacy competencies often ignored by our singular focus on print
literacy/writing.
For instance, in “Aurality and Multimodality,” she insists that “sound, although it
remains of central importance both to students and to the population at large, is often
undervalued as a compositional mode,” (617) and that, “the history of writing in US
composition instruction … functions to limit our professional understanding of
composing as a multimodal rhetorical activity and deprive students of valuable semiotic
resources for making meaning” (617). Selfe argues that such a tendency puts many
marginalized communities, such as American Indians, African Americans and
Hispanic/Latino Americans at a disadvantage by not recognizing the long history of their
use of aurality as a compositional mode for preserving their stories and working towards
resistance towards racial and ethnic oppressions. Similarly, in “Students Who Teach Us,”
Selfe urges composition teachers to appreciate literacy experiences and competencies
students bring with them, especially their new media literacies, and use new media
technologies “systematically in their classrooms to teach about new literacies” (45). She
gives an example of an African American student, David John Damon, who had
developed great competencies in digital literacies, but failed in his composition course,
and eventually had to drop out:
Although his computer skills had improved by leaps and bounds, his skills
in communicating in Standard English remained seriously
underdeveloped—and his teachers in the English Department were very
concerned about his ability to organize to write sentences that were
grammatically correct according to conventional standards, and his
problems with development and logical argumentation. (50)
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This is a great example of not only how failure on the part of the teachers and the system
as a whole to recognize the literacies that students have developed and are comparable to
those legitimized by the academy ruins the lives of many historically underprivileged
students, but also how false notions of language can block many from attaining higher
education.
Selfe is not making an either/or argument about writing and aurality or writing
and new media literacies. Rather, she urges composition teachers to “encourage students
to deploy multiple modalities in skillful ways—written, aural, visual” and to “respect”
and understand “various roles each modality can play in human expression” (“Aurality”
625). This is an ongoing problem not only in the US, but also all around the world.
The critical/cultural theorists’ critique of the binaries between writing and other
modes (aurality, visual, etc.) is of paramount importance both to do justice to students
who tend to struggle in mainstream literacy practices and to enrich the literacy
experiences of other students and teachers. I agree that it is important to expand
composition to a range of modes of composition, valuing modes like aurality and
visuality that have historically been sidelined due to various social and ideological
reasons. And it is true that such extension might offer greater potentials for meaning
making for our students. However, I also think that we need to be careful in making such
an argument not to actually validate dominant and ideological versions of composition,
rather than looking at practices and problematizing such ideological versions.
First, when we see composition and communication practices, we find that
modalities are not discrete entities. Here, my own experience making a website for the
first time for a visual communication course will, I believe, show how a numerical or
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additive model of modality and materialist/formalist notion of remediation can be
problematic. The assignment was a very common one in a visual communication
(multimodal composition) class. We were required to choose a topic and make an
argument about it in “writing.” Then we were supposed to remediate that to a website and
an avatar on the Second Life, besides making a video on the same topic. When I was
making a website, I found it very hard. I was thinking of it in terms of making an
argument and other textual strategies used to argue, e.g., juxtaposition, parallelism. But
the focus on the class was on making the website “show” the information, not “tell” or
“argue” in a linear way. It was extremely hard for me, very frustrating. It was definitely
primarily because of my lack of familiarity with designing a website, making a “visual”
argument. But I now also think that it was also because of my long experience in writing
that shaped my composing habitus. I think both myself (more so) and the instructor failed
to explore the main reason behind the problem, that the major reason behind the problem
was we saw writing and website design as discrete. The assignment was based on the
notion of remediation. But it was thought of in a very formalistic and materialistic sense.
It was thought in terms of what happens when we remediate one medium through another
medium. But we should think not in terms of remediation as mediation of one by another,
but mediation of one kind of practice by another. Doing so keeps both the technical
aspect and technological aspect of technology, both the social and technical aspects of
mediation together. We are not like machines capable of separating the past from the
present, social from the material, we’re rather remediated partly by practice. Therefore, it
is important, as Selfe and George argue, to learn from students’ composing practices, but
without using our truncated notion of writing or any other single mode.
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Similarly, when we critique the dominant ideology of monomodality, we should
not conflate the ideology of monomodality with the practice of an assumed mode, e.g.,
writing, taking it as monomodal. When we do so, we end up making an argument either
for “either/or” or for “addition” to, thus speaking from the same framework that we try to
challenge. It is true that privileging of writing has relegated other modes to the margin
and cultural sideline. But it is also mainly because of unwittingly accepting a limited
notion of writing, and similarly, that of other modes. The divisions are handy tools,
generalized representations to reduce the complexities and messiness of practices. They
are often useful for certain purposes. But the problem arises when such representations
assume immutable reality, more real than what we actually see in practice. For instance,
see how we generally understand “composition” in the academy. As many composition
scholars point out, it is often understood only as academic writing. Based on such and
similar understanding of writing, many have started arguing for abolishing composition
because the skills taught in composition courses do not transfer to writing tasks in other
disciplines. Furthermore, writing to be taught in a composition class is customarily
assumed to be academic arguments, both by those who take composition as a skills or as
a tool for an entry into the discourse of the academic community32: both asocial and
social views of composing process. That tendency takes away from composition what
other meanings users/composers make of it or what other forms they practice, both within
and outside the academy.
The problem with, similar to what Wysocki says about mode, limiting writing
with one or a few fixed qualities or features, e.g., making an argument (often opposed to

32

The tendency of taking teaching of composition as enculturation or as the tendency of advocating an
alternative discourses fall victim to the same tendency.
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displaying information in visual mode) is reflected in Diana George’s defense of visual
design as composition on the ground that it makes an argument like writing. I’m not here
disagreeing at all with George’s claim that visual design should be considered
composing. Rather, I’m just showing the potential problem if we argue that something
should be considered composing similar to writing because it does what writing is
supposed to do in dominant understanding. We do not need to accept the truncated
meaning and value of writing that it should make an argument, argument that is direct,
linear, and “logical.” And that visuals also make an argument, and therefore, it should be
counted as legitimate form of composing. In other words, similar to Bruce Horner’s
argument about the literacy scholars’ focus on promoting alternative literacies where
those scholars tend to “buy into the ideological framework responsible for that

denigration in the first place,” George is defending visual design in terms that retain
the notion of argument as inherently valuable—that is, visual design is deemed valuable
insofar as it does work that composition is traditionally thought to do (“Ideologies of
Literacy” 6). Therefore, George is accepting in advance the terms of value that had
originally been used to dismiss visual design as lacking value. So if literacy is assumed
to mean academic literacy, then visual design is defended as literacy insofar as it
conforms to conventional notions of academic writing (.e.g., making an argument). What
George calls the visual mode (though writing itself is visual in many ways and it does
have several other modal dimensions) does much more than make an argument, just as
writing does many more things than merely making one kind of argument.
Let me give an example outside of composition. It is like thinking of the value of
gardening only in terms of how much money you save. For instance, I plant a few
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vegetable plants like peppers and tomatoes in my patio. Sometimes I do not get more than
a few chilies. But not only that they tend to taste (not only in the sense of simple taste)
different, so better. Playing with them, with the squirrel that come to destroy them,
watering them, looking at them every couple hours to check if they have new buds, all
these values mean much more than whether I can save as much or more than I spend on
growing these plants. There are countless other ways they influence me, sometimes
relieving me of the stress of writing my dissertation or going through the terrible
experience of a job search. In similar ways, there are values that we do not see in writing
that students will take from it, sometimes predictable, sometimes unpredictable. So, we
do not need to replace writing with something else or only add something to writing.
Rather, it is also important to see writing and other modes in a much broader way and see
how their meanings manifest through students’ uses of them and appreciate the beauty in
such variations. Thus, as James Slevin says, composition should be “about the encounter
of different ways of reading and writing; our discipline arises in acts of interpretation and
composing, different ways of reading and thinking and persuading brought into our
classrooms by students. Our disciplinary work in all its forms, including research, arises
from the need and the desirability of promoting and enriching the dialog, already
underway” (44).
When we are following an additive logic, there is a danger of looking for
monomodal or monolingual competence, competence in separate modes or languages.
And that makes the job of students even harder, especially so because they are supposed
to achieve the competence in designing a composition by fulfilling the norms that
actually do not exist. This reminds us of Parakrama’s example about language
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distinctions and his entrapment into the same logic that he was trying to dismantle.
Parakrama talks of the difficulty of writing his dissertation in non-standard English
because he was raised and educated in the Western education system and therefore had
internalized its rules. But the main problem with such an argument is that it assumes
separate competencies in different varieties of English as if they are fixed and stable.
When such competence is sought for, such an attempt is bound to fail. Similarly, in the
case of David Damon in Selfe’s study too, shifting from writing to “new media” literacy
and judging his composing practices based on the discrete rules of the visual grammar
can equally be challenging, as it is challenging to students who try to maintain the
separateness of two linguistic practices. Yes, he is successful in the world outside his
composition class, especially in designing websites and adapting to new media literacies
pertinent to the student organizations he is involved in and other clients. But if his
composition is judged in terms of the strict principles/grammar of visual design, he would
again find it somewhat challenging because, despite separation of writing from other
modes or technologies, issue of language conventions will pop up in academic settings.
Therefore, while it is important to acknowledge David’s literacy strength and encourage
him to experiment and explore more possibilities, it is equally important to interrogate the
assumptions about writing as merely argument (or monomodal) and language as
“standard” English.
Finally, as with some translingual and plurilingual theories, multimodal studies
also takes modes as “resources,” whether in a materialist or in a critical/cultural
approach, similar to Bourdieu’s notion of capital. One fundamental problem in defining
technologies (modes and media are technologies) as resources, as I argued in terms of
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language theories in Chapter Three, and as Jay Jordan also contends in his recent article,
drawing on Rickert and other new materialists, is to reinforce “exclusively human
languaging agency” (366). First, it is true that human agents do use and utilize resources,
but it is equally true that they are also used by the resources. Second, when resources are
used, they are mediated by and mediate practices. For instance, when I made a website
for a visual communication course, I tried to utilize resources from my writing experience
and images and image manipulation based on my cultural imaginary. While I was able to
make a website of a sort, those of the resources used did change what I wanted to show,
very different from my original intention or purpose. That is partly so also because our
acts of reading and writing are shaped not only by the obvious, salient aspects, but also
things we often ignore, things taken for granted.
Conclusion: Modality in Practice
To sum up, it is important to locate modality and its meaning not in materiality or
in ideology exclusively because doing so abstracts modes and media from the complex
ecology of practice, which incorporates both the social and technical aspects of our social
life, including our literacy practices. From this perspective, writing is and always has
multimodal potentials even if one or only a few modal aspects of writing become
manifest in specific uses. In other words, as Theresa Lillis argues, in specific instances of
semiotic practice, “it is important to take account of the potential significance of different
modal dimensions whilst at the same time avoiding adopting what we might describe as a
‘modalist’ analytical bias in our approach to writing, akin to the common ‘textualist’ bias
evident in many approaches to writing” (38). As Anne Wysocki contends, while it is
necessary to pay attention to all the available potentials and mediating factors (or what
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NLG call available designs), it is equally or perhaps more important to keep our eyes,
ears, and other senses open to seemingly “unavailable designs” (55), “rendered
unavailable by naturalized, unquestioned practice” (57). In other words, in Rickert’s
terms, we need to avoid taking the salient aspect of any communicative practice as
necessarily significant to all situations. Our acts of writing and communication are
mediated as much by the salient as by the ambient aspects.
Furthermore, there are several dimensions in any semiotic practice, not only more
than writing and speech or verbal and visual or temporal and spatial. And all of these are
nested in social practice. However, what we call social is, as Latour says, not a stable
condition or homogeneous worldview, determining the nature and function of
technologies we develop and use, especially in this age of globalization. Therefore,
notions of multimodal affordances should be placed in everyday practice in its complex
and heterogeneous ecology where the relationship across all mediators, human and nonhuman, mediate/translate goals and purposes behind our semiotic practices. When we
take mediation of a complex act of composing practice as translation by both seemingly
salient and ambient aspects of the specific situation, our humanist notions of modal or
linguistic resources need to be interrogated. The consequences of our uses of
technologies are not determined only by our careful (or careless) and deliberate
utilization of a stock or toolbox of resources, but also by the agency of the items in the
toolbox.
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CHAPTER 5
RELATIONS BETWEEN MULTIMODALITY AND TRANSLINGUALITY:
PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

In the previous two chapters, I tried to examine studies of language relations and
those of multimodality and the potential alternative ways to deal with them, especially in
terms of how language and modality have been conceived. I want to conclude by
summarizing main points of overlaps and disjuncture, and suggest ways to integrate the
issues of modality and language relations in some productive ways. In their recent
publication, “Translinguality, Transmodality, and Difference,” Bruce Horner, Cynthia
Selfe, and Timothy Lockridge have actually explored these issues in their complexities
and offered some important ways to work across languages and modalities. I think the
new materialist theory of practice33 provides some grounds to further expand and
complicate the issue of mediation and modality. After such exploration of convergences
and divergences and ways to bridge the gap, I will end with a brief discussion of the
implications to pedagogy. As Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge article demonstrates, there
are many similarities between multimodal and translingual theories, but with some
33

I think new materialist theory of practice does represent the major theoretical ground that Horner and
Selfe often utilize in their discussion of the issues of modality and language relations. When they come to a
sort of a consensus, I feel like they are actually moving towards new materialist understanding, with a
practice theory touch (and cultural materialism), despite some inconsistencies in their way towards
resolving the seemingly conflicting perspectives.
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significant differences, which, as the Horner and Selfe dialog shows, can be narrowed.
Both these two fields attempt to challenge ideologies that delegitimize practices that are
different from what are assumed to be appropriate, both within the academy and outside,
that is, ideologies of monolingualism and of monomodality. They point out the rich
multilingual and multimodal practices on the ground, especially in recent times, as a
result of increasing intersections between cultures and semiotic (both linguistic and other
semiotic) practices in a globalized context. Similarly, in most of the multimodal and
translingual studies in composition, the major focus has remained on critique of gatekeeping practices in the academy that have barred many students from racially, culturally,
and economically underprivileged backgrounds from entering the academy and achieving
academic success and the potential contributions they could make to empower their
communities and enrich our understandings of communicative practices.
On the other hand, the major similarities lie in their focus on additive models,
both in dominant notions of multilingualism and multimodality. Despite these
similarities, they have some difference, especially in terms of the later translingual
theorists’ emphasis on questioning such boundaries and focusing on intersections across
linguistic practices and multimodal theorists’ attention to the role materiality plays in
communicative activities.
This shows that studies of language relations and that of modalities can learn from
each other. From recent developments like translingualism, especially in its focus on the
porous nature of linguistic practices (see Horner et al.’s “Towards a Translingual
Approach; Horner, NeCamp, and Donahue’s “From English Only to Translingual Norm,”
Canagarajah’s Translingual Practice, etc.), multimodal studies can rethink the divisions
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between different modes in terms of their functions and focus on their fluid natures and
unpredictable consequences. At the same time translingual studies can learn from
multimodal studies in terms of how going beyond discursive aspects to consider material
aspects of language negotiations can provide a more concrete picture of the challenges
and opportunities facing language negotiations. However, such a material focus should
avoid materialist or modalist perspective in understanding the role of materials in
semiotic practices. What the materialities of technology allow is not completely limited
by material nature; the dominant representations of technology tend to limit what is
available and what is not. We should consider why other possibilities are not seen.
I think the following quotation from Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge’s (HSL) recent
piece helps me demonstrate both the points of tension and possibilities for bridging the
gap:
Despite the different trajectories and limited perspectives of our own
labors, we all sense a need for a more expansive view and practice of
composition, whether in terms of modalities or languages of expression,
and a sense that we can stimulate and support efforts towards that goal by
identifying overlaps and parallels in work towards it from questions about
both language and modality.
I completely agree with Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge’s point that we need to adopt a
“more expansive view and practice of composition.” I here see both the tension and a
route towards resolution of the tension between a cultural materialist and materialist
position, between Horner and Selfe playing out in this quotation and throughout this text.
Actually, in my perception, this dialogue shows the blindspots of both—Horner’s
acknowledgement of the role of materiality (not only in cultural materialist sense) and
Selfe’s acknowledgement of the need to see beyond dominant understandings of
modality. In a sense, this dialog and the sort of consensus they arrive at points towards
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the need to adopt a new materialist theory of practice to rethink about mediation. For that,
we need to do a few things on theoretical fronts about techno-linguistic mediation.
Reassembling the Notion of the Social
As discussed in the previous chapters, some of the major problems in our
conceptualizations of languages and modalities are directly linked to the limited notion of
mediation where the focus is largely on one or the other aspects below or a combination
of them:
a)

Social as homogeneous: In many accounts, such as critical perspective
on technology, social is taken not as a material social reality but as
representation of the social as homogeneous and stable entity either in
terms of economic, cultural, or other similar macro forces. This is
manifested in the tendencies of taking semiotic acts as by-products of
social/cultural/economic/linguistic structures/ideologies/hegemony.

b)

Technology as determining social relations and meanings: Reversing
the social and humanist treatment of technologies, this materialist
determinism considers the materiality of technologies as largely
determining social relations and thought processes. As discussed in the
fourth chapter, this tendency is prevalent in multimodal studies where
modes are associated with certain functions or affordances.

c)

Individual as free-floating agent: In some
multilingual/plurilingual/translingual theories, we find the pendulum tilt
more towards individual agency, especially as a response to structural
theories of language. A somewhat similar tendency can also be found in
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multimodal scholarship in its emphasis on semiotic acts as “motivated”
and their problematic notion of resources.
In all these three tendencies, the relationships between semiotic practices and
society/culture/ideology/individual intention or agency are vertical, often suggesting the
relationships in terms of determination rather than translation. Instead, it is necessary to
see all of these, including semiotic practices like writing, as parts of the ecology of
mediation, without reducing them to any single larger force. In order to do so, as Latour
contends, the first thing we need to do is to disassemble the “social,” but to reassemble it
to attend to the complexity and dynamism of the relationships in any given instance of
semiotic activity:
In the alternative view, ‘social’ is not some glue that could fix everything
including what the other glues cannot fix; it is what is glued together by
many other type of connectors. Whereas sociologists (or socio-economists,
socio-linguistists, social psyschologists, etc.) take social aggregates as the
given that could send some light on residual aspects of economics,
linguistics, psychology, management, and so on, these other scholars, on
the contrary, consider social aggregates as what should be explained by
the specific associations provided by economics, linguistics, psychology,
law, management, etc. (Reassembling 5)
This gives a clear sense how the new materialism/ANT (Actor Network Theory) of
Latour does not discard the notion of the social for emphasizing the role of the material.
Rather, what we normally call social has to be redefined, not as a glue that can fix
everything (context, often highly generalized, used to explain textual features), something
to explain away regularities and/or peculiarities in language and other semiotic practices,
but as a collective, a bundle of constantly shifting associations. In other words, he is
trying to avoid the assumptions of homogeneity and stability in the existing view of the
social. When we think of the social as a bundle of associations, not as a homogeneous
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whole, we resist limiting “in advance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of
associations” (Reassembling 11). This focus on heterogeneities is important in today’s
globalized world, especially because “in situations where innovations proliferate, where
group boundaries are uncertain, when the range of entities to be taken into account
fluctuates, the sociology of the social is no longer able to trace actors’ new associations”
(Reassembling 11).
The reassembling of the social helps us move beyond linear and limited notions of
mediation to a more expansive and ecological conceptualization of mediation as
multilateral. In such an expansive view, we do not depend on only discursive notions of
the social, we get an opportunity to consider the roles of things often reduced to mere
effects of larger forces like the social or to mere tools or objects for use by human agents.
When we consider any linguistic situation, we do not think of its mediation only in terms
of a “socio”linguistic perspective, but in terms of all available connectors. When we do
not depend on only a discursive notion of the social, we get an opportunity to consider
the role of things often reduced to effects of larger forces or to mere objects/tools.
Second, while one implication of dissembling the social is to try to account for all
possible connectors and see how they mediate our actions and their consequences, the
other important implication is to pay attention to the “missing masses” and their roles not
merely as tools for perpetuating ideologies (therefore not acknowledged), nor as
determining the nature and consequences of human actions, but as transforming, while
also perpetuating, such ideologies, though such transformations might not, at times, look
like any significant change. In other words, taking that to mediation of semiotic practices,
the materiality of various modes and technologies does matter, but how that matters is not
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dependent completely on their ostensibly inherent material qualities, but on the
relationship between their materialities and the user’s semiotic practices. Similarly, the
materiality of modalities and technologies should not be limited to their formal features.
That should include their connection with the material world around them that shape how
they contribute to the production or reception of meanings. That is partly what Jay Jordan
also means when he talks about the need for translingual analysis to include material
aspects of language negotiations. Here, let me give an example of my own experience
with job interviews and the roles different technologies of communication played. First,
in a materialist way, I thought a Skype interview was better than phone interviews
because it is a richer form of communication than phone, what McLuhan might term as a
“hotter” medium than the telephone. And it was true that I could make better sense of the
interviewers’ questions and their implications by looking at material aspects more than
their accents, tempo, and stress patterns, including how they are sitting, their facial
gestures, their bodily orientation, movements of their eyes, legs, hands, and the way they
dressed up. But at the same time there were other material aspects that came to my
attention that equally affected the interviews, like the way I had to be dressed up, sit, and
perform before the camera. Moreover, sometimes the lights getting through the blinders,
the ambient noise (or lack of such noise), etc. tended to affect me, sometimes positively
sometimes negatively. Later I actually liked phone interviews more than Skype at times
because I found myself more comfortable when I was lying on my bed. The coziness of
my bedroom, the relaxation and the feeling of such relaxation that I got from lying on the
bed tended to make me feel as if I were talking informally to my friends about something
else than giving an interview. The other “insignificant” material objects like a pen I could
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play with, and innumerable things that I cannot account for, are part of the ecology of
mediation that helped or hindered my performance in those interviews. The point I’m
making here is, yes the materialities of technologies and modes play significant roles. But
there are more aspects of their materialities and the surrounding (ambience) that we often
tend to forget when we focus on the abstracted affordances of such technologies.
Therefore, we should be careful not to limit the potentials of the materiality of any
technologies to what has so far been seen as their functions or affordances.
Let us take as an example the argument about the relationship between
multilingualism and digital technologies (multimodality) that we often see in recent
composition scholarship. The common argument is that digital technologies and the
multimodality they afford promote multilingualism and help students resist
monolingualism. For instance, Amanda Athon argues that new technologies like Web 2.0
empower multilingual students by promoting their local cultures and languages:
Traditional print texts highly value linear communication and thus, a
sameness that is also found in standard academic English. The similarities
between the rise of homogenous, linear texts in the classroom likely
coincides with the emergence of standard academic English as the most
valued dialect and the language that permeates our college composition
classrooms. We can distance our students from the notion that standard
academic English—an inherently linear language that focuses on
sameness—is the only correct dialect. With the rise of new technologies
and Web 2.0, we should adjust our pedagogical practices to embrace
nonlinear texts in our pedagogy. Having our students engage in acts of
multimodal composing, such as using visuals to create literacy narratives,
or by having students read or view recordings of authors who write in
dialects, allows our students to embrace their language and cultural
histories.
I do largely agree with many of her points, especially her concern about the potential
danger of promoting the ideal notion of standard academic English. But her claim about
“academic English” being inherently linear and new technologies, especially visual and
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aural, as inherently non-linear, and therefore, promoting multilingualism has many gaps
and fissures to be explored and interrogated. First, by making a binary between writing
and visual and assigning linear and non-linear arguments to them, she equates material
form with function. Second, she repeats the same mistake that instrumentalist notions of
technology make by taking technology as a tool for promoting linguistic and cultural
diversity. Third, such a conception reinforces the false notion that there is such a thing
called linear standard Academic English; what is rather true is that there is a strong
presence of such an ideology about standard English in the teaching of composition.
Therefore, focusing only on the materiality of technologies and then limiting the
materiality with certain functions limits writing in English (standard or non-standard) to
linear arguments or similar thinking. But the accompanying material existence and the
practices that what is called the standard language has been part of have made us think
that writing does not allow multilingualism, and therefore, the argument goes,
multimodality comes as an escape from a monolingual trend in composition.
I’m not denying the fact that digital technologies, coupled with global trends of
migration and international trade, have brought language intersections and multilingual
realities to the surface. But what I’m pointing out here is the need to focus more on what
material social conditions, both seemingly significant and insignificant, besides dominant
understandings of the materiality of technologies (including languages) create an
atmosphere more productive for appreciation and uses of multilingual and multimodal
potentials.
Furthermore, it might be equally or even more interesting to look into whether or
how people decide to change how they use their language repertoire depending on
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whether they are composing on digital spaces or on paper, but paying equal attention to
(f)actors beyond technologies.
Lastly, we also need to redefine agency when we include things into the ecology
of mediation. As discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, with regard to
plurilingualism/multilingualism and multimodality, the dominant definition of agency in
the discussion of language ability and multimodal use in composition scholarship is
human centric. That is often reflected in the emphasis on the creativity of multilingual
participants in deliberately and strategically utilizing multilingual resources. As Jordan
contends: “Crucial to Canagarajah’s articulation of translingual practice is (re)focusing
on ‘the work of creative and active social agents’ who ‘employ the disparate and
conflictual elements of a language or cognitive system’” (375). In an attempt to counter
monolingual hegemony, this tendency replaces the traditional notion of the competent
native speaker with the fully conscious and competent multilingual composer. We can
find a similar tendency in multimodal scholarship, especially in terms of their focus on
the multimodal subject as “motivated” and communicative modes as “resources” (see
Kress’s Grammar of Visual Design).
Min-Zhan Lu and Bruce Horner try to complicate translingual agency by
conceptualizing it in terms of the translingual composer’s ability to negotiate the “‘micro’
and ‘macro’ in light of the specificity of relations, concerns, motives, and purposes
demanding meaningful response in individual writers’ past, present, and future lives”
(591). Drawing on Pennycook’s notion of language as a mesopolitical practice and
Butler’s notion of reiteration as recontextualization, Lu and Horner emphasize how such
recontextualization generates potential conditions for transformation. This definition of
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agency in terms of practice tries to avoid the human centric rhetoric reflected in many
translingual and plurilingual theoretical accounts. Here creativity does not reside only in
conscious and deliberate breaks from the conventions, but also in acts of mimicry or
reiteration. However, even in this account, they do not go that far to account for agency
beyond humans: “A translingual approach thus defines agency operating in terms of the
need and ability of individual writers to map and order, remap and reorder conditions and
relations surrounding their practices, as they address the potential discrepancies between
the official and practical, rather than focusing merely on what the dominant has defined
as exigent, feasible, appropriate, and stable ‘context’” (591).
Here, they do acknowledge the role of context, but fall short of recognizing the
heterogeneities within the alternative context that they think translingual composers need
to pay attention to. Therefore, the new materialist theory of practice would take this
notion of agency one step further by reminding us that not only the materials do exert
agency, more than “simply [being] the hapless bearers of symbolic projection” (Latour
Reassembling 10), but also that we are “ambient subjects” (Rickert 91).
In all of these accounts of agency, what we see is a tension, tension resulting from
the need to go beyond the division between humanism and anti-humanism, the focus on
individual agency and social shaping. An alternative to, and perhaps an extension of,
these conceptualizations that might provide us a more productive way of redefining
agency is to not replace one context with another or one kind of agents with others, but
by diversifying what we call context so that we can count on the role of all actors that
make a difference in human actions. Let us attend to things “beyond ‘language’ and
‘languaging’ to include attention to” the things and technologies that surround us, “the
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air, sweat, plastic, memories, twitchiness, cheeses, skin, color that are materially copresent, co-evolving with language” (Jordan 380), but without losing sight of the
differences with which certain elements of the context get greater light whereas others
remain mostly in the dark.
Reconceptualizing the Relations between Language and Modality
When we go beyond limited views of mediation where we only think of language
and culture(s) or modality/technology and culture/ideology and consider it as a result of a
complex set of relations and co-influence of a multitude of (f)actors shaping semiotic
acts, whether multimodal or multilingual, it paves our way, at least theoretically, for
bridging the gap between issues of multimodality and multilingualsm. The first move we
need to make is to consider composing as a socio-material practice where social and
material aspects interact and shape the uses and consequences of our semiotic acts, which
transform social and material aspects in turn. When we focus on a broader notion of
practice as consisting of not only the interactions between the individual and the social
(structure), and when we see practice in its concrete form, as a repeated activity in a
constantly changing ecology of mediation, we cannot and should not separate modality
from language, and both from material and social aspects surrounding them. It is
important to see beyond the narrow division between language and modality or speech
and writing as evidenced in sociolinguistics and composition (see Lillis’s Sociolinguistics
of Writing) and see them as parts of the broader ecology of mediation. In other words, we
go beyond studying language or modality against the backdrop of a force considered to
be determining the nature of such acts, thus taking everything else as insignificant or
irrelevant. Rather, we need to both broaden what modality and language mean and how
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the choices composers/users make are partially affected not only by their intention or
their position in the social structure, but by their understanding of what they assume
“language” or “modality” does, thus making these as (f)actors mediating semiotic
activities in specific situations.
Calvet rightly points out the problem of separating language (assumed as one
mode) and other modes (visual assumed as images or audio or other modal appearances)
when he develops an ecological approach where he calls our attention to the need to pay
attention to the whole range of semiotic technologies/modes and the intersections
between network of practices and representations:
In the name of what theory should we separate out, in this sequence of
actions, the one which is communicated by the emitting of sounds? The
answer generally is that, on the one hand, there is the oral instrument of
communication, namely language, and on the other there are facts that
have to do with ‘non-verbal’ communication, or semiology. And this
affirmation is characteristic of the trap into which the theory of language
as an isolatable object, an instrument, has led us. (22)
When we see any linguistic or other semiotic practice, we instantly see how it is
intricately linked with modes and technologies assumed to be separate. Therefore, it is
important to look for a multitude of connections and meaning potentials in any given
semiotic practice: “the notion of language is a model, simultaneously useful and
reductive, and we must take care not to allow ourselves to be imprisoned by the models
that we use…it [language] does not exist in isolation from social life; language (or at
least what I continue, for the sake of convenience, to call language) is a social practice
within social life, one practice among others, inseparable from its environment” (Calvet
22). Therefore, the notions of language and modality need to be rethought on at least two
fronts: one, going beyond limiting them in terms of narrow ideas of their materiality and
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their functions, often reduced to stable categories in dominant representations; two,
resisting conceptualizations of them in terms of larger categories like
ideologies/power/culture (social-shaping) or focusing on the unique resources of
multilingual or multimodal users/students (human-centric).
Furthermore, though we often see language being separated from multimodality,
in reality, not only are languages always already multimodal, they are, in their specific
instances of use, part of the multimodality that operates in most of our communicative
practices. As Horner says in Horner, Selfe and Lockridge piece, “it no longer makes
sense to treat language, whether as writing, or speech, or both, as apart from the
multimodal”:
Following Olson’s warning… it seems ultimately problematic to
distinguish between language and modality. Dominant conceptions of
language offer a highly attenuated, restricted sense of all that goes on in
the activity of ‘language acts’ (a.k.a. communicative acts). Kress (2000)
acknowledges this in calling language multimodal (p.186), vs. thinking of
language as itself discrete mode. Conversely, it seems appropriate to
recognize modalities as a feature of language. From this, it no longer
makes sense to treat language, whether as writing or speech or both, as
apart from the ‘multimodal’.
What Horner says here is important because in discussions of multimodality, it is taken as
different from linguistic practice. Therefore, multimodal composition is often used, as
separate from language (writing in its narrow sense), to refer to compositions like audio
essay, photo essay, video, or a website (all of which contain elements of linguistic
practice). The problem in such accounts is a very limited understanding of modality. That
is why the dominant conception of both language and modality need to be rethought. As
Lillis says, even what we call writing involves modes and material existence far broader
than what is often described as verbal:
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Much has been claimed about what writing is and does, on the basis of
assumptions about particular modal-material dimensions, notably, its
verbal nature and its object like (or material-permanence) existence.
However [. . .], whilst it is important to discuss writing as a verbal-object,
there are other important modal dimensions to consider, as well as a need
to explore the meanings attached to these different dimensions by users,
writers (producers) and readers (lookers, readers, consumers). (Lillis 21)
Lillis points out that it is important to understand writing as “verbal-object” as much as it
is to explore how readers/viewers take writing, both in verbal and in other modal
dimensions, or as a multimodal text. However, this should not be taken as a denial of how
the visuality of traditional writing is different from the visuality of images or video. But
the point is that based on such differences, we should not reify language (writing) and
“multimodal” as inherently different, especially in terms of fixed functions.
From the perspective of a new materialist theory of practice, it might be more
useful to conceive of what we call language and modality as examples and instances of
larger technological practices where, in researching and analyzing composing practice,
we do not separate language and modality either from each other or from other
technologies of remediation. However, when doing so, it is important to conceive of
technology in a sense broader than mere ‘technique’ or ‘tool,’ as we saw in materialist
and instrumentalist definitions. The use of technique is a part of the definition of
technology, but technology is not only the tool, but also how it is used, the “systematic
treatment of an art, craft, or technique” (“Online Etymology”), where we take system not
as internally self-sufficient and self-regulating, but as patterns of use developed through
practice. In that way, we can adopt a more “expansive view and practice” of composing
where composing does not get limited to one or a few specific kinds of writing that are
assumed to serve certain interests in society. And that expansive view can incorporate not

159

only the semiotic practices in their complex relationships, but also the ways they are
variously used by composers across geo-political and cultural locations.
In that light, language itself is a technology with varying modal possibilities.
Other semiotic materials like images, sound, gestures, etc. are also technologies that can
be and have been used for communicative purposes, often in conjunction with and
complementing writing. At the same time, these technologies are remediated through
print or digital technologies. And as they are remediated, their meanings are largely
shaped by the habitus of the users, material dimensions (both in terms of their own
material existence and their relations with the material surrounding) and social location.
In other words, their meanings and roles are constituted by the practices in their material
social relations and the beliefs about them. Considerations of language and modality and
their relations in terms of the complex relations between dispositions and practices help
us understand the durability and transformations of semiotic practices and ideologies
about them.
Dispositions and Practices
Given the mutually co-constitutive relations between practices and
representations/dispositions and the possibilities of discrepancy between the two, how
can we understand both the durability and shifts in language beliefs and practices? First,
it is important to distinguish between belief about language and modal relations and the
actual semiotic practices where what we’ve been calling multimodality and multilingual
practices mingle, shape and thereby transform meanings both for the composers and
readers/viewers. But it is at the same time true that practices and beliefs shape and coconstruct each other. That looks like a paradox, but this is what helps us go beyond
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simple determinism, whether it is ideology determining the nature of semiotic practices
or the materiality of modes determining meanings and patterns of thought. As Latour
contends, “belief is not a state of mind but a result of relationships” and as the
relationships across elements in material social practice change, the existing beliefs also
begin to be questioned and doubted, creating a ground for change in dispositions (MC 2).
The direction and the nature of changes depend on a variety of things. Often times,
transformation in disposition might not immediately follow change in practices because
despite such changes, the users/producers themselves fail to see the contradictions
between the practices and ideologies, while, at the same time, such changes are not
recognized positively by the dominant institutions, including academia. Moreover,
dispositions are forms of sedimentations resulting from long and repetitive uses (of
various semiotic practices). Similarly, this is so also because notions of what counts as
appropriate are intricately linked to existing power relations and the reproductions of
such power relations through academic institutions, language policies, the linguistic
marketplace, and geopolitical relations.
For instance, Bal Krishna Sharma’s recent study of how multilingual Nepalese
diaspora use online technologies, YouTube in particular, and what role that plays in terms
of their language use shows the discrepancy between their language beliefs and their
semiotic practices. The study was specifically centered on a UN speech by a Nepalese
minister posted on YouTube and the comments on the video, especially those related to
her “‘bad’ English” (19). His analysis showed that
YouTube brings superdiverse participants together with their multiple
subjectivities, identities and attitudes, and their demonstrated language
competence is characterized by varied forms of linguistic repertoires in
English and in Nepali. Ideologically the comments seem to reproduce the
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modernist view of language as a bounded system, but linguistic resources
used to construct these comments show a number of linguistic peculiarities
and heteroglossic uses that challenge the writers’ own conscious
conceptualization of language. (19)
Despite their multilingual practices, their comments reflected monolingual belief. Though
it is true that YouTube (or any other social networking sites) “brings superdiverse
participants together,” we should not overlook the dangerously uniform belief beneath
apparent diversity. The participants in that online discussion utilized their “varied forms
of linguistic repertoires in English and Nepali,” but their language disposition seemed to
remain largely unaffected.34 There could be a host of reasons. One important reason that
we should not forget is that all languages, as Calvet contends in his recent book, Toward
an Ecology of World Languages, are not equal, and that inequality, as ingrained in
language policies and their assumed values for economic and social progress, tend to
make us continually hold language beliefs that contradict ground reality:
Even if to the linguist’s eye all languages are equal…, the world’s
languages are fundamentally unequal. … But the fact remains that a
discourse which would represent English and Breton, or French and Bobo
as socially equivalent would be both unrealistic and ideological: all
languages do not have the same value, and their inequality is at the heart
of the way they are organized across the world. (4)
Here, two things are important to mark. First, the value of languages is tied to socioeconomic and geo-political relations in general and to the specific uses and purposes
individuals put them to. Second, languages that are valued more than the others (and
those valued less than others) continually undergo transformation due to their interactions
34

In the study, many participants thought that the minister should have used Nepali language with
translation. But many went far beyond the issue of language to comment that it was a shame for Nepal to
appoint someone like her to the post of minister. Such comments do show variations in their beliefs, some
swept away by the ideology of English monolingualism (in the sense of English only in certain forums or
for certain purposes), whereas some considered it important to use native language if it was hard for her to
use English. But, at the same time, all the participants did hold, as the researcher mentions, monolingual
belief in the sense of taking languages as separate and bounded.
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with other language practices. But, despite active roles of the users in transforming
language practices, it does take time and opportunities for them to reflect on the
discrepancy between language beliefs and practices.
In the same way, we also should not conflate ideological representations of
modalities and languages with what they are and what potentials they could have in
material social practices. For instance, in terms of modality, writing has traditionally been
tied to, as in the classic case of Walter Ong or in the general understanding, making
rational arguments and “analytically sequential, linear organization of thought,” where as
other modes like orality and visual representations have been associated with the opposite
mental operations like “rhapsodizing” (Ong 16) and non-linear thinking (Kress and Van
Leeuwen 218). Here, we should be careful not to take writing in terms of the limited
ideological notion of it. Like stereotypes, such representations of modal aspects are not
completely false, but very limited. The same tendency can be found in terms of the values
of language varieties. For instance, in some discussions in composition and in general
understanding outside the academy, certain language varieties/languages are assumed to
perform certain functions or purposes, e.g., native language/dialect as more appropriate
for early drafts of writing or for self-exploration (expressivist/accomodationist) whereas
standard variety as appropriate for final, official draft/version, publications, or the notion
that English is a language of science and technology, of progress, and of advancement.
These beliefs, while inherently problematic for their reification of languages from
language practices, are still very dominant because of which many students are
discouraged from tapping into the semiotic repertoire that they have developed through
their participation in diverse linguistic practices or in linguistic practice that is already
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diverse. Similarly, even those students who practice multilingualism or multimodality
find it hard to resist SL/MN (Single/Standard Language and Modality) ideology.
In concluding this section, it is also important to mark that communicative
practices in most cases today are always already multimodal, and issues of linguistic
diversity need to be adequately addressed to help our students not only become
successful communicators in a globalized world, but also to facilitate development of
translingual/transmodal dispositions. While increasing intersections of diverse linguistic
practices and the ease with which audio and visual elements can be incorporated into the
composing practices have created a more favorable atmosphere for the development of
translingual and transmodal dispositions, our attention to diverse socio-material
dimensions in the ecology of mediation can provide us ways to recognize the value of
differences in student writing/composing. As Cynthia Selfe contends in “Translinguality,
Transmodality,” it is equally important to “encourage more teachers not only to recognize
or ‘acknowledge the legitimacy of the transmodal position,’ but also to
encourage/experiment with/try more transmodal production, to experiment with different
semiotic ways of composing meaning—and to help students do so as well.”
Pedagogical Implications
“It makes me sick—That’s how I feel. And that’s why a lot of people are
not interested. I-am-not [states each word slowly]. What am I saying?—
Everybody knows what ‘I’m not’ means. It’s like trying to segregate, you
know, you’ve got like a boundary that sets, you know, you apart from
other people. Why?” (Lillis Student Writing, 85)
“Despite these accomplishments, however, the year was not going well for
David. Although his computer skills had improved by leaps and bounds,
his skills in communicating in Standard English remained seriously
underdeveloped—and his teachers in the English Department were very
concerned about his ability to organize and write formal essays, his
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inattention to standard spelling, his inability to write sentences that were
grammatically correct according to conventional standards, and his
problems with development and logical argumentation” (Selfe, “Students
Who Teach Us” 49).
I think all of us feel sick about why David in Selfe’s study or the student in Lillis’s study
had to suffer, where their literacy knowledge and skills should actually have been
encouraged and promoted. These are only two representative cases. I myself know of
many such cases, especially in Nepal where thousands of students fail, not once but
several times, in their School Leaving Certificate examinations (and many other) because
their English is “bad.” We all know the potential consequences of policies that promote
monolingual ideology. With the publication of the result of the examinations come news
of several suicides and mental breakdowns every year. However, such policies are still
dominant in the US and across the world.
Both the quotations above reflect the frustration that many non-mainstream
students go through in situations where writing is conceived only in monolingual and
monomodal terms. The purposes of teaching composition under such ideological models,
as discussed by various scholars in composition, are teaching abstracted notions of
writing and language, often focusing on quantifiable outcomes. Such an emphasis
assumes what Paul Matsuda calls the “myth of linguistic homogeneity” and what
multimodal scholars would call a uniform notion of literacy. As a result, their focus
remains on promoting a transmission model of pedagogy, which “extends to the demand
for a ‘truth in advertising’ of course descriptions whereby teachers must tell the student
consumers what those enrolling will be getting, and, of course, teachers must then deliver
what’s promised, and students are assumed to know what they want and will need”
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(Horner, “Rewriting Composition” 457). In such a model, students are supposed to learn
fixed skills of language and writing. Peruse the major goals or outcomes statements of
any US composition program, and you will find such a goal highlighted in the very
beginning. Even the “WPA Outcomes Statement for First Year Composition” mentions a
similar goal for FYC courses. It says, “By the end of first-year composition, students
should control such surface features as syntax, grammar, punctuation, and spelling,”
assuming there are fixed conventions that students can and should “master” (Council of
Writing Program Administration 2008). This language of mastery and the
characterization of those features as surface features mask how they are, in reality, the
results of sedimentations of language practices in specific socio-historical contexts. This
dominant tendency towards language conventions promotes the masking of the politics of
language “standardization.” And this is where what I’ve called a mesodiscursive
approach sees the need to change how we approach language conventions, shifting our
focus from the masking of politics to historicizing such tendencies in FYC curriculum.
When the guiding principle in curriculum design assumes difference in language
use as deviation/error, it not only upholds the myth of discreteness and stability of a
language “system”35 (Horner, Lu, Royster, and Trimbur 2011; Pennycook 2010), but it
also frustrates many students in ways similar to the one we see in the above quotation
from Lillis. In many cases, the direct impact of such language beliefs would be students
getting a lower grade, the consequences of which can be devastating (loss of scholarship,
ineligibility for admission, etc.). Besides the false theoretical assumption, the real
35

It’s not only the dominant monolingual policy/ideology that assumes language fixity. Other language
theories that acknowledge diversity also end up holding the same belief, emphasizing either on ELF or on
separate varieties of World Englishes. Therefore, these theories would not help us overcome the problem of
overcoming monolingual ideology in curriculum design.

166

practical problem is that most of non-mainstream students are systematically placed at a
disadvantage because the norm often comes from the idealized notions of language
practices of the dominant class. Many students who use English differently go through
serious frustration and heavy pressure due to the fact that teachers always mark their
writing as “incorrect,” requiring them to master the dominant variety. For instance, in the
quote above, the student feels as if she is “segregat[ed]” simply because she uses “I’m” in
place of “I am”. Theresa Lillis rightly points out the political ramifications of such
practice: “Example 1 helps the researcher learn about the significance of a particular
textual feature—I’m—to the writer. The writer doesn’t see full versus contracted forms
as a question about neutral conventions but rather as having the potential to exclude
people, including herself, from engaging in academia” (Student Writing 360). Such
students also often go through psychological struggle due to the fact that they feel
insecure about their future prospects. In other words, in such models, difference is
punished rather than, as Selfe says, making it an instance for learning, learning for both
students and teachers (“Students Who Teach Us”).
In place of a pedagogy that promotes what Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge call
SLMN ideology, we should promote translingual and transmodal pedagogies that not
only recognize the legitimacy of different ways of meaning making, but also encourage
students and teachers to utilize their literacy potentials and experiment with literacy
practices different from the dominant notions of proper literacy. Similarly, as Selfe,
James Slevin, and many translingual theorists have argued, such experiments and
students’ unique literacy practices should be taken as sources of learning for teachers.
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So, the goal of teaching composition should be to develop understandings across
differences. Such a focus becomes even more important in today’s world where
intersections of people and cultures facilitated by digital technologies have brought
diverse semiotic practices together. This is an extension of what Slevin says in a slightly
different context about the disciplinarity of composition:
Composition is a discipline, an educational practice in the older sense I
have sketched, that cannot know itself because we have lost our power to
name what we do. Our discipline is about the encounter of different ways
of reading and writing; our discipline arises in acts of interpretation and
composing, different ways of reading and thinking and persuading brought
into our classrooms by students. Our disciplinary work in all its forms,
including research, arises from the need and the desirability of promoting
and enriching the dialog, already underway. (44)
As Slevin says, the work of composition should concentrate on promoting and enriching
the dialog in engaging the encounter of different ways of reading and writing conceived
in a much broader sense. We should reimagine composition as an activity of learning; it
is learning new way of thinking and interpreting, learning new ways of using language
and other semiotic systems.
However, when we emphasize making difference the center of our focus in
teaching (and research), we should try to go beyond additive notions of literacies,
whether multilingualism or multimodality and pay attention to the everyday practice in its
complex socio-material complexity. That means, as I discussed in the third chapter while
talking about Arjuna Parakrama and Neha, assumptions of separateness are not only
unrealistic, they make language negotiations even more difficult and frustrating for many
students. In other words, those who do not seem to use a particular language or variety in
its pure form (mastery, which is never possible) will suffer.
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Similarly, we should resist the temptation to fetishize some practices as creative
and separate them from everyday practice. Such a tendency, as in the popular notion of
code-meshing or celebration of a dominant notion of multimodality, “threatens to render
it [code-meshing] a species of exotica to be marveled at rather than a feature of everyday
practice” (Horner in Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge, “Transmodality and
Trans/Multimodality”). Furthermore, the notion of multilingual/multimodal agency as
composers’ deliberate, active, and strategic uses of language or modal resources, seen in
many translingual/plurilingual/multilingual accounts, and their focus on metalinguistic or
metadiscursive awareness can sometimes do a disservice to many students because such
an emphasis ignores their struggle and difficulties negotiating differences.
At the same time, such an emphasis ignores creative uses of language/modality
that look repetitive. For instance, when one of my students in a FYC class was asked to
remediate her research paper into a different format that explicitly uses a variety of
modes, she made a flyer with the uses of different fonts and sizes, experimenting with
various compositional possibilities in terms of the arrangement of different blocks of
texts and white space, creating a clearly visual representation of her written text in a form
of a flyer. It looked appealing and creative. But that visual text was itself “written.” It
would be a mistake to just require her to use images as visuals in her flyer or to consider
her flyer a verbal mode. While encouraging students to experiment with a variety of
modes and linguistic possibilities, we at the same time should not forget that our singular
focus on mixing of modes (as understood in an additive sense) might not only curb her
creative potential, but take away the possibility of providing clear instances of the fluidity
of assumed technologies or modes.
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Furthermore, students’ semiotic practices should be considered in their material
ecology where we consider not only the materiality of modes and socio-political
conditions, but also seemingly insignificant material surroundings, from furniture,
lighting, black/white boards and trashcans to the location of a classroom and the way the
room is structured. Similarly, we should show our willingness to understand students’
own material conditions. Considering such ecology, broader, more complex, and diverse
than our common understanding of cultural ecology, helps us develop our teaching
strategies accordingly and see students in their specificity. When we do so, we can
perhaps appreciate not only deliberate and obvious instances of code-meshing, but also
those that do not look diverse/multilingual. That way, we see diversity not only based on
the differences between “native” and “non-native” students, but among what we call
“monolingual” students. We can see how the code-meshing of the Malaysian student in
Lu’s study and that of Buthaina in Canagarajah’s study are different and that both should
be considered creative despite the fact that the Malaysian student decides to reiterate so
called standard use, whereas Buthaina uses Arabic script with English, emoticons with
alphabetic texts.
Therefore, when we read and respond to student writings, with our focus on
difference as the norm and ecologies of writing as broader and more complex than handy
categorizations, we should approach difference not in terms of broad categories like
identity markers (ESL, non-native, etc.) but in terms of what Stephanie Kerschbaum calls
“markers of difference”: “It will be useful to re-emphasize the distinction between
markers of difference and identity markers more generally. Markers of difference are
always situated, negotiable, and part of individual interactions…. Thus, markers of
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difference do not provide cross-contextual understanding of the meaning associated with
any particular identity marker” (109). In other words, we should discard the static notion
of difference and use what Kerschbaum calls “a dynamic, relational, and emergent
construct” (116). This is what Helen Fox says when she talks about the importance of not
generalizing the problems of ESL students: “It would not be a good idea to assume that
anyone who comes from abroad, or worse, anyone whose last name is Wong or Das
Gupta or Hernandez must have a particular writing or thinking style, or must be affected
by cultural differences to the same degree or in the same way as other world majority
students, or even at all” (110-111). In other words, when we see difference in student’s
composing practice, it’s better to follow the traces of every agent than to assign the
source of such difference to any a priorily known or assumed reason/force.
Finally, though there is a general misconception that translingual/transmodal
approaches are useful only for non-traditional/non-mainstream students, partly due to the
focus on additive notions of language and modal difference in the academy, we should
show how it is perhaps more useful to seemingly monolingual students and teachers
alike. This is particularly so because translingual/transmodal approaches need to focus as
much on material practices as on dispositions. Students tend to suffer a lot not only
because they are not capable of navigating across linguistic and modal diversities (which
is hard), but because they are accustomed to think about writing in a way that makes it
hard for them to appreciate the strength of their unique practices. Similarly, given current
geopolitical and cultural realities, so-called monolingual students also find themselves in
many situations, both within the academy and outside, that demand ability to understand
and appreciate semiotic practices that look quite different from their own. And, since
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dispositions and practices are co-constitutive, encouraging both teachers and students to
experiment and take risk in translingual and transmodal composing practices (since they
are inextricably linked), while helping them to see the limitations of existing notions of
language and modality will be central to teaching-learning practices. Constant exposure
and continuous experimentations help teachers and students develop dispositions that can
see the value of things that looked inappropriate to them in the past.
As most of us have been trained in monolingual and monomodal educational
systems, we tend to ignore productive differences in student texts. For instance, when I
was working in a writing center, one student showed a comment on her paper from her
instructor. It read like “Your paper is very difficult to read because your sentences
wander around.” Due to our monolingual training, we still ignore sentences that “wander
around”; we don’t have tolerance towards ambiguities and complexities that differences
in composing could generate, at least if they are written by students. This applies not only
to teachers outside the English department, but also to those who teach FYC. This
pervasive ideology of English monolingualism and monomodality of writing still governs
how teachers think about language despite semiotic practices going through constant
transformations in varying socio-political contexts. What it says is that writing programs
need to work continuously towards changing the dispositions of such teachers because, as
Patricia Friedrich says, they cannot be changed and “implemented overnight” (26). Some
ways towards changing such disposition can be by encouraging teachers (including
graduate teaching assistants (GTAs) and adjuncts, who form the majority of those who
teach FYC), as Patricia Friedrich says, to learn from recent scholarship on language
learning and modal relations:
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I recommend that both WPAs and faculty read and discuss works in
sociolinguistics and particularly in world Englishes. When instructors
become aware of the magnitude, the scope, and the many different
functions of English around the world, their perceptions of the language
tend to change completely, and their sensitivity to issues facing users of
the language who are different from themselves seems to grow
accordingly.
This applies to promoting transmodal disposition and practices too. The focus on
experimenting and taking risk at using different semiotic practices is equally important,
especially because many of us think that we do not know much about use of “new” media
and modalities. Cynthia Selfe points out such resistance and the need to equally focus on
experimenting:
At the same time, I also see another complicating tension: on one hand, a
celebratory recognition of multimodality/transmodality and, on the other
hand, a push-to-the-background/resistance to teaching certain forms
of/environments for multimodality/transmodality production: like some
English teachers' resistance to teaching/recognizing anything but
conventional print-based word papers (which, granted, are themselves
multimodal, but not in the same ways as texts created in digital
environments can be). (Selfe in Horner, Selfe, and Lockridge,
“Translinguality, Transmodality”)
Here, it is important to remind those who resist new literacy practices not only that we
are more and more surrounded by texts that utilize the resources of a variety of
technologies and modalities, but also that they themselves practice such literacies in
many seemingly monomodal texts. Second, we can utilize, as Wendy Hesford et al.
advocate, the resources that a diverse group of teachers can bring, especially from their
experiences of teaching or learning linguistic and other multimodal practices that are
different from our mainstream tradition. However, it would be a mistake to assume that
non-native or multilingual GTAs/faculty are free from monolingual bias, particularly
because the teaching of English is equally (sometimes even more) governed by
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monolingual ideology outside the United States and other English-speaking countries.
The sharing of these diverse experiences, by both native and non-native teachers, can
help promote greater awareness about language politics and discursive practices.
It is also important not to separate the issue of language diversity from modality
in teaching as they are, in most situations, inextricably connected. For instance, let me
take the case of David in Cynthia Selfe’s study. In his case, monolingualism is as much
of the source of the problem as the monomodal focus in US composition teaching,
besides many other aspects of material-social relations that went undetected. It is perhaps
partly true that David could have done well in his composition class had the teachers
been cognizant of his alternative literacy skills and recognized the value of them. But, it
is equally possible that he would have suffered because the ghost of monolingual belief
follows even in what we often call new media literacy practices. We all know that most
multimodal assignments include a ”writing” component, often in the form of reflection,
that needs to fulfill the same requirements of a traditional essay. It is definitely better than
limiting students to essayistic writing. But if we do not address the issue of language
diversity in conjunction with modalities and literacies considered different from writing,
we expect the same thing from what we call multimodal composition or new literacy
practices, repeating the same problem, but in a different form.
Conclusion
With increasing diversity in the student population and proliferation and
intersections of diverse semiotic practices, it has become a necessity for us to address
challenges our students are facing and the opportunities that such developments have
created both for us as teachers and our students. While it is important to be cognizant of
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and learn from students’ composing practices within and outside the academy, especially
in terms of how they, as what Steven Fraiberg calls knotworkers participating in a variety
of networks, produce texts outside the academy and how that affects their
writing/composition within, it is equally necessary to see how such practices are
transforming or/and perpetuating problematic assumptions about language relations and
its relation to other semiotic modes. In examining such composing practices, we should
resist the temptation to separate languages from other semiotic practices as they are part
of the same material-social ecology and are inextricably linked with each other.
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